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ABSTRACT 
State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 
 
Coty J. Martin 
 
What are the most influential factors to the rise of terrorist groups in the developing world? From 
Nigeria to Indonesia, various groups have conducted devastating attacks, against fellow citizens 
and international visitors. Hendrix and Young (2014) find military capacity may encourage the 
use of terrorism while bureaucratic measures depress them. Further investigation into underlying 
catalysts for mobilization is required before we can explain the rise in activity of terrorist 
organizations in these regions. I expect as measures of military capacity increase that terrorism 
increases while increases in administrative capacity reduce terrorist activity. I also expect 
indirect factors such as repressive activity by the state increases terrorism while corrupt and 
clientelistic behavior in the state has a more complex, suppressing effect on terrorist activity. To 
test these assumptions I first use a cross-national quantitative analysis to identify significant 
factors in the relationship between terrorism and state capacity in sixty-five states across Africa 
and Southeast Asia using several sources of data including the Global Terrorism Database. I then 
examine four of these significant factors, military capacity, administrative capacity, repression, 
and corruption in two case study chapters that consider policy changes made after the rise of 
terrorist activity in West Africa and Southeast Asia. The results are mixed, finding as states 
increase military and administrative capacity terrorist activity increases which suggests with 
advances in legal and military capacity in the state comes the potential for repressive tactics and 























Completing a PhD is a monumental task and not possible without the support of family, great 
friends and colleagues, and of course my mentor and former advisors. First I thank my parents, 
Tina Martin and Paul Colegrove for always being there for me as I navigated this process. My 
graduate student colleagues, particularly Brian Fitzpatrick and Kyle Rogers, were important 
networks of support both for consultation on the early stages of my dissertation and as friends as 
well. I also would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Erik Herron, Mason 
Moseley, Robert Duval, and Danielle Davidov, for their service and feedback on the final 
product. Separately, I cannot see how anyone could complete a PhD without a compassionate 
and dedicated chair and advisor so special thanks to my friend and mentor Christina Fattore. I 
would also like to thank Sylvie Henning, my advisor at East Carolina University, for 
encouraging me to pursue my doctorate after completing my first Master’s degree as well as 
Leanne Powner for her assistance as a dissertation coach for several of the later chapters. I would 
also be remiss if I did not acknowledge the late Patricia Cunningham III, the PhDiva, who 
advised me long after her time as my undergraduate advisor at Ohio State ended and as a close 
friend whom I dearly miss. Without a late night three hour conversation with her in my first 
semester at WVU, when I was at my lowest and ready to quit, I would not be submitting this 
dissertation. My last acknowledgements go to my supportive colleagues and students at West 






Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 The Puzzle of Terrorism in the Developing World………………...…………………1 
Chapter 2 A Literature Review of the Relationship between Terrorism and State Capacity……8 
 Defining Terrorism and the Rise of Terrorist Organizations…………….………………8 
  Legal Debates on Defining Terrorism……………………………………………9 
  Scholarly Debates on Defining Terrorism……………..………………………..12 
 The Capacity of the State to Combat Terrorism in the Developing World……….…….26 
  Regime Type and Stability………………..…………………………………….27 
Territory and Population..……………………...……………………………….28 
The Military Capacity of the State…………………………...…………………29 
The Bureaucratic or Distributive Capacity of the State…………………..…….30 
  Clientelism, Population Density, and Territorial Control…………………...….31 
 Terrorism in the Developing World…………….………………………………………36 
  A Brief Geographical Outline of the Regions……………………………..........36 
  Secularism and Democracy in the Developing World……………….…………41 
  Political Violence and Ideological Extremism in the Developing World………46 
 Conclusion…..……………………………………………………………………..……55 
Chapter 3 A Theory of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World…………….…57 
 Interviews with Analysts and Policymakers…………………………………………….57 
  Local vs. International Factors…………..………………………………………61 
  Bureaucracy, Corruption, and Infrastructure…………...………………………..65 
  Military and Security Apparatus…………………………………………………68 
  Territory and Density……………………………………………………………71 
 Terrorism and State Capacity in the Developing World: Theory and Hypotheses……...72 
 Direct Factors of State Capacity: Military and Security……...…………………………73 
 Direct Factors of State Capacity: Administration and Bureaucracy…….….……………74 
 Indirect Factors of State Capacity: Repression and Marginalization…..…….…………..76 
 Indirect Factors of State Capacity: Corruption and Control…….....…………………….78 
 A Note on State Capacity, Terrorism, and the Potential for Endogeneity……………….80 
  Terrorism, Military Capacity, and Endogeneity…………………………………81 
  Terrorism, Administrative Capacity, and Endogeneity…...……………………..82 
 Accounting for Theoretical Endogeneity Concerns……………………………………...83 
Chapter 4 Cross-National Analysis of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World..88 
 Research Design for Cross-National Analysis……………..…………………………….89 
  Structural Capacity Factors: Military & Administrative Capacity........................94 
  State Behavior Factors: Democracy, Control, & Corruption…………………….97 
  Controls…………………………..……………………………………..………..99 
 Results of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World………………....….100 
 Capacity and the State in Summary………………………………….………..………..106 
 A Note on State Capacity, Terrorism, and Endogeneity………………………………..109 
 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................111 
 Figures 4.15-4.29 Coefficient Plots for Two-Year Lags.................................................114 
Chapter 5 The Case of Boko Haram and State Capacity in the Lake Chad Region……….…..121 
 Introduction......................................................................................................................121 
 West Africa: The Rise of Boko haram in the Lake Chad Region....................................123 




  Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region.....................................................................126 
  Boko Haram.........................................................................................................128 
  Beyond Boko Haram............................................................................................132 
 Capacity in the Lake Chad Region..................................................................................135 
  Bureaucratic Measures against Terrorism...........................................................136 
  Semi-Formal Bureaucratic Measures: Working With Religious Leaders...........144 
  Military Capacity Measures against Terrorism...................................................146 
  Semi-Formal Measures: Vigilance Committees..................................................151 
  Regional Efforts at Building Capacity.................................................................155 
 Findings and Continuing Weaknesses in Capacity..........................................................159 
 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................162 
Chapter 6 Jemaah Islamiyah and State Capacity in Southeast Asia’s Island States……….......164 
 Introduction......................................................................................................................164 
 Southeast Asia: Terrorism and Capacity in Pacific Island States....................................166 
  Islands, Archipelagos, and Terrorism in the Pacific............................................166 
  Terrorism in the Southeast Asian Region............................................................170 
  Jemaah Islamiyah.................................................................................................172 
  Beyond Jemaah Islamiyah...................................................................................175 
 Capacity in Southeast Asia..............................................................................................180 
  Bureaucratic Measures against Terrorism...........................................................181 
  Semi-Formal Bureaucratic Measures...................................................................194 
  Military Capacity Measures against Terrorism....................................................200 
  Regional Efforts at Building Capacity.................................................................208 
 Findings and Continuing Weaknesses in Capacity..........................................................210 
 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................215 
Chapter 7 Conclusion: Findings and Future Avenues of Research.............................................217 
 Summary and Comparison of Findings between Regions...............................................218 
 General Findings, Limitations, and Future Research.......................................................223 
Appendix A Questions for Interviews..........................................................................................227 
Appendix B Full Regression Tables (with 1 Year Lag)…...…………………………………...228 
Appendix C Full Regression tables (with 2 Year Lag)…………………………………………240 











Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Terrorism in the Developing World 
 In recent decades devastating terrorist attacks have occurred from Nigeria to Indonesia 
with several organizations having established footholds in several locations. There are several 
theoretical explanations for why terrorism occurs in places as diverse as the densely populated 
cities of North Africa, the desert and jungle regions of the Saharan and Sub-Saharan countries, 
and the island nation-states of Southeast Asia. Why are there numerous terrorist incidents along 
the Lake Chad border region in small villages whereas incidents in the city-state of Singapore are 
few and far between? Why have some groups or movements carried out hundreds or thousands 
of attacks in a given year while comparable groups or movements have proven less active? 
In short, this dissertation examines what factors are most influential to the rise of terrorist 
groups carrying out attacks in the developing world. The proposed answer is to consider the 
state’s capacity to counter extremist groups using terrorism to try to achieve their political or 
ideological goals. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, rates of economic development 
and regime type offer no clear pattern to explain the phenomenon. Nor do individual-level 
understandings of ideological motivations among those that become terrorists. Instead, 
considering how effective the state is at carrying out its duties as an organized body to respond to 
the needs of a population offers us an alternative explanation for why terrorist organizations 
thrive in certain countries and not in others.  
Variations in state capacity can increase or decrease the potential for extremist 
organizations to implement terrorist activity. In terms of the capacity of the state, I refer to the 
opportunity for a non-state actor such as Boko Haram or Jemaah Islamiyah to rise up against the 
state. This opportunity comes from the state’s ability to maintain its influence throughout its 




found to initiate more terrorist activity while increased administrative capacity has been found to 
decrease the number of terrorist attacks (Hendrix & Young 2014). When openings develop 
bureaucratically, through the rule of law for example, groups can challenge the state’s authority 
(Choi 2010). At the same time however, when the state’s capacity increases in terms of both 
military and administrative capacity states are better able to target pockets of dissent. In turn, this 
in fact may make groups more prone to carry out terrorist attacks against the state. Other indirect 
factors must be considered as well. Repressive tactics used by more authoritarian states or those 
transitioning to democratic regimes and clientelistic practices within the state’s institutions that 
creates discontent among the citizens of the state can likely impact terrorist activity as well.  
 To better understand terrorism as a tactic for achieving political objectives requires a 
better understanding of the power dynamics between the state and terrorist organizations and 
when a tipping point is reached. This point occurs when organizations are able to challenge the 
state through terrorism and at least believe that the state is vulnerable in some manner. 
Francisco’s (1995) predator-prey model can serve as an apt analogy when we consider how to 
observe this tipping point. As Francisco notes in his inverted-U hypothesis, strong 
discouragement of protest is the result of coercion by the state, including repressive reactions to 
public protests. Meanwhile, strong encouragement of coercion follows protest behavior. 
However, extremely harsh forms of coercion by the state can also accelerate protest. In short, 
how those dissatisfied with some aspect of their community react to the influence of the state is 
at the crux of finding when individuals are willing to risk personal harm to take up a cause 
against an authority figure.  
 A similar relationship would seem to exist when we consider the interaction of terrorist 




counter antagonistic groups if this predator-prey relationship can be flipped. The state itself, if 
incapable of deterring dissent and political violence, may fall victim to a particular terrorist 
movement or organization that finds itself at a strategic advantage. This advantage may be 
limited to a particular geographic territory or a broader region where non-state actors can find an 
opportunity to operate and target the state at its weakest points.  
Using the case of Boko Haram as an example to illustrate this analogy, early iterations of 











political violence. The group focused its operations specifically in the northeastern region of the 
country and succeeded at carrying out thousands of attacks over several years in an area of the 
country the state has been yet able to fully recapture in a military or bureaucratic sense, as well 
as in bordering regions of other states. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the distribution of terrorist 
attacks by Boko Haram across Nigeria and surrounding states. A glance at the map shows a 
concentration of attacks far from the capital and not concentrated in any particular city. 




Yet in contrast a group such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia existed several 
years prior to the first activities of Boko Haram. While JI existed prior to the September 11th 
attacks, the group’s notoriety as a violent terrorist movement comes afterwards first with the 
2002 bombing of a nightclub on the island of Bali. Yet as depicted in Figure 1.2 there have been 
comparatively fewer terrorist attacks attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah from 2000 to 2015. JI 
overall is responsible for far less attacks than groups in Southeast Asia and beyond such as Boko 
Haram in the Lake Chad region despite a longer period of existence as a terrorist organization 
and in far less of a geographically-concentrated area than Boko Haram. In short, why the 
variation in the level of activity?  
Returning to the central questions of this dissertation, why has terrorism so far been more 
prevalent in some states but less so in other countries in the developing world? A clear consensus 
on the primary factors driving terrorist organizations does not exist amongst scholars. I also find 
through interviews with those in the policy and think tank communities that no consensus on the 
driving factors for terrorism in the developing world exists in that community either. Therefore, 




with consideration of both what has been written previously on terrorism as well as the factors 
noted by policymakers and other experts, my theoretical focus on explaining terrorist activity in 
the developing world centers on the concept of state capacity. The strength or weakness of state 
capacity may increase or decrease the potential for extremist organizations to implement terrorist 
activity. Relating back to the predator-prey analogy, the state’s weaknesses can lead to a reversal 
in the relationship, potentially at the sub-state level, where the state becomes the prey to an 
active terrorist organization. This leads to the growth of terrorist movements that challenge the 
state’s authority to rule and the ability to recruit members not satisfied with the status quo in 
their lives in the state.  
Over the next several chapters I provide a discussion of the relationship between state 
capacity and terrorism in the developing world. Chapter Two provides a look at the status of the 
literature on terrorism and state capacity. I look first at the debates regarding how the legal and 
scholarly communities define terrorism and distinguish it from other forms of political violence. 
I then review the literature on several elements of the capacity of the state including regime type, 
territorial issues, military capacity, and administrative capacity. I conclude the chapter with a 
brief discussion of the different regions of the developing world that will be analyzed in this 
dissertation and discuss how the modern wave of terrorism has affected Sub-Saharan Africa, 
North Africa, and Southeast Asia.  
Chapter Three provides an in-depth discussion of what those in the policy community 
deem as the most critical elements of how to explain the rise of terrorism in the developing 
world. I conducted these interviews with various members of the policy community and think 
tanks that work on the issues related to counterterrorism both in the US and around the world. I 




activity and the growth of terrorist organizations are affected by the capacity of the state. I also 
list and discuss hypotheses regarding the capacity of the state and weaknesses in capacity 
including territorial control and clientelism. Finally, this chapter concludes with a general 
overview of the research design that will be used to test my theoretical assumptions and the 
potential concerns regarding endogeneity between terrorism and state capacity.  
Chapter Four takes a broad look at the regions considered in this dissertation and offers a 
cross-national analysis of terrorism in the developing world between 1985 and 2012 through 
zero-inflated negative binomial analysis to test the relationships between several aspects of state 
capacity and the number of terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan, North African, and Southeast Asian 
nation-states. I find that military capacity as well as repression are strong explanatory factors for 
increases in terrorist activity and consistently lead to higher rates of terrorism as states engage in 
increased military spending and repressive behaviors against their citizens, consistent with 
existing literature. In contrast the results of the cross-national analysis in Chapter Four find some 
support for the argument that while the quality of bureaucracy and administration in the state 
affects terrorism, the relationship is not entirely in line with the theory presented in Chapter 
Three and requires further consideration in the next chapters. Other measures such as a proxy for 
infrastructural development in the state and the proxy for clientelism via corruption do show 
consistent negative relationships with the number of terrorist attacks in the developing world.  
In Chapters Five and Six I delve deeper into several of the significant relationships 
identified in the cross-national results on state capacity and terrorism presented in Chapter Four. 
In particular I focus on four of these factors: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military 
capacity, repression, and clientelism. Chapter Five and Chapter Six consider two of the regions 




focus on the aforementioned case of Boko Haram and its impact on four states in the West Sub-
Saharan African region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. All four are concentrated around 
the Lake Chad region as is a majority of the activity of Boko Haram which in the last several 
years transcended international borders in its attacks on civilians and those that represent the 
states in the region. I find all four states, in response to the rise of Boko Haram as a local and 
then regional threat to security, adopt new legal administrative and military re-organization 
policies in their efforts to respond to existing weaknesses in state capacity in the region.  
I then move on to consider the same group of factors in four geographically-concentrated 
states in Southeast Asia impacted by the other aforementioned case, Jemaah Islamiyah. In 
Chapter Six I follow a similar pattern of analysis and consider the case of Jemaah Islamiyah, 
Abu Sayyaf, and others affecting four geographically-concentrated states in the region: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. All four of these nation-states are situated 
across multiple islands and experience far different challenges with state capacity in terms of 
terrorists traveling between territories. Both chapters consider the period when each respective 
group of states began to face the challenge of countering terrorist movements in their territory 
and how each state responded to improve administrative and military capacity as well as the 
capacity-compromising issues of repression, clientelism, and corruption. I offer a brief 
discussion of the similarities and differences between the two regions and my overall findings in 









Chapter 2: A Literature Review of the Relationship between Terrorism and State Capacity 
The literature on the study of terrorism is both broad in its discussion of the phenomenon 
both as a form of political violence as well as a tactic implemented by non-state actors to achieve 
their goals. The following chapter will first discuss the issues with defining what specifically 
falls into the realm of terrorism. Scholars as well as legal practitioners have long debated the 
concept. Therefore, the initial section begins with variations in defining terrorism across the 
international spectrum. The discussion will then turn to the scholarly debate, highlighting the 
conceptual issues that have been raised regarding three particular elements of how we can 
consider terrorism as a phenomenon: targets of the acts, tactics used, and the motivations and 
goals behind terrorism.  
The second section will provide an in depth look at how the capacity of the state, in other 
words the state’s ability to govern its territory and counter challenges to its authority. I first 
discuss how regimes and territorial issues factor into the success or failure of terrorist 
movements. This section is followed by discussion of literature regarding military and 
administrative capacity of the state and how clientelism within the state and repressive tactics by 
the state impacts terrorist movements. The third and final section will delve into the regions of 
interest in this dissertation. Brief discussions of the literature regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, 
North Africa, and Southeast Asia provide insight into the case selection for later chapters.  
Defining Terrorism and the Rise of Terrorist Organizations 
Before any discussion of how concepts of the capacity of the state impacts the rise of 
terrorist organizations, the use of terrorist tactics against the state and its population, and how 
states use their resources to counter threats from within its territory, we must first begin with 




conceptualized in the eighteenth century, it was used to describe violent behavior by the state or, 
as Nacos (2012) frames it, terrorism was meant to describe “political violence ‘from above’ as 
exercised during the Reign of Terrorism in the wake of the French Revolution, when terrorism 
meant the mass guillotining of the aristocracy and other real or perceived enemies of the state” 
(p. 19). Not until a century later was the term began used to describe violent actions taken by 
those not in power against those that are in control of a state or government, expanding the 
definition to include violence ‘from below.’  
By the early twentieth century anarchists utilizing bombings and assassinations of 
political leaders across the world led to the term taking on an anti-state connotation. No longer 
was terrorism associated with those in power, but instead associated with those out of power 
trying to take it from the state. Usage today still varies on several factors. A debate continues 
regarding whether a small group of terrorists that grows into a challenger to the state is then a 
guerilla or revolutionary movement. Groups such as the IRA of the twentieth century and ISIS in 
the twenty-first come to mind. Therefore, to understand how power dynamics between the state 
and the discontent results in terrorism, we must define what is and is not considered terrorism in 
the contemporary sense. 
Legal Debates on Defining Terrorism  
Even prior to the September 11th attacks a debate over defining terrorism had developed. 
The earliest efforts at an international level to provide a working definition of terrorism occurred 
in the era between world wars. Written in 1937, the following definition established under the 
League of Nations Convention (Nacos 2012, p. 25) describes: 
“[a]ll criminal acts directed against a state and intended or 
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular 





It is worth noting here that, as will be discussed in later sections, the League definition does not 
limit terrorism to politically-motivated acts of violence. While other efforts at defining the 
practice occurred later in the twentieth century such as the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997, the next significant definition of terrorism was not 
established at an international level until 1999 through a UN resolution that defines terrorism as: 
“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in 
the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for 
political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever 
the considerations of a political, philosophical, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”  
 
The most significant change from the League and UN definitions is the specificity of terrorism 
being used as an action to achieve politically racially, or religiously-motivated goals. In 2005 the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was unanimously 
passed by the General Assembly and is the last treaty regarding terrorism to be ratified by the 
membership of the UN.  
Within the United States a debate between agencies also existed, even in the years after 
the 9/11 attacks and the “Global War on Terror” initiated by the Bush administration. To 
illustrate this debate, we can turn to the definitions of terrorism provided by several US and 
international organizations that work to counter the activities of terrorist organizations around the 
world. First, Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as:  
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.” 
 
Meanwhile, the Federal Bureau of Investigation also uses its own definition of the phenomenon:  
[Terrorism is] “the unlawful use of force or violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 





Both definitions contain more or less similar elements regarding the purpose and the target of 
terrorist acts but legal definitions of what constitutes terrorism vary in some cases from agency 
to agency and often from country to country.  
The Country Reports on Terrorism from the US Department of State also highlight 
variations across the world in their efforts to define and counter terrorism. In the case of Russia, 
its agencies do not share a single definition of what constitutes terrorism while France has a 
system of non-jury courts for terrorist acts and has a broad definition for terrorist offenses known 
as the “association of wrongdoers” offense. Malaysia’s most recent legal reform to laws 
regarding terrorism expands its definition to include support given to terrorist organizations and 
the use of social media to promote terrorism and terrorist organizations. In contrast, Nigeria’s 
2014 Law for the Fight against Terrorism has been criticized by some of the country’s political 
leaders for being too broad and potentially creating a slippery slope for using the law for political 
repression against opponents of those in power (BCCVE 2016).  
In short, such variation across the legal spectrum within and between states demonstrates 
the vagueness of the concept nearly two decades after the initiation of the “Global War on 
Terror.” The variation in defining terrorism as a phenomenon may have consequences for how 
states approach the issue of developing and adapting capacity to meet terrorist threats. Legal 
variance on the judicial systems that hear terrorist-related charges for example could lead to 
shorter trial periods or the consideration of charges not available to state or local courts such as 
the death penalty in some countries. Additionally, the rise of al-Qaeda’s incorporation of 
franchises across the developing world, the emergence of ISIS versus its current status, and 
cyberterrorism are fitting examples of the gray areas within this debate as well. Therefore, this 




considers these variations in definitions particularly in the case study chapters regarding 
terrorism in Sub-Saharan and North Africa as well as Southeast Asia.   
Scholarly Debates on Defining Terrorism  
One suggestion regarding the debate over defining terrorism is that an effort requires new 
approaches to the study of the phenomenon because there are more varieties of political violence 
being identified so new terms have been established for new varieties of terrorism (Laquer 
1999). The purpose of terrorism is one element. Any discussion of terrorist organizations 
carrying out acts of violence across the world requires consideration of the purpose behind these 
acts. A factor common to many but not all definitions of terrorism, both legal and scholarly, is 
political motivation (Hussain 1988; Hoffman 1998; Post 2007; Cox et al 2009; Enders et al 2011; 
Nacos 2012; Krause 2013; Crenshaw 1981, 2014).  
Three categorizations of terrorism have been established, with political terrorism being 
the first. Within this categorization are both religious and secular motivations for carrying out 
acts of terrorism. Criminal terrorism, the second, has no political motive and is more mercenary 
in nature. Finally, personal or pathological terrorism seeks to eliminate specific opponents, in 
some instances where elites are involved, utilizing the state and its coercive forces (Hussain 
1988; Post 2007). There is some ambiguity between these three categorizations however. In 
some instances personal goals could logically be sought under the auspices of political 
motivations for example. The general focus in this dissertation though will be on those cases that 
are politically driven and both of a secular or religious nature.  
Targets 
As noted as well in the legalistic definitions, terrorism for political purposes is carried out 




makes up that particular community. The act of terrorism seeks to systemically induce fear and 
anxiety or create sympathy amongst the population to influence the behavior and actions of the 
government (Crenshaw 1981, 2014; Nacos 2012).  Political terrorism is often symbolic in nature 
and the victims of terrorist attacks represent the larger audience the group seeks to affect (Post 
2007; Crenshaw 2014). From attacks on the financial and military symbols of the US in 2001 to 
the 2017 incident outside of Parliament in London, terrorist groups continue to utilize symbolic 
structures to convey their positions.  
This practice is certainly not a twenty-first century development when one considers 
attacks by other organizations. Examples include the IRA bombings in London in the 1970s and 
1980s, Puerto Rican nationalists attacking the US Capitol building in 1954, and the bombing of 
the US Capitol by the Weather Underground in 1971. There are also numerous examples of less 
prestigious but still symbolic attacks on abortion clinics and more recently night clubs and 
university campuses as well. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia 
there are numerous examples of shopping malls, schools, and embassies being targeted as more 
generalized symbols of the ideals terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and al-Qaeda claim to be 
against in society.   
Beyond the symbolism of the physical target, there is also a discussion about the target in 
terms of civilians and noncombatants versus representatives of the authority in a state. While 
political elites and the media may paint a broad picture on what should and should not be 
considered terrorism when an act of violence occurs, there has been some discussion on 
differentiating between terrorism and insurgency based on whom an attack targets. One position 
that has been taken is that terrorism is “any premeditated violent act perpetrated against civilian 




heinous or unconventional the act, these acts must be classified as something other than 
terrorism,” (Cox et al 2009, p. 21-22) such as insurgency or guerilla warfare. 
Others have also suggested that acts of politically-motivated violence can only be 
categorized as terrorism if they are against civilian noncombatants (Post 2007; Enders et al 2011; 
Nacos 2012). Yet this strict distinction is not as clear cut as it may sound. The September 11th 
attacks as well as more recent attacks by Boko Haram across northeast Nigeria, in which 
terrorists targeted civilian, military, and political targets are notable examples of this definitional 
issue. Terrorism, as described by Crenshaw (1981) is a “direct attack on the regime aimed at the 
insecurity and demoralization of government officials, independent of any impact on public 
opinion” (p. 387). Some have also suggested that experts have mistakenly argued terrorism and 
guerilla warfare are not related when in fact political terrorism is a tactic in the strategies of 
guerilla warfare (Hussain 1988). In short, while it may be efficient to distinguish between the 
targets of terrorism and insurgency, these efforts can also create other difficulties as both can be 
considered as affecting the state as the prey, in the predator-prey analogy.  
Other issues in defining terrorism include differentiating between domestic and 
international terrorism as well as non-state actors versus state-sponsored terrorism. The FBI’s 
working definition for domestic terrorism notes that attacks that occur in the US or its territories 
are done “without foreign direction” whereas international terrorism are acts that “transcend 
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they are 
intended to intimidate, or the locale in which perpetrators operate” (Nacos 2012, p. 21). Sageman 
(2004) argues that distinguishing between the domestic and the international in sampling is 





At the same time, scholars have also highlighted the difference between terrorist 
organizations that function in cooperation with the state versus those that are seeking to bring 
radical change to the existing regime. Maogato (2003) notes that, like terrorism, there is no 
universal definition for state-sponsored terrorism. State sponsorship of terrorism can include a 
state directly supporting terror attacks or indirectly supporting groups through training, 
financing, and other forms of support such as tolerating a terrorist group acting within its 
territory. One such example is the Indian government’s support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in the 1970s and 1980s. The Indian government sought to indirectly influence 
events in Sri Lanka while denying involvement in the violence by the Tamils to gain 
independence (Byman & Kreps 2010). In this sense, the state is acting as a predator indirectly 
against another state, via a terrorist organization.  
State-sponsorship of terrorism has been on the decline however. The phenomenon of 
states supporting terrorist organizations peaked in the 1970s and 1980s but has rapidly declined 
since 2001 (Collins 2014). A more recent example where state-sponsored terrorism still occurs is 
with Hezbollah. The organization has become a well-trained and effective organization with 
support from Iran as well as Syria in their efforts to undermine countries such as Israel without 
becoming directly involved (Levitt 2007; Norton 2014). In short, terrorist organizations can exist 
as domestic-level movements or transnational threats to multiple states and may also have the 
support of a state or be acting alone in achieving its own political objectives.  
Tactics  
 In addition to the debate over the targets of terrorism, scholars have long discussed the 
tactics that such groups employ to achieve their stated goals. While Norris et al (2003) list 




are not used by others for example. In general, scholars have identified several categories of 
tactics used by terrorist organizations: 
 Bombings 
 Suicide Bombings 
 Assassinations  
 Armed Attacks/Assaults 
 Unarmed Assaults  
 Missile Attacks 
 Hijackings 
 Kidnappings/Hostage Taking  
 Facility/Infrastructure Attacks 
 Mass Destruction  
Of these categories, Nacos (2012) notes that bombings are by far the most often used terrorist 
tactic with suicide bombings a close second (p. 141). Such attacks she argues are most common 
in territories where non-state actors have gained some control and where police or security forces 
have minimal control or have some support amongst the population. Suicide bombings are also 
common and while there is some evidence that religious terrorists undertake suicide attacks with 
the belief that they will be rewarded in the afterlife (Nacos 2012), others have argued that instead 
suicide bombing as are used for more strategic reasons.  Instead of being a tactic used solely by 
religiously-motivated individuals, it is used as an inexpensive and effective tactic that is less 
complicated than other sorts of operations and receive significant media coverage (Hoffman 
2003) and has been found to actually achieve political gains (Pape 2003).  
Assassinations, as previously noted, has long been a tactic utilized by terrorist groups 
dating back to the nineteenth century. The method is typically used to kill one or more prominent 
individuals that are symbolic in some way to the cause and are differentiated from randomized 
attacks on civilians (START 2016). The risk associated with assassinations is higher in 
comparison to other tactics. For example, “shooting a target from close range is riskier” and in 




stop the Middle East Peace process[, he was] immediately subdued and arrested by security 
forces” (Nacos 2012, p. 143).  
Terrorist tactics such as bombings, suicide bombings, and assassinations are typically 
short, one-off events whereas hijackings and armed assaults can be extended events.  Armed 
assaults are categorized as attacks with the intention of physical harm via firearms, incendiary 
devices, or sharp instruments whereas unarmed assaults involve fists, rocks, or other less-than-
lethal weapons (START 2016). Similarly to straight-forward assaults, hijackings involve the 
targeting of civilians but may not involve physical arm but still involve the use of weapons. 
Beginning in the 1960s, plane hijackings became a common tactic of terrorist groups but 
“whatever the particular circumstances, only sophisticated groups can pull off a skyjacking with 
the prospect of success because this tactic demands patience on the art of the operatives and an 
ability to handle a duration operation.” (Miller and Russell 1979 in Nacos 2012 p. 157).  
Motivating Factors and Goals 
While a clear and concise understanding of terrorism in terms of who is targeted and the 
tactics used to carry out attacks has been explained, the underlying motivations and goals of why 
individuals and groups turn to terrorism must also be addressed. Scholars typically categorize the 
goals of terrorist organizations as short-term and long-term. Norris et al (2003) describe the 
immediate or short-term goals of groups as spreading anxiety and fear among the population, 
eliminating as well as destroying symbolic targets. Long-term goals, typically the primary 
motivation for a movement or group, includes publicizing issues that they are interested in, airing 
grievances to influence the government and policy agendas, gain concessions, mobilize support 




though terrorism is also used at times to just shock and demoralize the enemy or enemies of the 
group (p. 8).  
The origins of the political goals of terrorist organizations in democratic societies have 
their roots in larger disputes between actors and reflect the political beliefs of larger segments of 
society than just the terrorist organization itself (Gurr 1998). Gurr describes two routes or paths 
through which groups come to accept extreme action or violence as the most viable option. 
However, these two routes also reflect the goal formation of terrorist groups themselves. First, 
Gurr defines radicalization as a process in which the group is mobilized behind a political goal 
but has not made progress toward its achievement through non-violent forms of activism.  
The Front de Liberation du Quebec for example formed after French-Canadian separatists 
became discontent with progress of achieving policy change among policymakers in Ottawa. 
After a decade or so of non-violent action, the group began carrying out bombings against 
infrastructure targets in the 1960s. Similarly, a sect of the membership of the group Students for 
a Democratic Society in the 1960s broke off after the US increased its involvement in Vietnam 
and soon formed what became known as the Weather Underground. They conducted a campaign 
of attacks and bombings over a four year period. Gurr uses these two cases to illustrate how 
larger movements had subsets of their membership form into violent terrorist organizations still 
attempting to achieve the same goals.  
The other route that Gurr outlines is reactionary formation of groups. Members of 
regional or communal groups resort to terrorism in response to threats of social change or 
intervention in society by the state. While radicalization is about future goals, Gurr argues 
reactionary groups are about the defense of what the group perceives is a threat to their status in 




carried out acts of coercion and violence against supporters of Reconstruction. Later in the 
twentieth century the group’s activity increased during the Civil Rights era (p. 89) and again 
during the Obama and Trump administrations including the events at Charlottesville, Virginia in 
2017. Some groups are also representative of specific regional minorities. German-speaking 
Italians of the Alto Adige in northern Italy in the 1960s and the long-active but recently 
dispersed Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain demonstrate this type of groups. 
 Scholars have also debated the success rate of groups achieving their short- and long-
term political goals using terrorism. Jenkins (2003) suggests that several movements have 
transitioned from terrorist organizations to respected political entities. The African National 
Congress used terrorist actions at points in its struggle against Apartheid South Africa but 
became the governing party in 1993. The IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, has largely been 
accepted into the political structure of Northern Ireland with former leaders of the paramilitary 
wing such as Gerry Adams playing prominent roles in Parliament. Pape (2005) also points out 
that groups using campaigns of suicide terrorism that seek to expel foreign occupiers do so 
because others that have utilized this approach have succeeded as well. In short, the rate of 
success by some groups achieving “their ultimate goals in the past continues to encourage 
contemporary terrorists’ beliefs that they, too, may become exceptions to the rule” (Nacos 2012, 
p. 138).  
 Others disagree. Abrahams (2006; 2007; 2012), as summarized by Crenshaw (2014), 
argues that terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving political objectives and are not an effective 
form of coercion because, under pressure, governments targeted by terrorist organizations harden 
their positions and are less likely to accept the demands of such groups (p. 559). Krause (2013) 




suggesting that we need to not assume that groups adopt terrorism exclusively to influence 
policymakers. To summarize, terrorism does not work unless the target responds how the 
terrorists want them to respond (Fromkin 1975).  
Ideological Terrorism 
While several of preceding examples have highlighted nationalist or institutional goals, 
Kellen (1998) argues that ideological terrorism must be distinguished from terrorism of the 
nationalist sort. Terrorist organizations in the 1980s such as the Army of God and The Covenant, 
The Sword, and The Arm of the Lord in the United States were motivated by their interpretation 
of Christianity to prepare for and carry out attacks against targets such as abortion clinics. Better 
known today are militant Islamist groups with extremist ideological interpretations of the Qu’ran 
that have carried out attacks in many of countries of the developing world as well as in the US 
and Europe. One approach to understanding this rise of ideological extremist-motivated terrorism 
examines the phenomenon on an international level that evolved in waves of terrorist violence 
deeply rooted in modern cultural shifts. Each wave consists of a period of terrorist activity that is 
characterized by expansion and contraction phases, is “international in character,” with activity 
occurring in several countries and shares a common ideological perspective or philosophical goal 
(Rapoport 2004).  
Rapoport defines the first wave as the ‘Anarchist Wave’ at the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Anarchists and social revolutionaries such as Karl 
Heintzen and John Most in Germany and the US and Sergey Nechaev, Nikolai Morozov, and 
Pyotr Kropotkin in Russia justified the practice of terrorism in their philosophical writings to 
allow for revolution to occur. Political assassinations were carried out in Russia, France, Spain, 




Russia, French President Sadi Carnot, King Umberto of Italy, and American Presidents James 
Garfield and William McKinley were notable casualties of this particular wave of terrorism. 
Interestingly in today’s context, Nacos (2012) notes that “sometimes, anarchists aborted their 
assassination plans because they did not want to harm innocent bystanders” (p. 38).  
The second wave grew out of the anti-colonial movement after World War II. As 
European powers, devastated by the war, began to shed overseas territories in light of terrorist 
movements in Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria as well as international pressure to end 
colonial rule (Rapoport 2004). Rapoport also notes this particular wave was most identifiable in 
territories where local political problems made total withdraw difficult for colonial powers. 
Lastly, groups of this era adopted new language to make their existence seem more legitimate as 
the word terrorist took on an increasingly negative stereotype. Menachem Begin who led the 
Irgun, a Jewish paramilitary organization that existed during the British mandate-era of Palestine 
(and later was absorbed into the Israeli military) began to refer to his people as ‘freedom 
fighters’ struggling against an oppressor (p. 54). The language has since been adopted by 
numerous terrorist organizations with both nationalist and ideology-driven goals.  
By the time of the US entrance into the conflict in Vietnam a third wave had begun to 
develop. According to Rapoport, in this wave groups saw the US struggle to combat the Viet 
Cong despite technological and military superiority as an inspiration that non-state actors could 
continue to fight against larger and better-funded state apparatuses. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization served as inspiration after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 (p. 58). Groups in 
this wave, such as the West German Red Army Faction, the Weather Underground in the US, 
and the Italian Red Brigades, with support from the Soviet state, rose to challenge the existing 




The current wave is based in extremist ideological interpretations of major religions and 
at the heart of modern terrorism, with its origins in the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and tensions in the Middle East. Christian-motivated terrorist groups 
are a minor part of this wave as well with the “Christian Identity” movement forming rural 
communes waiting for the Second Coming and a racial war (p. 62). Jewish terrorists carrying out 
assassination campaigns in Palestine and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin and the Buddhist-Hindu-Christian inspired Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo also 
characterize this wave.  
Other groups have also grown in the US context since the beginning of the modern wave. 
Nacos notes that in the wake of the election of President Barack Obama, the Aryan Nations 
Revival proclaimed “to admire ‘the Islamic Jihad with a jealousy, they enforce the rules of Islam 
without question and without hesitation, they have become examples of righteousness to Allah, 
the deity of the Koran,” suggesting the ethno-religious movement may someday mimic their 
militant Islamist counterparts. While Rapoport’s prediction is that this wave would end by 2025, 
there is no evidence that this will be the case.  
Extremist ideological groups using religious texts as a foundation have also been found to 
have a close relationship with nationalism. When shared feelings of fundamentalism and 
nationalism become strong enough there is a higher proclivity to use violence because such 
movements often have to function through clandestine organization, often employing terrorism, 
to overturn the dominant national and religious structures (Armstrong 1997). Religion in general 
can serve as an independent cultural force in society and has the ability, through activist groups, 
to challenge other cultural or political powers such as the secular systems of democracy, 




an ‘anchor’ to those experiencing societal tensions between secularist societies and religious rule 
(Juergensmeyer 2003). When a vacuum develops because of political instability, Juergensmeyer 
suggests the void is filled with extremist militants creating moral order through terror.  
Organization 
 Finally in defining and discussing what makes terrorism a unique phenomenon, a look at 
how terrorist organizations are structured provides us with an understanding of how such 
movements are differentiated from rebel groups or criminal organizations. A caveat here is that 
there are admittedly gray areas. There are certain cases where terrorism and other forms of 
political violence overlap. The Southeast Asian terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf at one point fit 
the terrorist organization category well but morphed into a predominantly criminal organization 
focused on kidnapping individuals for ransom purposes only and was condemned by other 
terrorist organizations (Sageman 2004, p. 44). Organizations such as ISIS originated as a terrorist 
offshoot but became a quasi-state actor ruling over a territory whereas Boko Haram’s origins lie 
in an initially peaceful anti-Western movement that turned violent over time.  
 As Nacos (2012) notes, terrorist organizations until the 1990s were structured 
hierarchically with one leader or a small group that were at the top of a pyramid of members that 
served as lieutenants and rank-and-file members respectively. The IRA, Hezbollah, and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) are examples. However, in response to 
counterterrorist efforts and technological developments, this traditional structure has been in 
decline. Enders and Jindapon argue “although highly connected networks are best able to 
conduct logistically sophisticated attacks, they can be quite vulnerable to government 
infiltration” (p. 264). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) as well as Zanini (1999) point out the 




the information technology revolution of the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore as the cost of being 
interconnected increases in terms of operations and vulnerabilities and technological 
developments allow for alternative coordination, groups become ‘flatter’ as well (Enders and Su 
2007).  
 This ‘flattening’ of terrorist organizations has resulted in the rise of the cell-structure 
approach. Nacos provides a succinct summary of one of the first initiators of the cell approach 
through which everyone that is part of the ‘organization’ operates independently of a central 
command. Louis Beam, former Grand Dragon of the Texas Nights of the Ku Klux Klan led the 
organization in the 1980s but was an easy target of the federal government. He soon left for 
another white supremacist organization, the Aryan Brotherhood and implemented the cell 
concept. Beam noted that independent cells still needed some degree of information coordination 
but that small, “patriotic,” cells could act successfully against the state because they would be 
more difficult to track and maintain information on by authorities. As Nacos also notes, secular 
terrorist organizations as well as religious groups and single-issue movements all have utilized 
the cell approach prior to and after the promotion of the structure by Beam in the early 1990s. 
US militia movements as well as the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, al 
Qaeda, and ISIS have all implemented the structure (p. 161).  
 Leadership remains a vital component to terrorist organizations nonetheless. As Nacos 
argues, “without leaders taking up a cause, formulating a philosophy, and convincing others to 
embrace what they preach, there will be neither hierarchical movements nor independently 
operating cells” (p. 162). While decision-making and the planning of operations may be 
decentralized due to the lack of a hierarchical structure, centralized leaders, or a definable 




overarching philosophy might be personified in a figurehead or symbol of authority but in 
general power is decentralized (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999).  
As an example, two disparate groups that adopted cell structures in different eras 
succeeded for years using this approach.  First, the IRA eventually adapted a cell approach to 
specific operations after British intelligence officers infiltrated its ranks but still maintained a 
powerful hierarchy of leadership that overlapped with its political wing, Sinn Fein. Second, al 
Qaeda was able to continue to function for several years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, its 
main hub, in 2001 via affiliates in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Western Europe. Even prior to the 
loss of the Afghanistan hub, a cell of nine upper-middle-class expatriate students formed around 
Mohammad Belfas, a migrant from Southeast Asia, and planned the operational details of the 
9/11 attacks in the US (Sageman 2004). As Nacos summarizes, al Qaeda’s expansion “resembles 
the organizational model of those multinational corporations that grow through mergers and 
acquisitions in different parts of the world and leave most, if not all decision-making to the 
various national or regional affiliates” (p. 166). 
 In the latter example, a major game changer for the ‘flattening’ of terrorist organizations 
in the twenty-first century has been the internet. Not only have social network platforms allowed 
for terrorist organizations to facilitate connections between affiliates and cells around the world 
but it has also allowed organizations to wage informational warfare against the targets of their 
movements (Zanini 1999; Nacos 2012). Sageman (2003) notes that religious terrorist 
organizations have long been based on face-to-face interactions between recruits and insiders. 
These meetings still take place early on in order to transform an outsider recruit into a devoted 
member of the organization. Once established though, these groups can now use communication 




Merging with Others and Nodes. However, “too great a reliance on this new technology leaves 
the jihad vulnerable to sophisticated monitoring of communication and triangulation of its 
source” and the tracking of cell phone communications have been important to the capture or 
targeting of several prominent leaders including Osama bin Laden (p. 159-160).  
The Capacity of the State to Combat Terrorism in the Developing World  
In addition to understanding the debates on how we differentiate terrorism from other 
forms of political violence, how the state can counter extremist organizations through its military 
and bureaucracy must be considered as well. In terms of the capacity of the state, I refer to the 
opportunity argument of the state. I consider opportunity to be the ability of an internal entity to 
rise up against the state itself. A state has to be able to maintain its influence throughout the 
entirety of its territory, via military and bureaucratic resources controlled by the governing body. 
The following section highlights general elements of state capacity, though there is no consensus 
on which element matters most in the countering and deterrence of terrorism. 
Regime Type and Stability 
A great deal of literature has examined the relationship between democracy and 
terrorism. Whether states are purely democratic, authoritarian, or anocracies, accountability and 
restraint of the executive, regime stability, clientelism, and neopatrimonialism all have 
challenged democratization and affect the state’s capability to prevent terrorist activity or other 
threats to the regime (Bratton & van de Walle 1994; Chabal & Daloz 1993; Cox et al 2009; Tripp 
2010; Harbeson & Rothchld 2013; Chenoweth 2013). How a democracy can impose its will on 
the actions and behavior of individuals, the respect a state maintains for civil liberties and due 




participation in terrorism affect the level of activity and support for terrorist movements 
(Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw 1981; Foster, Braithwaite, & Sobek 2012; Schmid 1992; Tilly 2003). 
Others have argued that terrorism has been more prevalent in the world’s most stable 
democracies. Two competing perspectives then emerge. The first suggests democratic 
governments are more susceptible to violent conflict, which allows for the rise of long-
simmering ethnic and religious grievances. The second perspective suggests that democratic 
systems provide a framework for non-violent resolution of ethnic and religious issues (Eubank & 
Weinberg 2001, p.156). Terrorism in stable democracies, these authors suggest, may be the 
manifestation of the views of an excluded minority whose preferences are not included in the 
formation of public policy.  
Yet consideration of democratic rule has not had a uniform effect on terrorism, with some 
democracies being more prone to being victims of terrorism than others. Regime age has been 
found to be crucial to whether terrorism occurs in democracies along with military intervention 
or occupations (Eyerman 1998; Chenoweth 2013). Eyerman argues that young democracies who 
fall victim to transnational terrorism fail to convey their ability to defend their territory and 
institutions, that the newly available non-violent mechanisms to address grievances do not have 
instantaneous effects, and that new democracies have no ‘track record’ developed for democratic 
rule or peaceful political participation. Chenoweth similarly suggests that economically-poor 
democracies experiencing territorial conflict and transitioning democracies with inconsistent 
institutions suffer from domestic terrorism. Additionally, ‘regime immaturity’ has a significant 
effect. In contrast, dictatorships of any age are capable of reducing terrorist activity, suppressing 




2013). In sum, older democracies and authoritarian regimes fall victim to terrorism less on 
average than new or ‘immature’ democracies.  
In connection to regime stability, internal conflicts can exacerbate issues faced by 
transitioning states or ‘immature democracies,’ common through the developing regions of the 
world. Chenoweth suggests unresolved territorial disputes can increase terrorist violence against 
democracies but likely no more than authoritarian regimes that struggle to maintain control over 
separatist territories. Political instability in general has been argued as a likely factor contributing 
to cross-border terrorism (Goldstone et. al 2010). Among ‘failed’ states, those in the midst of war 
or experiencing political collapse are more likely to produce terror (Coggins 2015). Further, 
regimes facing multiple, violent political challengers have been found to be more susceptible to 
terrorism, though the endogenous effects of civil war has to be considered and must be isolated 
to best understand the relationship between internal conflict, state failure, and terrorism.  
Territory and Population 
First, the state’s ability to impose the rule of law upon those within its territory will 
ultimately be shaped by the size of that territory and the distribution of a state’s population. 
States whose political geographies make power consolidation difficult, ‘hinterland’ countries 
which do not have dispersed areas of high population density, and states where most of the 
power in the state can and is concentrated in one region, typically the state’s capital (Herbst 
2000, p. 145-159), all have different experiences in combatting terrorism. Low population 
densities can make governing a territory more expensive and difficult compared to Europe or 
other densely settled areas according to Herbst.  
As the recent successes of the Islamic State or ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Jemaah Islamiyah 




actors in areas where the presence of the state is less felt have found success in remaining a 
threat to the regime. Distance from the capital and the reach of the state has been found to both 
aid and inhibit the success of internal uprisings (Buhaug 2006; Buhaug & Red 2006; Raleigh & 
Hegre 2009) such as terrorist movements. Others have studied the effect of population density on 
conflicts and how this affects a state’s response to conflict (Tir & Diehl 1998; Straus 2006). 
Environmental factors such as terrain qualities, forest coverage, rurality of border zones, and 
rainfall variability have been studied for their effects on conflict (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala 2009; 
Hendrix & Salehyan 2012). 
Sociopolitical fault lines in non-democracies that attract a dissatisfied citizenry (Entelis 
2005; Pokalova 2012), uncontrolled internal stability or ‘stateless areas’ without much regime 
oversight (Kaplan 1994; King 2001; Piazza 2007) and inter-group competition for influence 
(Chenoweth 2010; Nemeth 2014) can lead to conflict such as the rise of terrorism in the 
developing world. Regime type aside, several have challenged the argument that state failure 
increases terrorism (Abrahms 2004; Bloom 2005; Horowitz 2010). Patrick (2011) finds 
transnational terrorist threats, such as al-Qaeda, emerge in wealthier and more stable, but not 
necessarily democratic, countries. Such groups then take advantage of conflict-ridden areas 
experiencing political vacuums which become victims to terrorism, but are not necessarily more 
likely to be originators of it (Coggins 2015).  
The Military Capacity of the State  
The state’s monopoly over the use of violence to deter or repel challenges to its authority 
is inherently challenged by terrorism (Weber 1919; Hendrix 2010). The state’s national military 
has a direct impact on the dimensions of conflict within a state (Mason, Weingarten & Fett 1999; 




military spending, clientelism, and inability to quickly reach and end internal conflicts or combat 
several at once can hinder the state’s military capacity (Henderson & Singer 2000; Fearon & 
Laitin 2003; Thomas 2014). Ethnic and religious divisions reflected in the state’s military 
apparatus can exacerbate conflicts with terrorist movements (Horowitz 2000; Blanton, Mason, 
Athow 2001).  
Indiscriminate violence by the state has been found to increase terrorist violence by some 
(Kalyvas 2006) but not others (Lyall 2009). A third argument suggests a reliance on superior 
military capability can drive terrorist groups toward alternative tactics (Gilli & Gilli 2014) 
including targeting civilians (Wood 2010), carrying out suicide bombings or using new 
combatants such as women who may not initially be considered as active combatants in terrorist 
organizations driven by terrorist movements (Sjoberg & Gentry 2007; Cunningham 2007; Alison 
2009; Parashar 2009; Stone & Patillo 2009; Gentry 2009; Bloom 2011). The Taliban for example 
have demonstrated how a state responds to how a group adapts to military pressure determines 
the life span and success of movements (Abbas 2014). In short, while there is a logical argument 
for the state being able to fight against terrorism militarily, at the same time repressive behavior 
has been found to also antagonize more violence as well. Therefore groups seeking to build 
support for their cause likely benefit from repressive tactics by the state’s military an domestic 
security forces but the capacity of the military in general likely shapes where and how groups are 
active within the state.  
The Bureaucratic or Distributive Capacity of the State  
The ability of states to both govern and distribute the resources of the state to its 
population is an important factor to consider as well. The establishment of well-run 




from the population, collect information on the masses, and provide for its citizens is also 
important to understanding the capacity of the state and the opportunities available to terrorist 
movements (Tilly 1992; Hendrix 2010) and has been found in some cases to be more effective 
than advanced military capabilities (Hendrix & Young 2014).  
The quality of the adminstrative capabilities of the state and knowing who may dissent 
can help inhibit terrorism and other contentious groups before military might is needed (Fearon 
& Laitin 2003; DeRouen & Sobek 2004) and likely serves as a counter-propaganda tool when 
the state can provide resources to citizens a fledgling organization cannot. As with the military 
apparatus though, bureaucratic corruption and mismanagement of resources, weak control of 
natural resources that can finance the opposition, and ethnic divisions in the civil service as well 
as unbalanced enforcement of rules and regulations or outright persecution or exclusion of 
certain sects of the population can all serve as spatial openings in the state for terrorism to take 
hold (Horowitz 2000; Blanton, Mason, Athow 2001; Fearon 2004; Thies 2010). When openings 
develop bureaucratically, through the rule of law for example, groups can challenge the state’s 
authority (Choi 2010). While different authors focus on different components of capacity, there 
does not seem to be a clear cut hierarchy among the two in the literature. Logically though, while 
military capacity may serve to immediately react to terrorist threats and as a symbol of 
deterrence, administrative capacity plays a longer game in terms of minimizing some of the 
grievances terrorist organizations rely upon for recruitment of the non-ideologues.  
Clientelism, Population Density, and Territorial Control  
In both military and administrative capacity, there is a potential for corruption to impact 
the effectiveness of the state’s ability to govern. What may be a more appropriate concept to 




existence and degree of clientelism being practiced in developing states. Clapham (1985), as 
summarized by Adebanwi and Obadare (2011), defines patron-client relations as “a form of 
organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and 
administrative systems…[and] officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers 
which are formally defined, but exercise those powers…as a form…of private property” (p. 48).  
Various scholars offer explanations of how clientelistic behavior indirectly influences 
terrorism through other factors. Keefer (2007) argues that younger democracies tend to 
underprovide non-targeted goods such as education and property rights in order to overprovide 
targeted goods such as jobs and public works projects which leads to clientelistic behavior and 
satisfies the demands of those with grievances against the state that could alternatively be 
provided by terrorist organizations. Weinberg (1991) finds that political parties that foster 
terrorist movements share two common features. First, the presence of “grandiose goals” that 
may or may not be achieved through the democratic process to the degree that makes supporters 
content. Second, parties or factions turn to terrorist acts when the party doctrine or platform 
focuses on the idea that the existing regime is illegitimate and does not address the goals of the 
movement and instead meets their demands with repression (p. 436-437). Finally, Piazza (2013) 
finds that rapid fluctuations in food prices that result in higher costs is associated with increases 
in terrorist activity, particularly in developing and middle income states with nondemocratic 
political regimes (p. 826). This relationship appears in Sudan in the late 1980s, Turkey, China, 
Mexico, and Russia in the 1990s, and Thailand and the Philippines in the late 2000s.  
As summarized by Teets and Chenoweth (2009), two potential explanations for the 
relationship between terrorism and clientelism (though the authors refer predominantly to 




suggests that terrorists attack corrupt governments to exploit public distrust in the system by 
portraying themselves as an alternative to the clientelistic actors in the regime. Hamas in 
Palestine serves as a telling example. In a similar vein, Felbab-Brown’s (2010) political capital 
model argues that belligerent groups not only benefit financially from illicit activity but also gain 
legitimacy and support from the local population so that they are actually strengthened by 
clientelism in their struggle against the state.  
The other explanation, which Teets and Chenoweth find support for in their study, 
suggests a facilitation reasoning for why clienteslistic behavior increases terrorist activity. As 
they note, rather than corruption directly causing terrorism, it “creates opportunities for terrorist 
organizations because of an inability or unwillingness to enforce the rule of law, which reduces 
the operating costs within such territories” and “allows for the creation of a criminal 
infrastructure” terrorist groups use to fund their activities. However, they also find that the 
presence of illegal drug trades reduce terrorist groups in a given state and argue that the interests 
of drug traffickers and terrorists are in opposition so the stronger side can discourage its 
counterpart from forming (p. 169).  
Several case studies provide further insight into this relationship. Adebanwi and Obadare 
(2011) note that the majority of Nigerians support anti-corruption efforts but many are 
“politically or economically connected to the corruption complex” (p. 195) via clientelistic acts 
by state officials. Rotberg (2009) as well notes that while patronage is a accepted as a common 
practice in the country by Nigerians, “they feel powerless to reduce corruption levels even as 
they seek to benefit from particular personal flows of clientelism” (p. 16).  
Tuastad (2010) through field research examines “how clientelism is not only a Middle 




international dimension” (p. 792) in the case of Palestine as well. Specifically, Tuastad finds the 
Gaza strip between 2004 and 2007 experienced internecine violence applied by groups protected 
by allies within the Palestinian Authority and upcoming elections threatened the local power of 
warlords dependent on these relationships, thus the violence served both the interests of the 
warlords and factions within the Palestinian Authority. In short, “democratic elections might 
make the mutually beneficial clientelist wasta system of the [Palestinian Authority] collapse, and 
would therefore, predictably, lead to opposition from the militants” (p. 796). And in studying 
patron-client relations in Nepal with a focus on the provision of public goods and land tenure 
Joshi and Mason (2011) argue that the Maoist insurgency succeeded in recruiting supporters 
from areas where strong patterns of patron-client dependency exist and those more dependent 
upon elites were more likely to join the insurgency (p. 172). Thus they argue when governments 
fail to deliver public goods some segments of the population are susceptible to joining armed 
insurgencies as an alternative.  
Finally, Mousseau (2011) finds among the world’s Muslim population that those 
supportive of Islamist-based terrorist organizations are not associated with religiosity, education 
levels, or income inequality and instead support is associated with urban poverty. In short states 
can inhibit terrorist recruitment by creating new economic opportunities for the urban poor and 
provide services such as healthcare and education that can alternatively be provided by Islamist 
groups (p. 35). Weltz-Shapiro (2011) disagrees and finds that “weak markets are not a sufficient 
condition for inter-group and anti-state violence because ruling group coalitions based on patron-
clientelist ties can sometimes manage stability with various combinations of severe repression 
and economic redistribution” and instead “violence in nations with weak markets is associated 




become weaker and new groups rise the latter demonstrate their power through violent acts. Thus 
there is reason to explore how clientelistic practices in the state impact terrorist activity.  
Additionally, the state’s ability to impose the rule of law upon those within its territory 
will ultimately be shaped by the size of that territory and the distribution of a state’s population. 
One example is a state whose political geographies make power consolidation difficult. 
‘Hinterland’ countries which do not have dispersed areas of high population density and states 
where most of the power in the state can and is concentrated in one region, typically the capital 
(Herbst 2000, p. 145-159) have different experiences in combatting terrorism. Low population 
densities make governing a territory more expensive and difficult compared to densely settled 
areas as noted by Herbst. As the recent success of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Jemaah Islamiyah in 
Indonesia, or the more long-term example of al-Shabaab in Somalia has shown, non-state actors 
in areas where the presence of the state is less felt have found success in remaining a threat to the 
regime. Distance from the capital and the reach of the state has been found to both aid and inhibit 
the success of internal uprisings (Buhaug 2006; Buhaug & Red 2006; Raleigh & Hegre 2009) 
such as terrorist movements.1  
In short, none of the factors of state capacity described above can explain the rise of 
terrorism alone. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that for nascent insurgencies to succeed, the 
government’s policing capabilities of its territory matters most. Recognition must also be given 
to the state’s ability to govern and implement the institutional duties of the state in an impartial 
and dedicated manner that also does not lead to a backlash by discontent groups. The challenge 
of governing expansive, lowly populated regions also factors into how effective the state can be 
                                                          
1 Others have studied the effect of population density on conflicts and how this affects a state’s response to conflict (Tir & Diehl 1998; Straus 
2006). Environmental factors such as terrain qualities, forest coverage, rurality of border zones, and rainfall variability have been studied for their 




in countering challengers especially when considering issues associated with corrupt behavior 
amongst state actors.  
Terrorism in the Developing World 
 Having discussed the phenomenon of terrorism and the state’s ability to counter it 
through its institutions and bureaucratic as well as military capacity, I now turn to a brief 
discussion of the regions that will be analyzed as part of this dissertation. The following section 
will provide a brief discussion of Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia through 
existing literature on the region’s political histories as well as their experiences with terrorism. 
Both have a long and difficult history with terrorist movements during several of Rapoport’s 
waves of terrorism. In one particular study, Elu (2012) identified approximately thirty unique 
terrorist groups in Africa and over one hundred distinct groups in Asia over a twenty-five year 
time span, though this may have to do with how groups and movements are defined. While other 
regions of the world such as Western Europe and Latin America have a long history of terrorism, 
this dissertation will focus on the aforementioned three regions that have been at the forefront of 
the ideological extremist wave of Rapoport’s chronology.  
A Brief Geopolitical Outline of the Regions  
 Sub-Saharan Africa along with the North African region which will be discussed 
separately make up the second-largest continental landmass and has environmental conditions 
that range between tropical rainforests, expansive deserts, and mountainous terrains. The region 
of Sub-Saharan Africa has nearly one billion residents and the forty-eight countries in the region 
has nearly 1,000 language groups and countless ethnic divisions within across states. According 
to one estimate, the Sub-Saharan region along with North Africa will be home to one of every 




percent between 1994 and 2011, the on-the-ground effects of these economic improvements are 
less evident. The average African still earned only $639 in 2011, or less than two dollars a day 
(in 2000 dollars) but even these numbers they argue are misleading because a large portion of the 
continent’s income via mineral commodities does not reach the citizens of Sub-Saharan African 
states (Englebert & Dunn 2013).  
A major cultural or political force in the state that must be accounted for when 
considering the rise of terrorism in the region is the legacy of colonialism. The imposed 
institutions of the colonial era have been suggested as one major reason for underdevelopment 
and instability in the developing world in general (Englebert 2000 a, b). The effects of indirect 
versus direct colonial rule have also been thoroughly studied and should be considered in 
understanding how state capacity in the Sub-Saharan region is affected by the history of a given 
state. Whereas indirect rule of colonies occurred through the use of pre-existing local power 
structures, often referred to as protectorates, direct rule installed European governments to 
oversee the territory (Englebert & Dunn 2013). In terms of the effects of indirect rule, several 
scholars have found that this form of colonialism impeded political development through 
institutional legacies which left ineffective central administrations that created a system of 
decentralized rule under empowered chiefs which left developing states unable to rule, resulting 
in instability (Migdal 1988; Boone 1994; Reno 1995).  
 On the other hand, direct rule left a legacy of states being able to lead development 
efforts via public goods that enhance the productive capabilities of the state (education, health 
care, roads) (Amsden 1985; Kohli 1994). However, the strict dichotomy between the two has 
been questioned. The governing styles of the British, French, and Spanish all varied in terms of 




Nowara 2006). Yet even with the end of the colonial era, in the majority of cases the colonizer 
maintained influence on postcolonial states and had extensive networks of access decades after 
independence (Young 2013). Lange (2004) finds that former British colonies, with less of a post-
colonial relationship and governed under indirect rule, are now less politically stable and have a 
worse rule of law than their French counterparts for example. What appears to matter specifically 
are the protections established by the colonial ruler and the duration to which they have been 
adhered. 
 For several reasons, North Africa, or the “Maghreb” which means “west” in Arabic, must 
be considered separately as a region from the rest of the African continent. States in North Africa 
including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia are typically considered with part of the 
‘Arab World’ with the Middle Eastern countries to differentiate between the differences in the 
politics of these two regions (Englebert & Dunn 2013, p.14-15). For my purposes here I will also 
include Sudan in the North African category. The region is characterized predominantly by the 
Sahara desert and makes up large parts of the territories of several states in the North and Sub-
Saharan regions. Steppe regions with enough water supply for grasses and small bushes to grow 
exist in the region as well, particularly along the Atlas Mountain area of Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia. Consequentially, most of the region’s population is concentrated in cities and towns 
located along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts as well as the Nile River (Cox et al 2009; 
Gasiorowski 2014).  
Like its Sub-Saharan neighbors, the states of North Africa developed for the most part as 
colonial systems that gained independence after World War II. France in particular played a 
major role in the history of the Maghreb where “psychologically, the heart of overseas France 




savagery of the eight-year war for Algerian independence, especially the self-destructive fury of 
its final phases, compelled the exodus of” one million French settlers and an independent Algeria 
taking on an anti-imperial foreign policy until the 1990s (Young 2013 p. 24). In the years after 
the era of independence and Rapoport’s anti-colonial wave of terrorism the states of the North 
African region formed absolute or constitutional monarchies and of the authoritarian republics, 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in the Maghreb “established radical Arab nationalist regimes 
in the 1950s and 1960s” that were characterized by “strong state apparatuses featuring powerful 
executive branches, vanguard political parties, extensive state control over the economy, and 
powerful security apparatuses” (Gasiorowski 2014, p. 14).  
In short, the colonial repression legacies in the states of North Africa, according to 
Githens-Mazer (2009), explain the struggle for establishing independent states governed by the 
rule of law and popular sovereignty. However, political repression since independence has 
created resentment and disappointment amongst North Africans who view the western character 
of the post-colonial regimes. Githens-Mazer further suggests that the repressive political 
character of the states in the Maghreb alongside western intervention in the region “continues to 
shape North African political mobilization, and worryingly has created a latent basis for 
radicalization among North Africans living and working in Europe” (p. 1015).   
 Finally, the region of Southeast Asia has experienced similar colonial and political 
developments as the states of Sub-Saharan and North Africa. The region consists of a mainland 
set of states that includes Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and parts of Malaysia 
and a set of states characterized by their island and archipelago-based geography which includes 
Indonesia, East Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, East Timor, and Brunei as well as several 




groups of Han Chinese and laborers brought to the area by European colonizers, sharing 
linguistic traditions and the predominant religion being Buddhism. The island component of the 
region is known for a mixture of Chinese and indigenous tribal groups that, due to the highly 
fragmented geography, has led to a very complex ethnic mixture. With the exception of the 
Philippines, much of the region though identifies primarily with Islam. The Philippines in 
contrast is overwhelmingly Catholic with the exception of a few Muslim majority islands such as 
Mindanao (Borthwick 2007).  
 Southeast Asia has a long history of combatting terrorist threats in the region which 
continues with efforts to counter threats from local terrorist organizations as well as transnational 
threats such as al Qaeda. For example, Communist-based groups using terror campaigns, 
including political assassinations, were typical of political violence in the Philippines from the 
early years of independence until the 1990s (Kingsbury 2017, p. 130). Prior to 9/11, Southeast 
Asian states did not deem terrorism an urgent concern (Febrica 2010). Today however, as the US 
spreads its focus for the “war on terror” to other regions outside Southeast Asia in the decades 
after 9/11, other states are looked toward as supporters in countering terrorism.  
On an international level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
taken on efforts to fight terrorism as well. A series of agreements have been signed by the 
ASEAN states including joint declarations for cooperation on counterterrorism (Ojendal 2004). 
In response to the Bali attack as well as others, ASEAN member states implemented policies to 
fight terrorism that led to individuals allegedly linked to groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah have 
been jailed without trial and Islamic religious schools suspected of supporting terrorist activities 




In the era since 9/11 states such as Singapore and Indonesia have adapted 
counterterrorism measures to different degrees. Singapore, not a regular target of the major 
terrorist movements in the region, has been a staunch supporter of US efforts in the region 
whereas Indonesia has distanced “its security policies from the U.S.-led “war on terror,” even 
though a series of terrorist attacks occurred in Indonesia” (Febrica 2010, p. 569-570). US wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq fragmented US attention, making it even more difficult for it to tend to its 
relations with SEA. And because 9/11 happened early on in the Bush presidency there was no 
time to develop a coherent strategy toward SEA. (Ba 2009, p. 379). Leavitt (2005) notes that the 
US and Southeast Asian states have called on Japan to increase its military role in the region. 
Other regional issues including China’s territorial claims in the region are also a factor.  
Secularism and Democracy in the Developing World  
 Secularism and its role in democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, and 
Southeast Asia must also be considered when trying to understand political violence and tensions 
over religion and authority. Hurd (2006) and Kuru (2006), as summarized by Fox (2011), also 
provide two different interpretations of what secularism means. The first, assertive secularism, 
exists where religion is separated from the public sphere entirely. Kuru argues however that 
passive secularism does not ban religion from the system of government but requires the 
government to remain neutral and treat all religions fairly and equally. The basic definition of 
secularism in short is the separation between the church and state or where there is no particular 
church, between religion and politics.  
The difference is a product of Western definitions separating Christianity from the 
political structure (Masuzawa 2005; Casanova 1994; Asad 1993; Asad 2003; Taylor 2007). 




religion from the state (Asad 1993, p. 28). Western Christianity played a founding role in our 
concept of secularism and while that does not mean non-Christian countries cannot have secular 
systems, it does mean they are likely to encounter difficulties Christian-majority states did not 
encounter. Secularism is a tool rather than an aim but how do religious extremist groups within 
the state respond to this notion of secularism securing the freedom of various beliefs and non-
belief react is the question. Gaskins et. al (2013) note that “secularization theory focuses on the 
‘demand’ for religion and, in its most basic formulation, states that religion declines and 
eventually disappears as societies develop” (p. 824). However, secularization theory has been 
criticized for its lack of micro-foundations and lack of empirical support (Gill 2011). Gaskins et. 
al find that religious participation declines with societal development, the ability of citizens to 
take secular actions, and state regulations on religion. However, religious participation does 
sharply increase as inequality increases in a given state.  
As Fox (2011) notes, the differences in approaches to secularism have consequences for 
public policy as well as the basic foundations and institutions of the state. Fox investigates how 
the nature of constitutional language regarding a separation of religion and state and clauses 
regarding a state’s official religion affect the likelihood of religious legislation. Clauses are a 
reflection of the ideals and policies of a society regarding the role of religion in government 
(Keith 2002). He notes that while most democracies have clauses referring to a separation 
between religion and the state in their constitutions, most also have religious-influenced laws. In 
other words legislation that is shaped by the predominant religious beliefs of the people of a 
given state. Others have also noted that political will is necessary to enforce constitutional 




However, Fox also argues that democracies do not necessarily adhere to constitutional 
structures. In the case of Nigeria, the 1999 constitution bans state religion at the regional or 
national level but Muslim-majority states have adopted Shari’a law as state or regional law. In 
Hungary and Spain, despite separation between religion and state constitutional mandates, both 
countries permit citizens to donate portions of their income taxes to the Catholic Church but such 
options are not provided to other religions within each state (Fox 2008). As is apparent in the 
American context, a fine line exists between protecting religious freedoms and imposing 
legislation that favors a particular set of religious beliefs over others.  
Fox finds that the wording of constitutional clauses regarding official state religions 
where one is established are more likely to consider religious legislation. References to God 
result in higher religious legislation scores as well but Fox also finds that declarations of 
separation between the state and religion have a minimal impact in comparison to states which 
do not address the issue of religion in their constitutions. In short, even when religious clauses 
are omitted from constitutions, Fox finds religious legislation is still considered and passed and 
argues this calls into question how much influence secular ideologies have on government 
policy. Additionally, if the state fails to adhere to its constitutional constraints on religion, or in 
contrast fails to provide legislation that protects the religious philosophies highlighted in 
constitutional language, this could certainly lead to discontent amongst the people of a state. In 
cases where the state reacts in force through legislation or physically through violence to 
discontent groups with religious-based extremist ideologies, this could lead to violence including 
terrorism. 
“Religion and democracy can make tense bedfellows,” (p. 439) meaning that tensions 




(2015) calls a “secularism trap.” The trap is the collapse of democracy because of religious or 
secular elites pursuing the maximum or most-extreme demands or goals regarding the place of 
religion in a democratic system. The very opening of political change increases the likelihood of 
conflict between the two concepts. The driving argument becomes not how democratic should 
the state be but what role will religion play in the political system. Tensions may occur in 
debates over electoral systems, federalism, or courts but are rooted in the relationship between 
religion and the state.2  
Buckley notes that other theories regarding secularism have failed to fully explain the 
tensions between religion and democracy. Modernization theory finds that development 
decreases the hold of religious institutions over public life while rationalist theories argue that 
the secularism trap is avoided in religious diversity where religious groups prefer the state to be 
secular to protect all religions freedom of worship. A third argument is that religious moderates 
minimize the secularist trap once they adopt liberal value systems. However, Buckley finds that a 
key factor is missing: the political institutions themselves. Institutional structures and how they 
are developed shape the trap. 
Secularism within the regions under consideration in Africa and Asia has been considered 
by several scholars. Stepan (2012) finds that a series of vertical and horizontal “rituals of 
respect” facilitate accommodation of religion within the state and respect among groups in 
conflict. These aspects of civil society as well as religious-state relations in general contribute to 
Senegal being a functioning and relatively peaceful Muslim-majority country that is also a 
democracy. Abdullah (2013) examines how two primary Islamic organizations in Singapore, 
                                                          
2 Research as Buckley notes finds wide variation across cases. Alfred Stepan notes that there are “twin tolerations” between religion and 
democracy in some countries, particulary those with Catholic authorities while others such as Nasr find that Muslim democracies are no different 





MUIS (the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) and Pergas (the Singapore Islamic Scholars 
and Religious Teachers’ Association) are used by the state via what he terms “muscular” and 
calibrated” secularism.3 Both organizations agree to a supervisory role by the state and Abdullah 
argues this has created religious harmony in the state. Finally, Mujani and Liddle (2009) look at 
the factors that have led to the rise of several secular political parties in Indonesia in the decades 
since it became a democracy. They suggest a history of religious pluralism, the policies of the 
Suharto regime, Muslim responses to Suharto, a large moderate Muslim population, and the 
inability of Islamist parties to mobilize significant voting blocs have led to the secularization of 
the Indonesian state’s political system.  
Finally, while Turkey falls outside of the regions of focus in this dissertation, it has 
served as an important case study for scholars on a Muslim-majority state embracing the 
concepts of secular practices that originated in Western democracies struggling to balance the 
relationship with Christianity and the state. Turkey is notable as the first Muslim country to 
embrace principles of secularism in its Constitution (Topal 2012). Kiling notes that between 
2000 and 2012 Turkey instituted a variety of reforms to enhance the liberties of religious 
minorities despite the small size of these populations and decades of discrimination against 
Turkish Christians and others. Kiling finds that international pressure played an important role. 
Kiling argues though that to produce reforms, international pressure has to be matched with 
domestic-level actors motivated by material interests or normative beliefs. Pressure from the 
European Union could not alone accomplish reforms that protected religious freedoms of 
minority groups. Yet once the AK Party realized it was in their own interests, in combination 
with activism from other civilian groups such as political liberals and some Islamic social 
                                                          
3 Muscular secularism refers to direct interventionist approaches using draconian measures and laws while calibrated secularism is a more 




groups, such reforms to the treatment of minority religious groups was achieved. In short, 
scholars have found that secularism and the relationship between religious groups and the state 
has been very influential in the ability of each state to democratize while maintaining respect for 
religious groups within the state. In the cases where some religious sects or extremist groups 
have not embraced secularism though, particularly when the state has responded to discontent 
with violence, threats in the form of political violence in general and terrorism in particular have 
been the result.  
Political Violence and Ideological Extremism in the Developing World 
Finally, terrorism in each of the three regions analyzed in this dissertation can be 
examined through their experiences of ideological tensions, ideologically extremist-based 
violence, and extremist-motivated terrorism. This final section will first turn to the tensions 
within the religion of Islam. By far, the largest number of terrorist organizations in the 
ideological extremist wave of terrorism in the developing world have ties to radical 
interpretations of the Islamic faith not held by the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the 
world, including Sub-Saharan and North Africa as well as Southeast Asia. Then attention will be 
given to the much less prominent but still active Christian-motivated forms of political violence 
in the region as well as other religiously-motivated terrorist movements. Without question, much 
less has been written on Christian extremist terrorist organizations than their Islamist extremist 
counterparts. Finally, while Rapoport is correct to note that the modern wave of terrorism is 
predominantly characterized by religious-motivated forms of terrorism, there are also secular 
terrorist movements throughout the area under consideration not motivated by Christianity, 




In the case of Islam, unlike Christianity, a large subset of followers do not distinguish the 
state from religion in the Western sense. As with Christianity, variation exists across religious 
sects, countries, and regions. Islam in some interpretations governs all aspects of a Muslim’s life, 
with no separation between religious and political responsibilities. (Husain 1995). Political 
institutions exist to defend the religion and are based on the Islamic system of Shari’a. As Husain 
notes, Muslims in this case must be loyal to the religion rather than the state they are living in 
because “at the heart of Islamic political doctrine lies neither state, nor the individual, nor yet a 
social class, but the umma, the Islamic community tied by bonds of faith alone” (p. 27). In times 
of crisis, when a ruler imposes laws or acts in a manner incompatible with the tenets of Islam, the 
devout Muslim has a duty to take political action, which may or may not be violent.  
 Political Islam, in which Muslims are actively engaged in the political system, can be 
traced in modern times to the Muslim Brotherhood movement which began in 1928 in Egypt 
under the leadership of Hasan al-Banna. The movement has affiliated and semi-affiliated 
branches across the Muslim world and in many countries where Muslims are in the minority 
(March 2015, p. 103). Political Islam itself is not a single movement or ideology, with various 
sects of Islam taking different approaches to the concept. Movements and ideologies range from 
left-leaning populism to ultraconservative interpretations that demand more societal control over 
morality (Dabashi 2006; Ramadan 2008). Though some sects of Islam seek traditionalism and 
others adapt to the modern world, Salafism in particular insists on strict, rigorous interpretation 
of the Qu’ran (Meijer 2009).4    
                                                          
4 A prime example of the tensions within the Islamic world between traditionalists and those that have embraced modernity is over the role of 
shari’a law, or the detailed system of rules developed by Islamic scholars, in society today.  Shari’a is regarded by Muslims as an expression of 
God’s will (Peters 2005) but with the rise of the state has become a challenging issue across the Islamic world in balancing the application of 
shari’a with the modern bureaucratic expectations of the state. During the colonial era, European states imposed their own systems of 
governance and in many cases replaced the local system that included shari’a but in others it remained, with shari’a courts receiving 
authorization from the state and codification of Islamic law into parts of the legal system (March 2015). Peters offers four categories that 
developed over time. First, some states saw complete secularization with no role for shari’a in the legal system. Second, other states have shari’a 




Due to the fact that Islam in general never historically developed an institutional 
separation between church and state on its own, unlike Christianity in most countries (Roy 
1994), political Islam has in fact been co-opted by many states in the developing world including 
Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Nigeria (Nasr 2001; Mandaville 2007; Otto 2010). 
However, the role of shari’a has been at the center of the tensions over the modern state. March 
notes that the majority of Muslim-majority states have some formal commitment to shari’a law 
in their constitutions. In countries such as Pakistan and Sudan, the inclusion of Islamic law in the 
legal system originates in strong ideological commitments by the regime. In others such as 
Egypt, this inclusion has been purely symbolic or adopted to appease internal Islamist opposition 
movements. In short, some states in the developing world have in general Islamized their legal 
systems since independence and found ways to make aspects of shari’a compatible with their 
system of governance (Brown 1997; Fadel 2003; Lombardi 2006; Moustafa 2007; March 2015).  
 Tensions over the role of the state and the role of shari’a law in society have become 
increasingly prominent with efforts to democratize the Islamic world. March (2015) argues that 
the more populist and democratic Muslim countries become, the more we should expect them to 
reflect the dominant religion of the state (p. 105). Others have suggested that democratization in 
states with deeply religious Muslim majorities has been possible because of a great degree of 
negotiation between the religious entities in the state and the secularists pursuing democracy 
With democratization however, the debate moves from a “two-sided struggle between ‘secular’ 
and ‘Islamic’ actors to a much more fluid and open debate about what the content of democracy 
should be in a Muslim society” (p. 47).   
                                                          
some states that have been re-Islamized after the end of colonization and the return of Islamic regimes. Fourth, shari’a has been applied in some 






At the same time, democratization may also create opportune moments for hardline 
religious groups within the Muslim community to gain influence over the direction of the 
country and criticize democracy itself (Villalon 1999; Soares & Otayek 2007; March 2015). As 
in the case of the Arab Spring, the factors that led to mass protests across several states in the 
developing world has created post-authoritarian instability while different factions struggle over 
what direction the country should develop. In several of these cases the factions include hard-line 
Islamists that want to base governance on strict interpretations of the Quran even if the majority 
does not support shari’a law, pragmatic conservatives that also seek a state based on Islamic law 
but are amenable to compromises that satisfy the majority of the population, and liberal Islamists 
that support Islamic principles but also believe in free will of individuals, tolerance of diversity, 
and an evolving interpretation of Islamic scripture (Haas & Lesch 2013, p. 5-6). As March 
suggests, brief moments of democratic rule in this region demonstrates that political Islam 
remains a core fault line in many Muslim countries (March 2015, p. 116).  
 As already noted, variation exists across the developing world, both in progress towards 
democratization but also in relations between sects of Islam and the state. The three 
aforementioned regions provide examples of this variation. The first which has already been 
briefly discussed is the Maghreb or “Arab West,” a region of northern Africa. Islam arrived to 
the region in the 7th century with the arrival of Arabs from the Middle East and has become the 
dominant religion through the region, those as discussed above includes various sects and 
ideological positions that are not always in agreement. 
In 2010 after a street vendor immolated himself in protest of the Tunisian regime, the 
previously described movements of the Arab Spring occurred (Haas & Lesch 2013). While there 




constitutional democratic norms, internal divisions in several cases resulted in instability and 
setbacks for democratization (March 2015). The 2013 military coup in Egypt is a prominent 
example. March calls this a historic turning point for the region. He argues that the Arab Spring 
“may mark a point where the mainstream Islamist movement splits again between those who 
reject democratic competition as a trap and turn to militancy and those who seek to lead a 
democratization of states presently in the process of deepening their autocratic tendencies” (p. 
118).  
 For the Sub-Saharan region, secularism is the norm in most, but not all, states. However, 
variation within the Islamic religion between Sufis who are politically quiescent and Wahhabist 
and Salafist sects that are fundamentalists and seek political control characterize many of the 
states in the region (Soares & Otayek 2007). Democratization in the region in the 1990s has been 
suggested as the opening needed by Islamic groups to become more active in Sub-Saharan 
African political communities (Villalon 1999 in Senegal; Tayob 2005 in Nigeria; Soares & 
Otayek 2007 in the region). Not all Muslims have felt integrated in the democratic process 
however and those in some states such as Kenya and Tanzania have felt marginalized (de Waal 
2004). Last (2008) suggests though that due to Muslim elites playing a role in the state in many 
cases and the ability to coerce and repress discontent has minimized extremism. Northeast Africa 
or the Nile River Valley however is an exception. “Neo-Fundamentalism,” rooted in the failures 
of modern Islam and the political system, has led to the rise of militant Islamists in countries 
such as Sudan and Somalia by embracing local agendas (de Waal 2004).  
 Finally, Southeast Asia has had a similarly long relationship with Islam which was 
introduced to the region in the 10th or 11th centuries, first at ports and capital cities of various 




populations in the region (Gross 2007). Gross notes that a common theme throughout the region, 
from Thailand to the Philippines to Indonesia, the country with the world’s largest Muslim 
population, is the struggle between “the forces of centralization and those of decentralization” (p. 
5). Entry of Western European states into the region played a role in advancing the spread of 
Islam through Southeast Asia as well.  
As European missionaries entered the region and European rule began in several states, 
Islam united the peoples of the region in resisting permanent Western rule (Gross 2007). Today, 
several countries in the region are transitioning into democratic governance while others have 
long been practicing some form of democracy. Additionally, many states in the region have 
growing economies and rapidly advancing industries (Cox et al 2009). Nevertheless, others have 
noted since 2000 a rise in Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist activity, attributed to 
insurgencies against the influence of the West, poverty, a failure of secular education to 
incorporate fundamental Islamic minorities, and the spread of Salafist Islam (Abuza 2002; Ressa 
2003; Bakar 2005). In short, tensions between traditionalism and modernity are not unique to 
Islam and vary throughout the developing world. As Euben (1999) points out, “Christian as well 
as Islamic fundamentalists share a preoccupation with the erosion of values, traditions, and 
meaning seen as constitutive of post-Enlightenment modernity” (p. 15).5  
The result of these tensions, between generational shifts, a questioning of political 
institutions, and democratization, has been a Salafist movement within the developing world. 
                                                          
5 Several scholars have attempted to explain these tensions specifically in the Islamic faith. One argument is that “Islamism is not Islam” at all 
because “Islamism is about political order, not faith” and it is a “cultural-political response to a crisis of failed postcolonial development in Islamic 
societies” as a result of globalization (Tibi 2012, p. 23). Islamism then is seen as a critique of the Westernization of society which political Islamists 
reject, particularly the notion of the state, centralized bureaucracy, and the use of technology (Hallaq 2013). March (2015) suggests that Muslims 
today are in are in a difficult position, where they cannot embrace modern institutions which are considered destructive to the culture of the 
developing world but at the same time these political institutions cannot be Islamized because they go against the ideas of the religion itself. 
Combined with generational changes, the illegitimacy of the political system has been considered a catalyst for the rise of reformist Islamic 






The goal of this movement is to reestablish the past glory of an Islamic state stretching from 
Morocco to the Philippines, to restore authentic Islam, and to advocate for violent jihad against 
Western powers and influences that prevent the creation of a truly Islamic state (Sageman 2004). 
The reasoning behind a revivalist movement has to do with Salafists rejecting Islamic 
scholarship that has guided the religion after the time of Muhammad and beyond what is written 
in the Quran. In addition, Salafists, according to Sageman, have deemed violent action necessary 
due to repression of the followers of this sect of Islam within modern Muslim states.  
The Salafist movement, led by militant extremists or fundamentalist Islamists has taken 
to using terrorism as its method for accomplishing their goals. Examining terrorism in the 
developing world requires a definition of what is meant by militant Islamists. Various definitions 
exist concerning who falls within this category.6 Most, however, agree on the differentiation 
between the religion of Islam, the political aspects of the ideology, and the nature of violent 
individuals acting on their beliefs. An appropriate definition for the purposes of this dissertation 
in explaining terrorism in the Islamic world describes militant Islamists as “a group or individual 
advocating Islamist ideological goals, principally by violent means” and these individuals call 
for the strictest of interpretations of the Quran, the opposition of both Western democracies and 
Middle Eastern governments, and political parties that are Islamist but do not participate 
violently in elections (Aboul-Enein 2010, p. 1).  
Non-Islamist-Extremist Motivated Religious Terrorism and Secular-Based Terrorism  
                                                          
6 Palmer (2008, p. 11) acknowledges the differentiation of the religion of Islam, the political aspects of the ideology, and the nature of violent 
individuals acting on their beliefs by defining Islamism as “the ideal of reestablishing the caliphate and its global dominion,” an Islamist as one 
who believes in the ideal of Islam, and a Jihadist as also one who believes in Islam but is willing to kill in order to achieve their goals, possibly 
including themselves in the process. Aboul-Enein argues that Palmer’s definition lacks precision and has the potential to group peaceful Islamist 
political groups with militant Islamists by describing them both as followers of Islam. Aboul-Enein suggests disaggregating ‘Islam’ from ‘Islamist’ 





 Other forms of religious-motivated terrorism exist as well. Non-Islamist ideologically 
extreme terrorist movement are concentrated in the Sub-Saharan and the Asian-Pacific regions 
which make up approximately thirty-seven percent of the global Christian population while less 
than one percent of the world’s Christian population is located in the Middle East and North 
Africa combined. While around 800 million Christians lived in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Asian-Pacific as of 2010, just under thirteen million lived in all of the Middle East and North 
Africa. Three countries in the Sub-Saharan region (Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Ethiopia) and one in Southeast Asia (Philippines) are among the top ten countries in 
terms of Christian population (Pew 2012). 
 Much of North Africa and Southeast Asia are Muslim-majority countries whereas only a 
small portion of Sub-Saharan Africa falls into this category. Instead, the majority of countries in 
the Sub-Saharan region are Christian-majority states. While there are still Islamist-extremist 
affiliated terrorist movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are also various instances of 
Christian and secular violence and terrorism. The Central African Republic is a recent and telling 
example. Starting in 2013, several thousand individuals have died in fighting between 
predominantly Muslim groups in the country’s north and predominantly Christian militias in the 
south. Early in the conflict, Christian anti-balaka forces carried out executions, mutilations, and 
general revenge attacks against Muslim civilians (CFR 2017). While this is just one example and 
there are others worth consideration in the Sub-Saharan and Southeast Asian contexts, it is a 
demonstrative case of extremist Christian violence in the region.  
 One particular “Christian” terrorist group that has been written on to an extent is the 
Lord’s Resistance Army active in Uganda and the states on its northern and western borders. The 




among the Acholi ethnic group in response to the Museveni government (Behrend 1998; Dunn 
2004; Finnstrom 2006). As noted by Doom et al (2004), the moral code based on the beliefs of 
Alice included “the confirmation of Alice’s leadership” through promises to follow the orders of 
Lakwena, a holy spirit, “strengthening the solidarity of the in-group,” and “biblical references to 
introduce Christian power” (p. 18).  Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA gained strength after the fall 
of Lakwena’s movement and used terrorism to control the population and loosely based their 
beliefs on Christian-based religious justifications as well (Van Acker 2004).  Kony’s movement 
differed from Alice’s in several ways. While the previous movement sought harmony through 
order and holy leadership, Kony used “the sword” and he himself “places his hands on those who 
are killed in order that they may be purified through the power invested in him personally” 
(Doom et al 2004, p. 22) as a religious figure.  
 Finally, there are terrorist movements within Africa and Southeast Asia during the 
modern wave of religious terrorism that have either do not fall within the extremist or radical 
belief systems of sects of Christianity or Islam, or even have no religious affiliation or 
motivation at all. Recent attacks on Christian and Muslim groups in Myanmar and Sri Lanka for 
example include one instance where “Burmese monks were seen goading on Buddhist mobs.”7 
Targeting non-Buddhist individuals does not meet the definition of organized terrorism but 
demonstrates there are other forms of religious tensions in the region. Very little appears in the 
literature that focuses specifically on this particular sub-set of religious violence and terrorism. 
Rapoport refers to the non-religious terrorist organizations as holdovers from the last 
generation or wave of terrorism but nonetheless they remain active for various reasons. The 
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) for example remains on 
                                                          




the US State Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations and remains active in 
the Philippines. Emerging in the 1960s and experiencing several waves of growth and decline as 
a non-state actor challenging the various regimes over several decades, the most recent Country 
Report on Terrorism notes that along with other groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, 
and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) are still involved in carrying out attacks 
and extortion operations, bomb-making training, and small-scale shootings despite pressure from 
Philippines and US joint-counterterrorism efforts (BCCVE 2016).  
In short, in the modern wave of terrorism where groups with extremist interpretations of 
the Islamic faith are dominant in the number of attacks. However, other forms of religious 
violence by Christian-extremists, Buddhist-supported mobs, and secular ‘holdovers’ from prior 
waves of terrorism characterize the regions under consideration as well.  
Conclusion  
Despite several decades of scholarly literature on the subject of terrorism, the preceding 
review demonstrated debates still exist in regards to several elements of the topic. Initial efforts 
at defining terrorism from a legalistic point of view on an international level date back to the 
days of the League of Nations but no definitive consensus beyond terrorism being used as a 
tactic to achieve political goals has emerged in the century since those first efforts to define this 
form of political violence. Scholars as well continue to debate several aspects of what is and is 
not considered terrorism. While a consensus on the fact that terrorism must have political 
motivations and goals, the nature of who is targeted by acts of terrorism remains. In general, 
several tactics are utilized by terrorist organizations with some such as bombings being used 
more frequently than others. How successful terrorists are at achieving their stated goals and 




 Both the nature of how groups are structured as well as the general goals of terrorist 
organizations have evolved over time. Groups such as al-Qaeda or the Lord’s Resistance Army 
are indicative of where modern terrorism has gone in what Rapoport terms the ‘religious wave.’ 
Groups have adopted leader-inspired but non-hierarchical structures that allow for adaptability 
and effectiveness at remaining active but amorphous groups of individuals using technological 
innovations to maintain connections without the rigor of a militaristic hierarchy. These 
transnational movements also demonstrate Rapoport’s point regarding a religious wave where 
groups use extremist interpretations of religion to recruit and promote their actions.  
 While a myriad of explanations have been offered regarding the causation of terrorism 
and the formation of terrorist organizations, this dissertation will focus predominantly on 
capacity arguments rather than grievance-based causal explanations for terrorism. The structure 
and integrity of states’ institutions, its capability to manage activity within its territory, and its 
capability to respond to the rise of terrorist organizations through its military and bureaucracy are 
deemed most important to identifying why terrorist organizations from Boko Haram to Jemaah 
Islamiyah have emerged in the developing world. The focus on terrorism and the capacity of the 
state in the Sub-Saharan African, North African, and Southeast Asian regions comes from their 
unique but generally similar histories in regards to the rise of terrorism during the modern wave 
of religious terrorism. The next chapter will illustrate my theoretical argument for why 
weaknesses in the capacity of the state drive the formation and activity of terrorist organizations 







Chapter 3: A Theory of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 
In the preceding chapter I provide an analysis of where the study of terrorism stands in 
the academic literature as well as the arguments over the origins of terrorism, how terrorism is 
defined, and what factors influence terrorist movements across the developing world. This 
chapter will first look at how those outside of the scholarly community see the issue of terrorism. 
The discussion in the following section is the result of conversations with US-based experts at 
governmental and non-governmental organizations on what they view as the most significant 
explanatory factors for why terrorist movements have found success from West Africa to 
Southeast Asia. After this discussion I turn to my theoretical assumptions for explaining the 
relationship between the capacity of the state and terrorism in the developing world. I outline 
several hypotheses that are tested in subsequent empirical chapters, looking broadly as well as in 
depth at the regions under consideration. Finally I conclude the chapter with a brief note on the 
potential concerns regarding endogeneity and how I consider that issue through the narratives 
investigated in the case studies in Chapters Five and Six.
Interviews with Analysts and Policymakers 
In the summer and fall of 2016 I conducted a series of interviews for the purposes of 
theoretical development to complement the review of literature presented in Chapter Two. In 
general, each individual provided responses to the questions provided in Appendix A, though 
interviews were open-ended and included follow-up questions based on each conversation. These 
questions include a general discussion of their experience working on the issue of terrorism and, 
if possible, a brief description of their position in governmental or non-governmental work. One 





 three had roles in the US Department of Defense 
 two in the US Department of State 
 three in US intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
 two in American think-tanks 
Therefore it is important to note that the views provided in these interviews are American-centric 
and reflect the perspectives of the US as a hegemonic military power approaching the issue of 
terrorism in the US and around the world but were the focus for the convenience of sampling.  
 
Participants provided responses in each interview to a series of questions regarding the 
factors they feel, based on their experiences in the policy communities in which they are a part 
of, are most significant to the emergence of terrorist organizations around the world. Follow-up 
questions asked individuals to differentiate between domestic and international factors to allow 
for the respondent to provide more detailed responses to the initial questions regarding capacity 
of the state. I also asked participants if regional variation affects the emergence of terrorist 
organizations, with varying results based on their expertise. Finally, I inquired about the state’s 
ability to oversee its territory. This last question allowed for several follow-up questions 
regarding the various aspects of military and administrative capacity that are the focus  
of later empirical chapters.  
Table 3.1 Description of those Interviewed in Fall 2016 
Interview 1 Former advisor to an Assistant Secretary in Department of Defense 
Interview 2 Foreign Affairs officer serving as deputy director at a State Department agency 
Interview 3 Analyst for government agency on drug trafficking and international threats 
Interview 4 US military officer working on terrorism over several decades 
Interview 5 Africa and Middle East policy analyst for DC think tank 
Interview 6 Government analyst working on policy in Lake Chad region 
Interview 7 Middle East foreign policy advisor for multiple US vice presidents 
Interview 8 Former agent with FBI, CIA, DoD, and US Air Force 
Interview 9 Law enforcement officer, interrogator at Guantanamo Bay 




In all, I conducted ten interviews in the fall of 2016. Table 3.1 provides a brief 
description of the background of those interviewed. I used snowball sampling to accumulate the 
responses for this section of dissertation, starting initially with a referral from a colleague at a 
military college in Pennsylvania who serves in the US Army and previously worked with the  
 
foreign affairs officer serving as deputy director at a State Department agency as well as the 
former advisor to an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense. From those two contacts 
I then received further contact information for several of the others listed in Table 3.1. In 




Local vs. International Factors 
 Significant factors are local in nature.  
 Ideology attracts some, but not all, 
recruits. 
 Perception of marginalization matters.  
 The government’s relationship with 
communities matters.  
 State capacity is a huge factor. 
 
 
Bureaucracy, Corruption, and Infrastructure 
 Good governance matters. 
 Ability to divert resources to securing 
territory.  
 Infrastructure is key to 
communication, transportation, and 
information. 





Military and Security Apparatus 
 Military capability is a double-edged 
sword. 
 The state relying on use of force can 
be exploited by non-state actors. 
 Intelligence capabilities at the local 
and state level matter. 
 Anti-state activity appears where the 
security apparatus is lacking. 
 
Territory and Density 
 Maintaining control of territory is key.  
 The control of space leads to control 




addition I created a list of public policy think tanks and agencies and solicited interviews through 
emails to these organizations. I derived the majority of the interviews from snowball sampling 
though Interview 10 with the vice-president of a foreign policy think tank responded to the cold-
call email approach. In all approximately I contacted thirty policymakers and think tank 
members to participate in this section of the dissertation with one third responding and 
participating in interviews.  
After I made initial contact with each participant I provided a general cover letter 
explaining the purpose of the interview, to inform the theoretical section of this dissertation, but 
avoided any specific references to state capacity and my theoretical assumptions in order to 
allow each respondent to provide an unbiased opinion on the questions asked. All ten interviews 
took place over the phone and nine of the ten permitted the use of a tape recording device to 
allow for detailed transcriptions of the conversation for the purposes of identifying key quotes 
and insights later in the project. The seventh participant, the Middle East foreign policy advisor, 
declined the request to record the conversation but did permit me to take hand-written notes. The 
average interview lasted approximately forty-five minutes though one interview with the seventh 
participant lasted over two hours, providing extensive and valuable detail to the interview 
questions.  
I asked each expert a series of broad questions that allowed them to identify factors that 
would be incorporated into the research design presented later in this chapter.8 Several of the 
questions focused either on domestic or international factors that drive terrorism in the 
developing world while others focused more narrowly on the nature of the capacity of the state in 
relation to the success of terrorist movements in the developing world. The rest of this section 
                                                          
8 Questions used in these semi-structured interviews were approved as part of an Institutional Review Board protocol and are included in an 




will focus on four major themes that emerged from the interviews. These themes and key points 
of consensus amongst multiple interviews are provided above in Table 3.2. In terms of 
generalization, the small sample size prohibits this to a degree but these interviews were 
conducted with the purpose of narrowing extraneous factors that affect the formation of terrorist 
movements. 
Local vs. International Factors 
Nearly all of those interviewed emphasized domestic factors and gave more detailed 
answers for those than any transnational or international-level factors. Transnational and 
international-level factors noted in interviews included broad cultural norms, the effects of 
globalization and technological innovation, and solidarity among Wahhabist or Salafi 
interpretations of Islam. In most conversations however, policymakers and researchers at think 
tanks focused more so on the local context. Ideology attracts some, but not all, recruits and the 
perception of marginalization matters. Finally, this initial theme leads into state capacity being 
one of the major local-driven factors to the emergence of terrorist organizations.  
As a foreign affairs officer who focused on local-driven factors in our conversation noted, 
in terms of identifying critical factors to the emergence of terrorist organizations, “it really boils 
down to these issues, they’re very local in nature.” Local-driven research is necessary for 
“developing strategies for how to sort of counter those violent extremist groups in” Africa and 
Asia. He suggested that there are broader categories of factors that drive terrorism including 
ideology, governance, and economics but it does not help to compare across states and regions at 
that broad level (Interview 2, 9/16/2016). In the case of Boko Haram he noted “there’s not a 
preponderance of evidence that recruits are driven to that group for ideological 




been through “conscription and in many cases like in Cameroon and Niger and Chad they’ve 
been offered economic” incentives. In contrast when “you look at the foreign fighter flow when 
it comes to ISIL, you know clearly social integration to those communities of where they’re 
leaving and going to, Syria and Iraq…those are issues of ideology and sense of belonging” 
(ibid.) In short, local context is a determining factor in which of the broader categories might be 
driving terrorist activity.  
Amongst those interviewed though, there was no observable consensus regarding local 
contexts such as socioeconomic status and its effect on the formation of terrorist groups or the 
recruitment of individuals to terrorist organizations. One respondent working on US foreign 
policy in the Middle East suggested that there is no correlation between poverty and 
radicalization. However, others highlighted frustration with socioeconomic conditions and 
unemployment which leads individuals to join terrorist groups for protection, income, and 
notoriety in the community. The aforementioned analyst did suggest that who is driven by what 
factor does to a degree depend on their place in the organization. For example, in some cases 
terrorist organizations offer a steady source of income and status in the community but also may 
offer a chance for revenge on other tribes or clans. One particular quote demonstrates the 
variation in what may be the driving factors that must be considered:  
“So if you are a poor, disempowered youth in Niger and someone 
comes to you and says "hey, if you join this organization you will 
be carrying an AK-47, which commands a lot of automatic respect 
and you'll be part of this organization that is feared" and there's 
some attraction to that for status that you can’t otherwise...people 
have to respect you or at least take notice of you. So I draw a pretty 
clear distinction between the leadership, which is ideologically 
driven, and then some of the foot soldiers, some are also 






The ideological component, according to some interviewed, sits at the center of the broader, 
international-level factors that must be considered in explaining the origins of terrorist 
movements. Internationally, ideological factors include ethnic or religious tensions. In terms of 
the factors that drive terrorism, the previously mentioned foreign affairs officer also noted that 
ideology is a major factor and “in a lot of cases we’ve found the ideology attracts certain 
segments of society” (Interview 2, 9/16/2016). 
An individual who formerly worked on counterterrorism strategies at the Department of 
Defense concurred. He suggested in terms of religious-based ideological grievances that there is 
a degree of “solidarity across religious groups such as the whole Muslim world, [and] there 
might be an attraction regardless where you are a Muslim geographically… which is why people 
participate where they aren't even part of a minority that has been…oppressed.” This points to 
why extremists in the Islamic religion identify with broader terrorist movements such as al-
Qaeda. Additionally, this individual noted that most in Sub-Saharan Africa have more nuanced 
goals to overthrow governments or establish a state they believe the most powerful. In the 
African context those cases have been traditionally based on ethnic and religious beliefs. Yet 
when asked about how regions vary, he suggested that while there are different complaints and 
grievances, “they all have a political end, otherwise they are just killing people just to kill them” 
(Interview 1, 9/12/2016)  
A clear link between several of these grievance-based factors proposed by those 
interviewed appears to be the perception of marginalization by those in the community that turn 
to terrorism to achieve their desired goals, whatever they may be. As another individual 
interviewed noted:  
“When you start to look at the reasons that these groups are 




marginalization, a perception of being marginalized, sometimes 
that may be a sense of being marginalized by their own family, by 
their own local community” (Interview 6, 9/26/2016). 
 
This sense of marginalization can be political, social, or economic. When the marginalization 
occurs simultaneously with a lack of development there is a correlation with violent extremism 
specifically but there are other factors as well. First he argues, there may be the emergence of a 
supremacist ideology, often religious, but it can also not be religiously-based as well. By 
supremacist ideology, this analyst means “ideology that doesn't just say that they are the correct 
ideology but they feel an incumbent pressure to make others believe that or coerce others to 
believe that same sort of ideology [and] even the willingness to use force to create that 
coercion.”  
A second factor, in terms of how marginalization develops, is a lack of space for 
disagreements with the ruling authorities or those in power. In this context, “there’s not an ability 
to express disagreement, whether through political dialogue or parties or inter-religious or inter-
ethnic communication venues” so those that feel excluded may decide violent extremism is their 
best option. He adds the caveat though that support for violent extremism does not necessarily 
mean participation in the violence and that you cannot “undermine both of those groups in the 
same way…you have to find different ways to target those populations” (ibid.) 
A long-time military officer offered similar sentiments. He also suggested that “if the 
government has a good relationship with its population, I think you will see very limited 
problems as far as terrorism… [and] if the government, you know tries…to make concessions 
and tries to maybe meet halfway I think that… there are some groups that that might be the only 
goal, to have recognition from the sitting government.” Yet if the government is militaristic “or 




government and I think there’ll be a segment that will take up arms and do the asymmetric type 
warfare, hitting the weak, soft targets, types of things like that” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016). 
Bureaucracy, Corruption, and Infrastructure 
The idea of spaces then, both literal and metaphorical, brings us to the idea of state 
capacity as a critical factor in terrorism. All of those interviewed in some manner addressed the 
issue focusing on several areas that directly impact state capacity including governance and 
clientelism, administrative capacity, and military capacity while also indirect aspects of capacity 
such as territorial border control and population density. As the foreign affairs officer noted, state 
capacity is a “huge” factor from two perspectives. One factor is that violent extremist 
organizations see vulnerabilities through state capacity and it determines where they go and 
“stand up operations.” The second is that populations where the “government is not providing 
and delivering protections…can’t deliver services and options” become discontent and “violent 
extremist organizations provide alternatives” (Interview 9/16/2016). In short, weak governance is 
a huge factor.  
 The first aspect of state capacity or governance to be considered here is that of the 
administrative capacity of the state. As the long-time military officer put it:  
“[This] boils down to the government, if they have a somewhat 
stable country that can provide services that have you know, basic 
necessities, food, water, shelter, maybe medical facilities or the 
ability to care for their people, you'll see individuals being a little 
bit more content with what's going on…I think it's a big thing if the 
country or government can keep its population…somewhat 
content, you'll find that it'll be a little bit more peaceful” (Interview 
4, 9/20/2016). 
 
The government analyst working on issues in the Lake Chad region offered similar sentiments, 
noting that terrorism emerges where the state does not have good governance models. He also 




system and the people are critical because they depend on the individuals that make up the state 
to enforce things and send them whatever benefits, such as taxes or information, that make the 
system work. If the state relies on “very narrow lines of communication, it creates the 
opportunity for the intermediary” (ibid.) in this case a terrorist movement.  
A former law enforcement officer and interrogator at Guantanamo Bay, the facility where 
the US military holds those captured around the world that are accused of involvement in 
terrorism, offered a slightly different but also similar take on the governance or administrative 
side of capacity. He suggests good governance is about capacity but it is also about willpower 
and “a leader with money and the capacity to control a region may not matter without 
willpower.” Countries such as those in the Islamic Maghreb region of Africa have to have the 
willpower to divert resources to securing the porous regions of their territory. Even so, states 
such as the United Kingdom, with “tremendous capacity still had the IRA” (Interview 9, 
10/5/2016).   
Infrastructure also appeared as a theme throughout these interviews, noted as a major 
component of the state’s administrative capacity. As one individual argued, infrastructure is not 
only a significant part of the security of the state but also as a major component of capacity. It 
likely provides opportunities of employment for citizens as well as necessary services and “if 
you have, and I won’t say ten times out of ten, but I’d say a good majority” of the time if you 
have “the ability to provide basic needs for individuals--clean water, garbage pickup or at least 
some sort of sanitary conditions or environment,” then people are less likely to turn to violence 
or extremism (Interview 4, 9/20/2016). As the Lake Chad region analyst noted, the choice to 
build a road or school in one community is a double-edged sword. In one sense it may 




a minority ethnic community for example there may be tensions that develop with the state. At 
the same time the same road or school might be the factor that ends up minimizing the sense of 
marginalization if done well (Interview 6, 9/26/2016). 
As the foreign affairs officer noted, infrastructure is key because “it moves people and 
ideas…it provides people options and alternatives to these groups. So as a way to move goods, 
opportunities to go to other areas for other economic opportunities, opportunities to get to school, 
to get an education” (Interview 2, 9/16/2016). Another individual who has worked on the issue 
of terrorism at several US intelligence agencies suggested that infrastructure can act as a “beacon 
for dissatisfaction and for grievance” which allows it to become a propaganda tool for extremist 
groups when infrastructure is lacking as it undermines the credibility of the official governing 
body of the state (Interview 8, 9/28/2016). The foreign affairs officer also added “it'd be unique 
to see if you can sort of couch [infrastructure] in a way...when you think about violent extremism 
how infrastructure can provide alternatives to what extremist organizations are offering...I think 
that would be value-added to the current body of research” (Interview 2, 9/16/2016). 
Several interviewed noted the justice system and the rule of law being essential to good 
governance as well as offering a stable alternative to individuals buying into the propaganda or 
services ‘provided’ by militants or terrorists. As a policy analyst noted, the state is responsible 
for providing an equitable justice system and when it does not “then terrorist organizations can 
move in and impose a level of peace, a justice system, even you know [if] the justice code by 
which they live is appalling in many ways but it is a system” (Interview 5, 9/23/2016). As the 
military officer also notes, when the rule of law is applied equally then people will “respect 




When the system of justice is inequitable or the political system is corrupt there are 
opportunities for terrorist organizations to succeed in challenging the state as well according to 
several of those interviewed. Corruption came up frequently in an interview with an analyst who 
conducts research on drug trafficking and transnational threats including money laundering, 
trafficking in weapons and drugs, and other global criminal activity for a federal agency. As she 
discussed in terms of the capacity of the state: “most of us who work in… law enforcement state-
side, look at it from the point of view of governance and rule of law which is where my business 
comes from” but “if you have a position in the police force or some other government structure 
you can extract bribes from people to get certain things done” that weakens capacity: 
“[A]t the borders for example, border guards take bribes to let 
people through. And sometimes those organizations or police will 
set up additional checkpoints that are not required or are not 
official but are in places where they can extract more bribes. And 
that doesn’t have to do with official governance. It has to do with 
enabling people in those positions to look out for themselves…I'm 
thinking of it as a pyramid but basically the idea is a hierarchy 
where the people above empower the people below to do this 
extractive behavior and they look out for each other. [A]ny place 
that has this model in place is going to [be] vulnerable to having 
low state capacity because they're not even trying to have good 
state capacity. If the West pours money in it's not going to fix the 
problem we want to fix...it's not going to improve capacity if you 
have this suction process where resources are being taken away as 
they come in” (Interview 3, 9/19/2016). 
 
Furthermore, as noted by the DC think tank analyst working on the Middle East and Africa 
argues, corruption combined with other factors discussed thus far such as marginalization 
increases the appeal of the rhetoric coming from terrorist organizations.  
Military and Security Apparatus 
In addition to the bureaucratic and infrastructural capacity of the state, several of those 




as police forces to combat terrorist threats to the state. The common theme among the comments 
those interviewed made regarding the military capacity of the state is the double-edged nature of 
the state’s security apparatus. The vice-president at a think tank that has worked on terrorism 
from an academic but not policy standpoint summed up this concept as a balance between too 
little and too much capacity. He suggested that if the military of the state cannot provide security 
for the people then organizations such as terrorist groups may come along to protect them 
(Interview 10, 10/12/2016).  
A former foreign policy advisor concurred with this point. As he suggested, when you 
cannot “depend on the central government for your protection, then you have to start looking 
elsewhere. Whether it’s a tribal leader, a terrorist group like ISIS. You need someone that can 
provide that stability and protection for you and your family.” Yet as the vice-president of a 
think tank also noted, “the flipside is a military [when] able, [can] quash…[or] crush any nascent 
rebellion before it generates much popular support” and “the mere act of decimating a potential 
challenger will strongly discourage copy-cats” (Interview 1, 9/12/2016).  
There is a consequence to relying on the use of violent force to establish order however, 
as noted by the policy analyst working on issues in the Middle East and Africa. When 
individuals start to associate violence with state actors it can create the feeling that the state is 
not interested in the grievances of its citizens and “that is an easy area for extremists to exploit 
because it’s easy to make the state look like it’s merely a predator rather than an institution 
looking to support its population” (Interview 5, 9/23/2016).  Part of military capacity then, noted 
two of those interviewed, is the nature of the state. The former Defense advisor argues “in most 
authoritarian or even autocratic states…they can probably stamp it out a little better because civil 




In contrast, he believes democracies cannot use the same draconian measures as used by 
authoritarian leaders. Democracies though can minimize or marginalize terrorists so they are not 
acceptable to the broader society. Northern Ireland and the IRA were one example mentioned. 
The problem of course then is how to negotiate with terrorists, as in the case of IRA. In short, 
these policymakers argue state militaries or security forces using violence against their own 
people may create order in the short-term but may create opportunities for backlash and support 
of extremism in the long-term. As one put it, “it’s all about balance” (Interview 8, 9/28/2016).  
Related to military capacity in general, the capacity for intelligence gathering by the 
military and security forces specifically is an essential factor as noted by the former Defense 
advisor. Intelligence operations by the state military but also by local police can mitigate 
terrorism in the state. Again, important to this capability is the relationship between the state and 
the people. As he argues, having people that belong to the same community “being willing to 
share information with the authorities about extremists and those engaged in terrorism in their 
specific communities” affects the state’s ability to use its resources to provide security and deter 
terrorism (Interview 1, 9/12/2016). The long-time military officer similarly suggested that the 
seeds of rebellion or anti-state movements emerge where the state’s security apparatus is lacking. 
Even in authoritarian states where the military apparatus is a major component of governing, 
unless “you have someone standing on a street corner [and] you pretty much are watching 
everywhere” then inevitably “there are going to be places where the government, or the police, 
or whoever you wanna call who is in charge, may not have full control over that territory” 






Territory and Density   
Finally, several of those interviewed touched on the idea of space to act or “stand up 
operations” as one individual put it (Interview 2, 9/16/2016), leading to a discussion of some of 
the indirect aspects of state capacity including territory and population density. Related to the 
security capacity of the state then is the state’s ability to maintain control over its borders and 
sparsely populated regions. The long-time military officer noted that these areas are where 
individuals such as terrorists use not for hostile acts but instead for “rest and recuperation” or 
“fundraising, places where they can lay low or get training” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016). In other 
words, all of the things that go into being a terrorist movement that are not essentially direct 
attacks on a civilian population.  
Several interviewed mentioned specific examples that particularly illustrate the idea of 
territorial control and population density. Indonesia’s sparsely populated regions allow terrorists 
and others to operate and promote extremist ideologies such as Salafist interpretations of Islam 
as one analyst noted. The former foreign policy advisor to multiple vice presidents focused on 
the example of ISIS in Iraq and Syria where “you don’t have centralized governments that 
exercise effective control over the whole country itself” and in the case of Iraq it was “sectarian 
policies of the Maliki government in Baghdad” that led to alienation of populations in the 
sparsely populated territories along the border with Syria. On that side of the border “you had the 
2011 Syrian army fall apart, so [al Qaeda in Iraq which later became ISIS] moved to Syria [and] 
it gave them oxygen they needed to survive and grow” after the surge in US troops in Iraq at the 
end of the Bush administration. That control of space, he noted, gives groups a dedicated source 




In summary, those interviewed offered a broad set of explanatory factors when it came to 
the origins of terrorism in the developing world, why terrorist organizations or extremist groups 
utilizing terrorism emerge in some countries in Africa and Asia but not others. There was 
however more consensus on the role the capacity of the state plays in both allowing for these 
non-state actors to gain a foothold in the state as well as how areas of weakness in several 
aspects of governance lead to threats to the state apparatus. Space for operations was generally 
the most consistent theme. As the analyst that previously worked with refugees in East Africa 
argued, terrorist movements succeed in gaining the support of the people when ungoverned or 
poorly governed spaces exist (Interview 5, 9/23/2016). Therefore in terms of implications for 
policymakers, the capacity of the state looms as a significant challenge. As the former foreign 
policy advisor in two administrations argued:  
“We made a huge financial investment in Iraq and Afghanistan 
trying to [build capacity] and it doesn't appear to have worked so 
you know that's a huge problem for policymakers because it has...if 
it's right that these are the key issues that are creating the breeding 
grounds for the rise of terrorist groups and they're next-to 
unsolvable, [so] that means we don't have a lot of good options 
going forward” (Interview 7, 9/28/2016). 
 
Terrorism and State Capacity in the Developing World: Theory and Hypotheses 
The capacity of the state to put down threats to the status quo impacts the success or 
failure of the mobilization of terrorist movements but can also increase terrorist attacks in the 
wake of higher capacity. Informed by both the scholarly literature on terrorism as well as my 
interviews with policymakers and analysts, the following details my assumptions regarding how 
direct and indirect elements of the capacity of a given state explain why such groups emerge in 
certain parts of the developing world and not in others. In terms of direct factors, I consider these 




establishment of institutions, and implementation. In contrast, indirect factors are considered to 
be elements that the state must account for via its ability to govern in an effective and efficient 
manner. In one sense a state can invest heavily in its military or expand its revenue-generating or 
information-gathering capacity via spending or legislation. In another, the challenges of 
repressive tactics alongside clientelistic practices can affect security and development 
simultaneously.  
Direct Factors of State Capacity: Military and Security 
 
How the state responds to nascent threats from extremist groups that challenge the 
security of the state through acts of terrorism has an inevitable impact on the growth and success 
of those movements in the developing world. When the state lacks the capacity to respond to 
domestic issues it cannot effectively respond to violence that occurs as a result. As a portion of 
the population becomes radicalized under a particular ideological cause, the state may lack the 
perceived ability to intervene against a movement. As noted in the previous chapter, the state’s 
ability to use its security apparatus to counter terrorist movements has been found to be an 
important factor in prior studies of terrorism and capacity (Mason, Weingarten & Fett 1999; 
Derouen & Sobek 2004; Hendrix 2010; Shelton, Stojek & Sullivan 2013; Hendrix & Young 
2014). Those interviewed for this chapter also highlighted how critical the state’s ability to have 
what Weber (1919) called a monopoly over violence is an essential aspect of state capacity. 
If a monopoly is not held by the state then, rebel movements of any nature can find their 
opportunity to build up as a challenge against the state. Conventional wisdom has been that the 
state’s ability to root out terrorist threats and use the state’s security forces to deter terrorism. 




for why an increase in the state’s capacity to use military force can in fact result in a backlash by 
non-state actors resorting to terrorism. Therefore, to test that suggestion, I hypothesize: 
H1: as the state’s military capability increases, terrorism increases. 
 
While gaps in the state’s military apparatus in terms of territorial control can result in terrorist 
attacks succeeding, terrorism in response to political repression, discussed in a later section, that 
relies on brutal military force may increase terrorist attacks. When the particular movement has a 
religious background, common in the current religious wave of terrorism, it can also activate 
nationalistic support among a discontent ethno-religious group, which may even come from 
factions of the state’s military apparatus.  
Direct Factors of State Capacity: Administration and Bureaucracy  
 
While military capacity against a challenge to the status quo by the state in the short-term 
may or may not deter terrorism, a state’s long-term ability to administer or manage its territory 
and people matters as well and probably more so in the long run. As previously noted, the 
administrative capacity of the state has been found to be more effective against terrorist 
movements than military capabilities (Hendrix & Young 2014). Administrative capacity that 
inhibits or deters contentious behavior can take many forms, including but most importantly the 
dispersion of resources and the collection of information.  
Several aspects of administrative capacity that were highlighted during the interview 
process are important to consider here as elements of what I am referring to overall as the 
administrative capacity of the state. First, infrastructure forms the backbone of the state’s 
capabilities to interact with the population in nearly every shape and manner. By infrastructure I 
refer to everything from the roads that allow access from the capital to distant territorial reaches 




population to establish a well-informed citizenry, hospitals and local police forces that offer 
safety and protection, and telecommunications that allow for the people of the state to interact 
with those outside their own community. As one individual interviewed put it, infrastructure 
allows for the movement of not just goods and employment opportunities but ideas as well. 
Infrastructure both metaphorically and literally fills the spaces within the state where extremist 
ideologies may develop in isolation and without challenge otherwise.  
As one might guess though, infrastructure alone can have a double-edged sword effect 
like raw military capability. From the United Kingdom to the United States to the countries of 
the developing and developed regions of the world, the ease of movement of information can 
also be used by the same terrorist movements several of those interviewed argue it can help to 
counter. ISIS from its start as a splinter of other terrorist movements in Iraq and Syria has found 
success in using the internet to transmit its ideology and to radicalize individuals from thousands 
of miles away. Attacks in the US, Canada, Western Europe, and elsewhere have been claimed by 
ISIS but carried out by members that “joined” their movement without ever stepping foot in 
Syria or Iraq. None of the aforementioned states are those that would be considered as lacking 
capacity to counter terrorist movements.  
The ability of the state then to provide deterrents and alternatives to joining terrorist 
movements through its administrative capabilities is an essential layer to the administrative 
capacity side of the argument. Providing educational and employment opportunities can 
minimize discontent. Several of those interviewed noted that while ideologically-driven 
members of Boko Haram, ISIS, and al Qaeda exist, large portions of their membership are driven 
by economic or non-ideological motivations. Opportunities and alternatives alone however 




the United Kingdom again are illustrative cases of where capacity can only be relied upon to do 
so much in limiting, not eliminating, threats from non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.  
Therefore, the state’s ability to enforce the laws and effectively run the institutions that 
make up the state in an equitable manner is a final essential factor. A functioning judiciary that 
citizens have trust in and a political system that provides opportunities for those discontent with 
the status quo matter as much as the buildings and roads and educational or employment 
opportunities. For these reasons then, I hypothesize  
H2: as the state’s administrative capacity increases, terrorism decreases. 
 
As opportunities for terrorist organizations are created by the lack of a presence of the state on 
the ground or through other bureaucratic means, groups can form and challenge the state from 
within its claimed territory.  
Indirect Factors of State Capacity: Repression and Marginalization  
 
The state’s ability to use both of these dimensions of state capacity to identify and disrupt 
terrorist movements within their territory cannot be considered in isolation. While the state has to 
maintain its capabilities to defend itself and provide resources to its citizens, both the scholarly 
literature and those interviewed highlight the fact that this is a matter of balance when it comes 
to state capacity. In other words, state capacity is critical to the operation of the state but there is 
such a thing as too much of a good thing. Too much use of the state’s military and administrative 
apparatus to push back against resistance to the state’s authority can have the same effect as 
leaving open space for movements to gain control in areas of the state. As resistance movements 
take shape but find themselves isolated or threatened by an intense response from the state 
apparatus, I expect to see groups and their members resorting to terrorism as a tactical response 




Marginalization of certain populations in the state was another topic that regularly came 
up not only in talks with policymakers and think tank analysts but in the academic literature as 
well. In spite of the characterization of some states as democracies, many of the states within the 
developing world face challenges of internal instability and subsequent regime change on a 
regular basis. While states such as Indonesia have been relatively stable in terms of their 
democratic governance, countries such as Somalia have experienced abject failure of a central 
government for years. Other states that have been perceived as moderately successful 
democracies since the 1990s have in the past decade fallen to coups. Mali in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Thailand in Southeast Asia are notable examples. 
Even long-time authoritarian regimes in some countries have fallen as in the case of 
Libya after the Arab Spring. In most of these cases, unstable governments have witnessed 
fundamentalist groups challenge their authority over territory and terrorist organizations bring 
chaos to their capital cities as well as the far-flung reaches of their country. States that have 
found a balance between secular and democratic rule and also have found a way of satisfying the 
concerns of minority groups with religious demands in the developing world find themselves 
better able to prevent violent extremist movements that resort to terrorism. Therefore I 
hypothesize that: 
H3: more democratic regimes where citizens participate in institutions reduce 
terrorism. 
 
Some of those interviewed noted that essentially what can serve as a deterrent to buying into a 
terrorist movement’s rhetoric on top of economic opportunities is inclusion in the political 
process. Therefore, higher levels of democratic principles without stigmatization or isolation of 




No matter the nature of the regime though, the combination of increasing the military 
capacity of the state with the effect of the administrative capacity may not be as clear-cut as a 
negative indicator of terrorism. In fact, as the state expands its ability both militarily and 
bureaucratically to suppress activity by discontent actors, something else may occur. The 
response of the state to discontent movements with political goals being a harsh, violent 
crackdown can serve as the motivation for terrorist movements in the developing world. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H4: as states increase their resources militarily and bureaucratically, terrorist 
attacks increase. 
 
As the administrative and military capacity of the state rise, extremist groups that seek to 
challenge the status quo turn to terrorism more often to achieve their goals.  
Indirect Factors of State Capacity: Clientelism, Corruption and Control  
 
The state’s capacity through spending and the establishment of institutions that serve as 
deterrents and outlets to discontent groups is one important aspect of how a state can respond to 
the threat of terrorism. Indirectly though, the state’s control of a particular territory is another 
aspect of capacity that deserves specific consideration. In cases where the state struggles to 
maintain its authority over distant regions or minimally-populated provinces, groups of 
discontent individuals find opportunities to steadily build a movement.  
The regions under consideration in this dissertation offer a myriad of cases where states 
exist with varying territorial sizes. States in North Africa contain large swathes of desert that lack 
almost any aspect of the state in the form of infrastructure or administrative influence on the 
ground. Sub-Saharan states also contain deserts and remote areas of forest and jungles that have 
been integral to the success or at least prolonged existence of rebel movements across the region. 




but also large archipelagos that make centralization of power difficult even without movements 
against the state. In all of these regions, one can travel for miles without encountering tangible 
forms of the state or even large numbers of inhabitants. As some interviewed noted, these open 
spaces can offer non-state actors like terrorist organizations areas to set up shop for training and 
fundraising or just areas where they can lay low after striking at the state through a terrorist 
attack. This concept of open space creates opportunities for strongholds of resistance to develop. 
How spread out the state’s population is will affect how influential a state with insufficient 
control can be in monitoring its territory. I hypothesize:  
H5: states with low population density will experience more terrorism. 
 
Another potential outcome for states that have the challenge of controlling distant 
populations and minimally-regulated territories is the growth of clientelistic practices by local 
officials that lack oversight from a centralized and influential state apparatus. Many states within 
Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia experience challenges with corrupt and 
clientelistic behavior at the local, state, and national level. From bribery in legislatures to 
clientelistic behavior among politicians in the ‘frontier’ provinces of a country, how corrupt a 
state is unquestionably affects its ability to enforce laws and regulate activity. As one individual 
interviewed suggested, when border guards are taking bribes to let people through, that is an area 
where state capacity to prevent terrorist organizations from moving freely in a territory is 
weakened. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) find that terrorism increases in the wake of states being 
more corrupt. However, even though states may certainly be weakened in their ability to govern, 
this may also provide an outlet to non-state actors. Discontent groups may find themselves the 
recipients of payoffs or access that has a suppressing effect on how motivated groups are to carry 




H6: clientelism actually decreases terrorist activity. 
 
The example provided by Tuanstad (2010), summarized in Chapter Two, is illustrative of this 
point. In the case of Palestine between 2004 and 2007 several groups allied and clients of figures 
in the Palestinian Authority increased violent terrorist activity in response to the threat posed by 
democratic elections and reforms that would potentially sever the benefits provided from the 
existing patron-client relationship. Thus the presence of clientelistic relationships between 
terrorist movements and figures in the state potentially reduces activity.  
In summary, the capacity of the state administratively through the rule of law has been 
found to be significant in explaining a decrease in terrorist attacks in a given state (Choi 2010; 
Hendrix and Young 2014) while the capacity of the state militarily has been found to be 
significant in raising the likelihood of terrorist activity (Hendrix and Young 2014). Logically 
then, the combination of the two has to be considered as well. If a state responds in a way that is 
perceived as harsh or extremely violent to challenges to the status quo through increased military 
and administrative capacity, this tension may flare into a major movement against the authority 
of the state. In addition, there are several components of the state that indirectly affect its 
capacity to counter the operations of terrorist organizations. A state with large swathes of 
relatively uncontrolled territory or a history of clientelistic behavior must be factored in to the 
equation when explaining why some states in the developing world experience the violence of 
terrorism and others have not.  
A Note on State Capacity, Terrorism, and the Potential for Endogeneity  
 Logically there is the potential for the two major concepts under consideration in this 
dissertation, state capacity and terrorism, to impact one another. While the hypotheses presented 




reverse may be true. Several other scholars attempt to account for or rectify this concern 
theoretically and methodologically. The theoretical discussion of endogeneity between the two 
concepts is presented here while alternative methodological suggestions from the literature will 
be discussed in Chapter Four.  
Terrorism, Military Capacity, and Endogeneity  
In terms of terrorism and military capacity, Chenoweth points out that many policies such 
as military occupations can motivate a portion of the population to attack the offending country 
but even when demands of groups are met this may create more resentment among other 
constituents (2013, p. 369). Further Chenoweth argues that “it is not clear whether democracies 
initiate conflict with authoritarian regimes because they have been targeted by transnational 
terrorism or anticipate that they will be” and “we should not be surprised to find that the 
initiation of conflict is followed by terrorism, since anticipation of terrorism was the pretext for 
the conflict itself (370).” 
Similarly, Hendrix and Young (2014) argue a reciprocal relationship between state 
capacity and terrorism is understandable theoretically because “if governments are strategic they 
will likely respond to armed attacks by bolstering military assets” and go on to argue that “it 
would be more surprising if states did not respond to violent dissent with an increase in military 
spending and hiring” (p. 354). In short if governments anticipate violent action that will be taken 
against the state they may spend more on military resources and increase the number of soldiers. 
Other forms of conflict do suggest that violent activity is likely to impact state capacity. 
In studying civil war and state capacity, Thies (2010) finds that there is an endogenous 
relationship between civil war and state capacity. In fact civil violence actually affects state 




once this is controlled. Coggins (2015) argues terrorism is endogenous to various measures of 
state failure and finds that most failing and failed states are not predisposed to terrorism but 
states going through political collapse are significantly more likely to experience terrorist acts. 
She also argues that war fighting’s relationship to terrorism has not received sufficient 
theoretical attention,” arguing that much of the relationship between the two can be explained by 
“terrorism as war fighting (p. 457).”  
Coggins breaks state failure down into three categories with measures that she argues are 
not endogenous to terrorism: human insecurity, state incapacity, and political collapse. Through 
cross-panel analysis Coggins finds little support for a relationship between increases in state 
weakness and local groups’ perpetration of terrorism. There is a relationship between certain 
types of state failure such as human insecurity, state incapacity, and political collapse and 
increases in terrorist activity. She finds instead, and counterintuitively, that as a country’s 
development improves incidences of terrorism increase (p. 457).  
Terrorism, Administrative Capacity, and Endogeneity  
 In terms of administrative capacity several variables are endogenous to state capacity 
including the size of a state, the terrain and forestation of a country, and infrastructure like roads 
and telephone lines (Englehart 2009). Macroeconomic variables have been one conceptual area 
scholars note the potential for endogeneity between terrorism and economic factors (Arin 2016). 
And in terms of education as an administrative capacity concept, previous literature suggests 
terrorism and other forms of political violence impairs the specific administrative capacity 
element of education (Thyne 2006; Dreher, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2011) but Brockhoff (2015) 
argues that in terrorized economies there may be a lower demand for education and thus an 




Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul (2013) find no influence of terrorism on economic growth 
for several regional samples. As summarized by Hendrix (2010) however, while GDP per capita 
is an advantageous measure of administrative capacity for its widespread availability for 
numerous states over a long time frame it is highly correlated with other measures of 
bureaucratic and administrative capacity and thus the endogeneity of institutions and level of 
economic development is a persistent problem in the study of comparative economic 
development (see also Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001).  
While the issue of endogeneity between these concepts to conflict is not unique to 
administrative capacity, it is likely to be magnified when considering the rule of law and 
bureaucratic quality for example (p. 277). Hutchison and Johnson (2011) look at the endogenous 
relationship between political capacity and trust and argue that, in the African context, 
government capacity creates trust throughout the public. Theoretically the common thinking that 
trust is required to have effective governance is Euro-centric as an assumption (p. 742). Finally 
Abadie (2006) in studying terrorism uses a measure of political rights instead of civil liberties to 
account for the political climate of the state because endogeneity becomes a concern when states 
begin restricting civil liberties in response to terrorism (p. 52). 
Accounting for Theoretical Endogeneity Concerns  
As presented above there are several concerns in terms of whether changes in state 
capacity drive terrorist activity or whether terrorism inhibits state capacity. Based on the review 
of theoretical discussions regarding this issue of endogeneity I now provide my own theoretical 
interpretation of how endogeneity may be a factor in understanding state capacity and terrorism 




As argued by Hendrix and Young it is logical that states will respond to attacks against 
the state or its citizens by increasing military spending, developing new military units, and 
implementing new tactics to respond to nascent threats within the state. Therefore military 
capacity is likely to be responsive to any new threat introduced be it terrorists, rebels, or outside 
actors. As noted by Coggins the relationship between war fighting and terrorism has not received 
as much direct attention and finds that the type of capacity-based changes implemented drives 
terrorist activity in response.  
Thus as noted previously in my assumptions and hypotheses it is how the state utilizes 
improved forms of military capacity that drives the hypothesized increase in political violence in 
the form of terrorism in the developing world. As states establish more effective forms of 
military organization, redirect resources to counterterrorism, and in turn potentially misuse or are 
perceived as misusing these new resources and structures non-state actors are likely to respond. 
The response then is likely to be further, more targeted, violence against not just the civilian 
populace but likely those that represent the state’s military as well.  
In terms of administrative capacity and endogeneity there is reasonable concern that 
several administrative or bureaucratic concepts are not only endogenous with terrorism but 
endogenous to one another as well as economic measures of the state, the size of the state, and 
various concepts typically used to control for potential alternative explanations. While some such 
as Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul find no influence of terrorism on economic growth there is a 
logic to considering reverse causality beyond this direct relationship when considering the 
damage terrorism does to other elements of the state such as Brockhoff’s argument regarding 
education which then impacts economic activity in the state. For the purposes of this dissertation 




also face potential endogeneity issues with terrorism. Like military capacity, as the state begins 
to create its response to a nascent terrorist threat the state’s administrative capacity may increase 
but indirectly may contribute to more terrorist activity as well when repressive tactics are 
considered.  
In short any state reasonably is going to react to the earliest potential terrorist threats by 
finding ways to improve military and administrative capacity, be it organized anti-terror units or 
new legislation governing the charges and proscribed punishment for perpetrators or supporters 
of terrorist acts. As noted by Hutchison and Johnson in their study of political capacity and trust 
though, context matters. For Hutchison and Johnson this referred to the relationship between 
capacity and trust in African governments. The same point applies when considering the state 
taking responsibility for combatting terrorist threats versus creating new laws and military 
entities that can be abused by those in power. This abuse then creates further grievances amongst 
those discontent with the status quo in the state who then support or continue to support terrorism 
as a reasonable alternative. In short the timing of specific changes in capacity is an important 
consideration in understanding the relationship between capacity and terrorism in the developing 
world.  
To provide some insight into the timing of how these factors impact one another and 
attempt to account for concerns related to the potential endogenous relationship between state 
capacity and terrorism the following three empirical chapters use both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to look at the relationship from different perspectives. Chapter Four takes a 
broad look at the regions considered in this dissertation and offers a cross-national analysis of 




binomial analysis to test the relationships between several aspects of state capacity and the 
number of terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan, North African, and Southeast Asian nation-states.  
Several measures of military and administrative capacity are considered yet, as noted 
above, the theoretical potential for endogeneity remains. Therefore in Chapters Five and Six I 
delve into four of the factors found to be significant in Chapter Four: administrative capacity, 
military capacity, repression, and corruption. Again, while all four are found to be significant in 
Chapter Four, endogeneity remains a consideration. The goal then with each case study is to 
elucidate the story of how each region responds to the development of terrorist groups like Boko 
Haram and Jemaah Islamiyah, thus identifying how increases in military capacity and 
administrative capacity after the development of a group impact its activity.  
In Chapter Five I focus on the aforementioned case of Boko Haram and its impact on four 
states in the West Sub-Saharan African region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. All four are 
concentrated around the Lake Chad region as is a majority of the activity of Boko Haram. In 
addition all four respond to the development and spread of Boko Haram into their territory with 
various changes to military and administrative capacity. Yet in all four cases the implementation 
of new military units, inclusion of vigilance committees as additional security support in each 
state, and new laws defining and criminalizing support or involvement with terrorist groups has 
come with misuse of these capabilities and continued and in some cases increased terrorist 
activity.  
In contrast in Chapter Six I consider four Southeast Asian states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Singapore. I consider each through the same four factors and find Given that the 
rise of Jemaah Islamiyah dates back to the 1990s the states in Southeast Asia adjusted over a 




threats though including al Qaeda and the Islamic State entering the region and local threats to 
states like the Philippines in the case of Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) require continued adaptation to present circumstances.  
Reorganization of military and police units, redefining terrorism and establishing new 
legal statutes and procedures, and improving intelligence gathering and monitoring of terrorist 
activity all are examples of improved bureaucratic and military capacity taken on by the four 
subject states in the last few decades. Informal approaches and coordination with private groups 
occurs as well but a major difference between the two regional cases is the more rehabilitative 
approach taken by Southeast Asian states in both counter-propaganda and prison rehabilitation 
programs. Thus when comparing the trends in activity between the newer phenomenon of Boko 
Haram in the Lake Chad region versus that of Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia where 
different tactics and programs have been employed, we can observe, while keeping in mind the 
limits of generalizability with the case study approach, the chronology of events and the change 
in terrorist activity in response to changes in state capacity. The findings from these chapters as 
well as on the concern regarding endogeneity between terrorism and state capacity will be 












Chapter 4: Cross-National Analysis of Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 
 In the preceding chapters I presented a discussion of terrorism and state capacity in the 
developing world among those in the academic and policy communities as well as my own 
theoretical argument. In short, the overarching theory guiding this chapter examines the capacity 
of the state to use the combination of bureaucratic and military capabilities to take on the threats 
posed by terrorist groups acting against the state within their territory. When a state responds in a 
way that individuals perceive as harsh or indiscriminate, these tensions flare up quickly in some 
cases to mass movements against the authority of the state. Weaknesses in the state’s capacity to 
provide for its population or the outright misuse of resources through clientelistic practices may 
lead to a response from the population including the rise of non-state actors against the authority 
of the state as well.  
In this chapter I test the relationships between those proposed factors. This chapter begins 
with a discussion of the empirical design used to assess state capacity and terrorism in the 
developing world at a broad level of analysis and then provide the results of those empirical 
tests. Military capacity, measured through a general accounting of the strength of a state’s 
military force, and administrative capacity, measured through a series of proxies that account for 
both infrastructural and rule of law-driven concepts, are the primary focus of the analysis. I also 
consider repression and clientelism as factors of the state’s behavior in responding to citizens and 
non-state threats like terrorist groups. The results of this chapter find significant support for the 
theoretical arguments regarding military capacity and repression driving terrorist activity. 
Administrative capacity is also a significant factor, but the relationship runs against the 




hypothesized relationship between corruption and terrorist activity. Later chapters will drill down 
on military capacity, repression, administrative capacity, and clientelism, the factors of 
significance in this analysis.  
Research Design for Cross-National Analysis  
 I begin with a cross-national analysis of states in select regions of the developing world 
where state capacity still lags behind other regions. This analysis includes all countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, illustrated in Figure 4.1 with a few noted 
exceptions. While similar issues play out between discontent groups and states with varying 
levels of state capacity elsewhere, states in the African and Asian regions have been at the 










    
Many of the notable terrorist movements outside of the Middle East in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries develop within these territorial regions since the end of the Cold 





War, much more so than other developing regions such as South America and Eastern Europe as 
depicted in Figure 4.2.  
 
As for the Middle East, many of the terrorist movements long precede the time period under 
consideration in this chapter. I analyze terrorism and capacity in the states listed in Table 4.1  
 
 
from 1985 to 2012.  This time frame includes the development of terrorist organizations in the 
regions after events such as the Iranian Revolution, a notable point in the rise of religious 
terrorism, and during the waning days of the Cold War and Soviet-funded left-wing terrorism 
(Choi 2010). In total, sixty-five countries fall within the regions specified but several drop out of 
the analysis due to missing data. Figure 4.1 provides a map of the countries under consideration. 
A few countries such as Eritrea and Timor-Leste are included once they gain independence while 
I exclude South Sudan, only a country for a handful of years, from the analysis.  
The dependent variable for this analysis is a count of terrorist attacks in a country per 
year. While there are arguments for distinguishing between transnational and domestic terror 
events (Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev 2011) I believe in the context of understanding the 
Figure 4.2 Terrorist Events, Selected Regions (1985-2012)   




capacity of the state to prevent incidents of terrorism this distinction is unnecessary. A successful 
terrorist attack on a state be it by a domestically-focused group or a transnational terrorist  
 
movement still indicates a degree of weakness in the state’s capacity to prevent an attack. I 
obtain data for this variable from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2016) which lists 
terrorist attacks by six hundred identifiable groups in this region in the specified time frame.9 
                                                          
9 Because the GTD dataset does not include data for 1993, I average the count data for 1992 and 1994 in each case as done by others to deal 
with this issue (Choi 2010). As noted by the GTD’s codebook, “incidents of terrorism from 1993 are not present in the GTD because they were 
lost prior to START’s compilation of the GTD from multiple data collection efforts. Several efforts were made to recollect these incidents from 
original news sources. Unfortunately, due to the challenges of retrospective data collection for events that happened more than 20 years ago, 
the number of 1993 cases for which sources were identified is only 15% of estimated attacks. As a consequence START excludes all 1993 attacks 
as an actual count” (START 2016, p. 3).  
Table 4.1 Countries under Analysis 
North Africa 
 
Algeria Libya Morocco  Tunisia 
Egypt    
    
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Angola Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Senegal 
Benin Eritrea Malawi Seychelles 
Botswana Ethiopia Mali Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso Gabon Mauritania Somalia 
Burundi Gambia Mauritius South Africa 
Cameroon  Ghana Mozambique Sudan 
Cape Verde Guinea Namibia eSwatini  
Central African 
Rep. 
Guinea-Bissau Niger Tanzania 
Chad Ivory Coast Nigeria  Togo 
Comoros Kenya Rep. of the Congo Uganda 
Djibouti Lesotho Rwanda Zambia 
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
Liberia Sao Tome & 
Principe 
Zimbabwe 
    
Southeast Asia 
 
Cambodia Laos Myanmar Singapore 
Brunei Malaysia Philippines  Thailand 
Indonesia   Vietnam 




START researchers use a mixture of automated and manual data collection strategies for 
deciding when to include an incident as a terrorist attack and when to categorize an event as a 
non-terrorist incident. Using keyword filters that search through approximately one million open-
source media articles on any topic published globally in a given day in over 160 countries and 
over 80 languages, researchers refine the pool of articles and then manually reviews the final 
subset to ensure events meet GTD inclusion criteria. To be included in the GTD dataset, an event 
must be documented by one source recognized by START as a high-quality source. Six coding 
teams focused on location, perpetrators, targets, weapons and tactics, casualties and 
consequences, and general information code domain-specific variables for each event included in 
the GTD (START 2016).  
 The GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation” (9) and requires all three of the following elements are present in the 
description of an event for it to be considered for inclusion in the dataset:  
 Incident is intentional—a calculated attack by a perpetrator. 
 Incident involves violence or the threat of violence—damage to people and/or property. 
 Perpetrators of incidents are sub-national actors.  
Additionally, the GTD requires two of the following three criteria are also met for inclusion:  
1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.10 
 
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other 
message to a larger audience than those immediately impacted by an attack. 
 
                                                          




3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.11 
 
Further explanation of the inclusion and exclusion criteria can be found in the GTD codebook.12 
In the majority of cases START researchers attribute a terrorist incident to a particular terrorist 
organization. Of the 5,285 attacks in the regions of interest between 1985 and 2012 1,888 are 
listed as ‘Unknown’ attackers so I cannot disaggregate between different types of terrorist 
organizations for this analysis. The average number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year is 
approximately fifteen but varies largely depending on the country. The maximum count for the 
number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year is Nigeria in 2012 with 616 listed incidents.13 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics  
Variables Observations  Mean Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
Terror Attacks  1792 10.454 38.891 0 616 
Terror Attacks (t-1) 1729 9.752 34.879 0 354 
Terror Attacks (t-2) 1665 9.471 33.7 0 344 
Military capacity 1529 2.06e-10  1 -2.138 2.382 
Public Administration  1708  1.98  .966 0 4 
Relative Political Allocation 
(RPA) 
1637  1.024 .161 .59 1.297 
Relative Political Reach (RPR) 1637 1.007 .357 .237 1.694 
Military*Public Administration  1458 -.378 2.121 -6.413 3.818 
Military*RPA 1435 -.023 .988  -2.691 2.127 
Military*RPR 1435 .0157 .983 -2.460 2.488 
Phone Service (Per 100) 1757 3.74 7.078 0 49.71 
Participation in Democracy  1707 .390 .198 .035 .851 
Political Terror Scale (State) 1763  1.847 1.088 0 4 
Population Density (Log) 1783 3.738 1.402 .334 8.926 
Political Corruption 1736 .650 .211 .03 .964 
GDP per Capita (Log) 1679 6.690  1.236 4.171 10.905 
Chief Exec a Military Officer 1685 .386  .487 0 1 
                                                          
11 GTD recognizes this as acts not permitted by international humanitarian law, specifically the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-
combatants.  
12 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf  




Major Conflict  1792 .057 .233 0 1 
Land Area (Log) 1784 11.999 2.138 6.13 13.683 
I group the independent variables into two general categories of state capacity. Structural 
capacity factors such as the size of the military and the bureaucratic or administrative ability of 
the state make up the first grouping of variables. State behavior factors such as clientelism and 
repression fall into the second grouping. I also include several controls. Robust standard errors 
are clustered on the country account for structural issues with the data.  
Structural Capacity Factors: Military & Administrative Capacity  
 To measure military capacity I use a factor-analysis14 based composite approach of 
military capacity (Hendrix and Young 2014) based on variables from the National Material 
Capabilities dataset, a subset of the Correlates of War data established in the 1970s (Singer, 
Bremer and Stuckey 1972). As they note, this is preferable to the Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) score approach in the NMC dataset.15 I operationalize Military Capacity as 
military capability based on military personnel, military expenditures, and military expenditures 
per soldier. I expect a one unit increase in the index measure for military capacity to result in an 
increase in the number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year. As the size of the budget and 
military force in terms of soldiers expands in a given country-year, the number of terrorist 
attacks will increase as well. Responses to terrorism that rely on brute or overwhelming military 
force that can also involve repressive tactics or indiscriminate killing and not in any way work 
towards a reconciliation with those fighting the status quo of the regime leads to a response in 
kind from terrorist movements.  
                                                          
14 See Appendix D for discussion of the factor analysis approach.  




To measure the Administrative Capacity of the state I use several measures of 
administrative capacity in different models to both account for different conceptual measures of 
administrative capacity but also to serve as a check on other measures. While a variety of 
measures on specific infrastructural aspects such as the number and quality of public facilities 
may be more enlightening for this measure, limited or unavailable data over time for states in the 
region of analysis precludes this approach. To account for public infrastructure in some way I 
use a measure of Telephone Service or the proportion of fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 
people as a proxy for infrastructure development. The measure refers to the sum of active fixed 
telephone lines, voice-over-IP subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop subscriptions, ISDN voice 
channel equivalents, and fixed public payphones. The data is from the International 
Telecommunication Union via the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. As the 
proportion increases I expect the number of terrorist attacks to decrease. The state’s long-term 
ability to administer or manage territory and people through services such as telephone service 
leads to citizens not becoming dissatisfied with the status quo if their needs are being met. 
 In addition I look at aspects of legal capacity of the state to account for the state’s ability 
to implement the rule of law and effectively utilize public institutions. A measure on Rigorous 
and Impartial Public Administration examines the performance of public officials in following 
laws in an unbiased or non-arbitrary manner (Pemstein et al. 2015).  The measure is coded on an 
ordinal scale, converted to an interval of 0-4 in the measurement model. ‘0’ indicates the law is 
not respected and is administered arbitrarily while the high end, ‘4’, indicates law is generally 
respected in full by public officials.  
To examine another approach of understanding the administrative capacity of the state I 




participation in the formal economy—the economy that is taxed and directly supported by public 
infrastructure—to expected participation in the formal economy, estimated as a linear function of 
the structure, size, and degree of social spending in the national economy” (Hendrix & Young 
2014; see also Kugler and Tammen 2012).16 
Finally, in a separate model I include a third measure also derived from the Relative 
Political Performance Data Set. Relative Political Allocation is a composite indicator which 
allows me to understand how public expenditures are prioritized by a government in the 
budgeting process. The RPA measure is estimated for over 150 countries starting in 1970 and 
composed of measures on Secondary School Enrollment, Economic Openness, Government 
Output Ratio, Capital Output Ratio, and several other elements of Public Expenditure Shares.17 
RPA examines the gaps between the actual expenditures on certain sectors and what they refer to 
as the “best” expenditures that maximize economic growth on any particular portion of 
development. Kugler and Tammen define political allocation as “public expenditures on security, 
infrastructure, education, health, housing, or welfare compared to the optimal value that 
maximizes economic growth,” (2012, p. 12) all factors which fit conceptually with how I define 
administrative or administrative capacity. By understanding which sectoral resources 
governments are over- or under-allocating allows us to understand how states develop and 
proceed on a path to prosperity.18 I expect an increase in any of the measures of administrative 
capacity results in the hypothesized decrease in terrorist attacks in a given year. Administrative 
capacity inhibits contention against the state by allowing for the dispersion of resources and the 
collection of information. 
                                                          
16 See Appendix D for further discussion of the RPR measure.   
17 See Appendix D for further discussion of the RPA measure. 




In addition to these measures, I include an interaction term to account for the fact the 
combination of both aspects of capacity impacts terrorist activity in the state. The interaction 
term is included for the military capacity measure and each of the three measures of 
administrative capacity in appropriate models. As hypothesized, the increased ability of the state 
to act both bureaucratically and militarily against perceived threats to its authority is expected to 
increase terrorist attacks in a given country-year. As the bureaucratic and military capacity of the 
state rise, extremist groups that seek to challenge the status quo turn to terrorism more often to 
achieve their goals.  
State Behavior Factors: Democracy, Control and Clientelism    
To better understand the institutions of the state, both for engaging citizens in the 
political process as well as being used as an instrument of repression against those opposed to the 
status quo, I also examine four other factors: population density, democratic institutions, political 
repression, and clientelistic behavior by those in the state apparatus. First, to assess the 
relationship between sparsely populated territory and more terrorist activity in the form of 
terrorist attacks, I use a measure of Population Density or people per square kilometer of land 
area to consider the cleavage that exists between governing those in the population centers of the 
state versus the peripheral regions. Data for this measure comes from the World Bank. I expect a 
decrease in population density to result in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks.  
Second, to account for the effect of democracy on terrorism in the developing world, I 
use a measure from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016). The 
Participation in Democracy Index measures the extent to which participatory democracy is 
achieved in a given state. This includes participation by citizens in all political processes, 




emphasizes participation in civil organizations, direct democracy, participation in elected 
government, and the level of electoral democracy (ibid). 
Third, to understand the use of force by the state in a different manner I use the Political 
Terror Scale to account for Repression. I chose to use the scale developed by Gibney et al. 
(2016) for the annual reports on human rights practices published by the US State Department as 
this is the most complete measure covering the period of interest. The scale ranks each country 
on its experiences of political violence and terror in a particular year on a five-level scale where 
a ‘1’ indicates a secure rule of law and political murders are extremely rare whereas a ‘5’ 
indicates no limits on the means used by governments to pursue personal or ideological goals. I 
recode this scale run from 0 to 4. Coding of the measure ignores violence by non-state actors and 
focuses on measuring levels of violence by the state, ensuring the level of political violence 
being captured in this measure is not including violence by terrorist organizations. The measure 
essentially captures terror by the state and not by terrorists. I expect an increase in this measure 
results in an increase in terrorism by non-state actors in a given country-year. 
The last measure included other than the controls is an index measure for Political 
Corruption that serves as a proxy for the concept of clientelism and its effect on terrorist activity. 
This index accounts for types of corruption which inhibit the state’s ability to perform its duties 
(McMann et al. 2015). The index is created by aggregating measures and taking the average on 
public sector corruption (a combination of public sector bribery and embezzlement), executive 
corruption (a combination of executive bribery and embezzlement), legislative corruption, and 
judicial corruption.19 I expect an increase in the corruption measure, again serving as a proxy for 
clientelism in the state apparatus, to result in a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in a 
                                                          




given country-year. If the state offers clientelistic rewards to those discontent with the regime, 
this may actually decrease terrorist activity.  
Controls 
Finally, control variables employed by others in the study of state capacity and terrorism 
(Hendrix and Young 2014; Piazza 2011; Choi 2010) are included. First, Log GDP per capita 
examines an income-based grievance effect when considering terrorist attacks in a given country. 
Second, I control for whether the state is a military regime by using a dichotomous variable on 
whether the chief executive is a military officer in a given country-year. The variable is coded as 
‘0’ if the leader formally retired or never held military rank prior to entering office and ‘1’ if 
chief executives are officers with no indication of formally retiring their rank (and are listed as 
officers for the duration of their term) (Beck et al. 2001). Third, I use a measure of major 
conflicts in a state from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I 
recoded the intensity variable from the dataset so ‘1’ indicates what the dataset defines as ‘war’ 
or at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year and ‘0’ if the conflict is less than 1,000 
battle-related deaths or there is no conflict in a given year. I recode this variable to account only 
for major conflicts going on in the state in a given country-year. Fourth, I include the land area of 
the state to account for territorial variation between the states in consideration. Finally, the count 
of terrorist attacks is also included as a lagged independent variable (by one year and two years 
in separate sets of models) to ameliorate the potential for reverse causality and to account for 
whether terrorist activity in the prior year influences the likelihood of terrorism in the following 
year. 
Given that the dependent variable for this analysis is a count variable, I use the zero-




incidents serve as the dependent variable, there are several reasons to use this method over 
ordinary least squares, Poisson regression, or non-inflated negative binomial techniques. As 
Piazza (2011) explains, a count of terrorist incidents in a state in a given year cannot be negative, 
incidents of terrorism are unevenly dispersed and clustered in given countries, and there are 
years where some countries do not experience any terrorist activity at all. The zero values can be 
divided into two distinct types.  
Results of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World  
To understand the relationships between the aforementioned variables I provide several 
models for analysis, based in general on the following equation:  
 
Terrorism (t) = Terrorism (t-2) + Military Capacity. + Administrative Capacity + Mil*Bur Capacity + Phone 
Service + Population Density + Democratic Institutions + Political Repression + Political Corruption + 
Controls  
 
As previously noted, I test multiple measures of administrative capacity composed of various 
elements of what can be defined as the administrative capacity of the state, from rule of law to 
infrastructure. The first three models (Public Administration, RPA, and RPR respectively) 
include the basic models without controls and provide a base line look at the different measures 
of state capacity. The second set of three models include the basic models as well as the 
interaction measure between military and administrative capacity. The third set of models 
discussed include the control variables and the last set of models include regional dummies as a 
robustness check. These first twelve models are tested with a one-year lag of the count of 
terrorist attacks. I then repeat this exercise with all twelve models substituting a two-year lag and 
will briefly discuss those findings as well. Discussion of all results is focused on the non-certain 




year lag are provided in the text of this chapter,20 those for the two-year lag appear the end of the 
chapter, and the full regression tables are available in Appendix B. 
 First, the results of the baseline models without controls, interaction terms, or regional 
dummies find a few variables that are significant no matter which measure of administrative 
capacity is included. Military capacity and repression are significant in all three base models and 
have positive coefficients, suggesting increases in military capacity and repressive actions by the 
state do result in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year. In short, 
as the state’s military ability is turned against non-state actors, extrajudicial killings occur, and 
civilians are arrested and detained or brutalized by the state’s forces, these non-state actors 







                                                          
20 If the confidence interval line crosses the zero (dotted) line, the results are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, the zero-
inflated method is not compatible with the clarify module so this figure is created running the data as a negative binomial instead. The regression 




In these base line models, participation in democracy is the only other explanatory factor which 
appears to be significant across all three base line models. The democracy measure interestingly 
is also significant in the positive direction, suggesting as states in the African and Southeast 
Asian regions become more democratic, they also face more terrorist violence. In two of the 
three models the proxy for infrastructure, phone service, is significant and in the negative 
direction suggesting an increase in the phone service measure results in a decrease in the number 
of attacks.  
Corruption is significant in the third baseline model and in the negative direction, 
suggesting an increase in this measure leads to a decrease in terrorist incidents. In short as 
hypothesized, repression and growth in military capacity lead to increases in terrorism. Also as 
hypothesized more democratic practices do not necessarily lead to more harmony in a state and 
providing non-violent outlets for political discontent does not guarantee a reduction in terrorist 
attacks while the proxies for infrastructural development and corrupt behavior by the state does 
show an inverse relationship with terrorism. The puzzle of more democratic institutions leading 
to higher rates of terrorist activity is discussed further at the end of this chapter. The lagged 
measure of terrorist attacks is significant in all three models and exhibits a positive relationship. 
When the two-year lag is included in these baseline models in Figures 4.16-4.18 public 
administration remains significant but RPA and RPR do not. The democracy and repression 
measures are consistent in the two-year models as well and corruption is significant in two of the 
three models.  
 The second set of models include the interaction between military and administrative 




capacity, repression, and participation in democracy are significant and in the positive direction 














The public administration measure is significant and consistently in the positive direction in one 
model while corruption, the proxy for clientelism, remains significant in the negative direction in 
the RPA model as well. None of the other measures, including the interactions, are significant 
other than the lagged count measure. In the two-year lag models the findings remain consistent 
as well.  
 The third set of models includes the full model plus control variables. Repression and the 
democracy measure remains consistent and in the same expected direction across all three 




administrative capacity, they are significant in two of the three models (Public Administration 
and RPA) but not in the hypothesized direction. An increase in either measure of administrative 
capacity also results in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks as well. Both major 
components of state capacity, structural and behavioral, demonstrate a positive relationship with  














As for the interaction terms between those components, the interaction is only significant 
in the RPA model and in the negative direction. Phone Service is not significant in any of these 
models but corruption is in the latter two. For controls, only GDP is significant in all three 
models while the measure on the presence of a major conflict is in one model. An increase in 




literature. The major conflict measure is significant in the positive direction in the RPA model. 
The lagged variable for terrorist attacks is significant as well. As for the two-year lag models the 
results are similar though some of the measures lose their significance in some models though no 
other measures are found to be significant in Figures 4.22-4.24 that were not significant in one-














 Finally, I include a few last models that provide insight into the significance of each 
region of interest as a robustness check. These final models include each region as a dummy with 
the North Africa dummy omitted in all three models as Chapters Five and Six focus on Sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia respectively. Across these models military capacity and the 




models as is the Administrative Capacity measure (Public Administration and RPA). The 
interaction term between Military and Administrative Capacity are significant in the first two 
models of this group while corruption is in the second two and both the interaction term and 
corruption are significant in the negative direction. Finally in terms of controls the measure on 
GDP is consistently significant in the negative direction and the presence of major conflict is in 
the positive direction. None of the regional dummies is significant in the one-year lag models. In 
the two-year lag models the results are consistent in the same directions of significance as well, 
though a few measures become insignificant depending the models presented in Figures 4.25-
4.27. The only measure that becomes significant with a two-year lag is the land area measure in 
the RPA model and suggesting an increase in the size of the state’s territory results in an increase 
in the number of terrorist attacks, though this is the only model where this is the case in terms of 
significance. In terms of the other controls chief executive being a military officer is not 
significant in any model. Nor is the proposed explanatory variable population density.  
Capacity and the State in Summary 
The previously discussed models offer a variety of points worth discussing in terms of the 
effect of varying factors of state capacity and state behavior and their impact on the number of 
terrorist attacks across the African continent and the countries of Southeast Asia. The results 
provide some insightful results that support some of my hypotheses but contradict others, namely 
the effects of increases in measures of administrative capacity. The hypothesis as the state’s 
military capability increases, terrorism increases, has statistically significant support across all 
of the models: military capacity’s growth can drive up the number of terrorist attacks. Similarly, 
increases in the repression variable offer support for the hypothesis states that are more 




states in Africa and Southeast Asia becoming more militarily capable or more repressive against 
their citizens can drive members of the state to radicalization and engagement in violence against 
the state.21 
Meanwhile, the analysis does not offer clear support for the hypothesized relationships 
between bureaucracy and terrorism in the developing world. In fact, these results directly 
contradict two of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. In the case of administrative 
capacity when Public Administration, Relative Political Allocation, or Relative Political Reach 
are significant they have positive coefficients. In short increases in any of these proxies for 
administrative capacity lead to a rise in the number of terrorist attacks. In contrast though the 
phone service variable (serving as a proxy for infrastructural development in the state) does 
appear to be significant as a measure of administrative capacity in a few of the models in this 
analysis, suggesting this measure of infrastructural development results in a reduction in the 
number of the attacks, supporting the logic of the theory that the expansion of the state via 
infrastructure does impact terrorist activity. Thus, I have minimal or no clear support for the 
hypothesis as the state’s administrative capacity increases, terrorism decreases. The legal 
administrative capacity of the state is explored in more detail in Chapters Five and Six and 
provides some insight into how bureaucratic expansion by the state in some places leads to fear 
of misuse of the state’s authority and repression of those opposed to the state in various ways. 
In the case of the hypothesis as states increase their resources militarily and 
bureaucratically, terrorist attacks increase, a few models find the interaction term between the 
military and administrative capacity measures as a significant factor. The relationship when this 
measure is significant is in the negative direction. In other words an increase in the interaction 
                                                          
21 As noted in Chapter Two, indiscriminate violence by the state has been found to increase terrorist violence in some cases (Kalyvas 2006; Gilli & 




term between military and administrative capacity demonstrates a suppressing effect on the 
number of terrorist attacks. The combination of military and administrative capabilities together 
appears to better explain how the state denies terrorist groups opportunities to attack the state or 
provides alternative outlets for the discontent actors to utilize as opposed to the taking of life 
through asymmetric acts. The observed relationship requires further investigation to identify 
clearer support and is explored further in Chapters Five and Six as I investigate how bureaucratic 
components of the state’s legal system provide the state’s security apparatus with structures to 
identify and counter terrorist threats to the state and the civilian population.  
On the subject of democracy and terrorism however, the findings are consistently 
significant but not in the hypothesized direction and the hypothesis that more democratic 
regimes where citizens participate in institutions reduce terrorism does not appear to be the case.  
This contradiction requires further investigation and will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six 
as well as I investigate administrative bureaucracy at the individual state levels in four Sub-
Saharan Africa and four Southeast Asian nation-states. When considering the relationship 
between repression by the state and terrorism it suggests that transitioning democracies, not fully 
Westernized in the sense of the rights and liberties of citizens, fully democratic institutions, and 
checks on the power of the executive, suffer from upticks in political violence such as terrorist 
activity. As the institutions of democracy develop over time and states maintain democratic 
stability for an extended period this may offer some explanation as to why this particular 
measure of democracy has a positive relationship with the number of terrorist incidents in Africa 
and Southeast Asia during the observed time period.  
There is no support in this analysis for the hypothesis states with low population density 




happening and the cleavage between the population centers of the state versus the peripheral 
regions. Finally the corruption variable appears as significant in several models and in the 
hypothesized direction. The hypothesized relationship corruption actually decreases terrorist 
activity is supported by the results of that model. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) also find an 
indirect relationship exists between corruption and terrorism. Groups benefit from corrupt 
practices financially. Tuastad’s (2010) study of clientelistic practices in Palestine discussed in 
Chapter Two also aligns with this finding. However, this final hypothesis certainly deserves 
further consideration as the literature on how corruption impacts terrorism as a form of political 
violence is scarce and contradictory in some cases.22  
A Note on State Capacity, Terrorism, and Endogeneity 
 Clearly several of the explanatory variables identified in this chapter are significant and 
suggest an existing relationship between terrorism and state capacity. Yet there is reason to 
consider endogeneity and the potential that the relationship is actually the reverse of that which 
is hypothesized in Chapter Three. The following section briefly addresses how others have noted 
this concern in similar research on terrorism and state capacity and offers several future options 
that could be introduced into the models presented here to consider endogeneity in this design.  
 To account for potential endogeneity issues between terrorism and macroeconomic 
variables Arin (2016) lags all independent variables in her model (Footnote #3 p. 1114). 
Brockhoff (2015) uses a two-step Hausman-type procedure to control for endogeneity in 
modeling the relationship between education and terrorism. The first stage regresses the 
education variable on a set of exogenous controls and stores the residuals which are then 
                                                          
22 As noted in Chapter Two, there are two potential explanations for the relationship between terrorism and corruption in the literature. The 
motivational explanation whereby terrorists attack corrupt governments to exploit public distrust in the system and selling themselves as the 
viable alternative to a corrupt status quo (Teets and Chenoweth 2009; Felbab-Brown 2010) and the facilitation explanation whereby corruption 




included in the second stage count model where any significant residuals indicate endogeneity is 
present. Brockhoff finds no significant residuals however and thus concludes education, as a 
concept of administrative capacity, is not endogenous to terrorism (p. 1205).  
Dreher (2010) uses a two-stage least squares estimate because of the lagged dependent 
variable for terrorism that can lead to dynamic panel bias. Therefore Dreher includes a 
generalized method of moments estimator and treats the lagged dependent variable and terrorism 
measures as endogenous, including time dummies in the regressions and using several tests for 
autocorrelation to account for this complication (p. 75) but the employment of these correction 
models does not change the primary findings and the Sargan-Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests are 
argued as evidence that endogeneity is not an issue in their design (p. 81-82).  
 Hendrix and Young (2014) in their study of the relationship between military capacity 
and terrorism control for the presence of domestic armed conflict using a measure of armed 
conflict intensity that differentiates between low-level conflicts and those with 1,000 or more 
battle deaths to “mitigate concerns about the endogeneity of military capacity to expectations 
about facing armed resistance—that is, states that expect to fight insurgents/dissidents will invest 
in more military capacity” (p. 346). They go on to note however that if endogeneity were 
significant they would expect to see the level of and changes in past political violence” would be 
correlated with changes in measuring state capacity (p. 352).  
To address this potential issue of reverse causality Hendrix and Young (2014) estimate 
the effect of terror attacks on changes in measures of state capacity using error correction 
models. They argue “if reverse causality accounts for the observed correlations, then past terror 
attacks should be a significant determinant of present levels of state capacity” so if endogeneity 




of the violent threat (p. 352). The results of the error correction models “do not lend strong 
support to the conjecture that either the number of past attacks or changes in the frequency of 
attacks are strong determinants of current levels of bureaucratic and military capacity and are 
insignificant across several specifications.”  
In further discussion after correcting for this potential issue Hendrix and Young do find 
the change in conflict intensity is negatively associated with administrative capacity which 
suggests some reasonable concern that state capacity might be endogenous to armed conflict” but 
do find “terror attacks do not, in the main, drive either the expert assessments of 
bureaucratic/administrative capacity or military capacity” (p. 354). Thus controlling for large-
scale forms of political violence, as done in all models in this chapter, is one consideration for 
accounting for endogeneity when studying the relationship between state capacity and terrorism 
among others that should be implemented in future studies. For the purposes of this dissertation 
though I use case study analysis of two regions to trace the chronology of developments in state 
capacity and the subsequent terrorist activity across the African continent and in Southeast Asia.  
Conclusion 
 In short, the results of the cross-national analysis in this chapter find some support for the 
argument that while the quality of bureaucracy and administration in the state affects terrorism, 
the relationship is not entirely in line with the theory presented in Chapter Three and requires 
further consideration in the next chapters. In contrast, military capacity as well as repression are 
strong explanatory factors for increases in terrorist activity and consistently lead to higher rates 
of terrorism as states engage in increased military spending and repressive behaviors against 
their citizens. The proposed infrastructure proxy, telephone service, is a significant factor in 




between infrastructural development and terrorism. The role of democracy and democratic 
institutions does have what appears to be a clear relationship with terrorist activity and in fact 
suggests transitioning or more democratic societies in the regions of analysis appear to be more 
susceptible to terrorism. Other factors such as population density show no clear or significant 
relationship with terrorist activity. Looking within the state and terrorist activity along porous 
border regions and how states develop resources and capabilities in response to terrorist 
movements may offer more understanding of this relationship. Lastly, clientelism as measured 
via a proxy variable for political corruption and its relationship with terrorism requires more 
investigation as well but there does appear to be some relationship between corrupt behavior and 
a decline in terrorist activity.  
 In Chapters Five and Six I delve deeper into several of the significant relationships 
identified by the cross-national results on state capacity and terrorism. In particular I focus on 
four of these factors: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and 
corruption. Chapter Five provides a more nuanced examination of state capacity in the Sub-
Saharan Africa. With porous borders and cultural differences across the continent, a variety of 
examples can provide a better understanding of the relationship between how the state’s military 
and bureaucratic abilities interact to counter terrorist threats to the state. However I choose to 
focus on one particular case, that of Boko Haram which has impacted four particular states in the 
West Sub-Saharan African region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. All four are 
concentrated around the Lake Chad region as is a majority of the activity of Boko Haram which 
in the last several years transcended international borders in its attacks on civilians and those that 
represent the states in the region. In Chapter Six I follow a similar pattern of analysis and 




concentrated states in the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. All four of 
these nation-states are situated across multiple islands and experience far different challenges 
with state capacity in terms of terrorists traveling between territories. Both chapters consider the 
period when each respective group of states began to face the challenge of countering terrorist 
movements in their territory and how each state responded to improve administrative and 



































Chapter 5: The Case of Boko Haram and Capacity in the Lake Chad Region  
Introduction  
As noted in Chapter Four, several elements of state capacity impact the frequency of 
terrorist activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. In this chapter I 
consider four of those factors: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, 
repression, and clientelistic behavior. From the cross-national analysis we see evidence of how 
each impacts the number of terrorist attacks in these regions and this chapter provides a more in-
depth qualitative analysis of examples of each factor in a specific set of cases in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The chapter focuses on the case of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization and how state 
capacity developed in response to the rise of the Boko Haram movement in Cameroon, Chad, 
Niger, and Nigeria.  
Where Chapter Four examines more broadly how weaknesses in state capacity create 
opportunities for terrorist movements to develop and challenge the state, Chapters Five and Six 
examine how those states address weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity in response 
to terrorist activity in the state. The four aforementioned states in West Africa, concentrated 
around Lake Chad, are chosen to illustrate the development of the identified areas of state 
capacity in response to the development of an active and widespread terrorist movement over a 
period of several years. Different policy approaches developed as each state began to confront 
the challenge of improving areas of weakness in state capacity and can be examined in how each 
state approached the question of improving state capacity to respond to terrorism.  
First, to examine bureaucratic or administrative capacity I consider how state’s developed 
legal structures to respond to Boko Haram and other terrorist movements in the last decade. 




but is necessary to enhance state capacity in response to groups like Boko Haram. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the observed relationship at the cross-national level indicated an increase in 
the proxies for bureaucratic or administrative capacity resulted in an increase in terrorist activity, 
counterintuitive to the proposed hypothesis in Chapter Three but explored further in these two 
state-level analytical chapters. The balance between legislative efforts to define terrorism and 
whether those legislative efforts are perceived as abusive by the state could be an explanation.  
Second, the military’s capacity to combat groups using force and how it implements its 
use of force through different formal and informal bodies requires consideration here as well. 
Like administrative approaches including defining legal structures for responding to terrorism, 
states responded to Boko Haram and other terrorist movements by developing new programs. 
New military units and coordination between police and military institutions in the state enhance 
state capacity but also have the potential for becoming repressive responses to any challenge to 
the status quo. The use of informal groups of individuals to police border regions and conduct 
the duties of the state’s police and military forces similarly raises similar issues for capacity.  
Third, another significant factor in state capacity is border security which requires both 
major elements of military might and administrative capability. Groups such as Boko Haram are 
able exploit these specific weaknesses in Sub-Saharan states and are able to transcend borders 
both in their activity as well as in their efforts to elude authorities responding to terrorism. 
Therefore, building bureaucratic and military capacity at a regional level and through regional 
organizations provides some insight into the improvements in state capacity across the states 
involved. As mapping across these sub-regions within the Sub-Saharan case demonstrates, 




interconnecting strengths and weaknesses of states. Therefore in both the bureaucratic and 
military capacity sections I discuss efforts to improve border security locally and regionally.  
The factors noted above are explored in a qualitative approach. First I identified notable 
policies and issues of capacity discussed in the US State Department’s Country Reports on 
Terrorism from 2007 to 2017. I then explore those policies further through additional data from 
government and international organization reports and local and international media coverage of 
specific incidents across the region in the last decade. Geo-spatial mapping is also presented to 
highlights specifically where incidents of terrorism are occurring in each region of interest. After 
discussing the policies undertaken to improve bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military 
capacity, and briefly examining regional capacity I conclude with a discussion of the ongoing 
capacity weaknesses in the region that result in clientelism and repression.  
West Africa: The Rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region  
The Lake Chad Region 
For this chapter I consider four countries surrounding the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Figure 5.1 provides a map of the region. All four share colonial pasts. 
In the 1960s, Chad, Niger, and parts of Cameroon gained independence from France while 
Nigeria and the rest of Cameroon gained independence from the United Kingdom. Over the next 
several decades all four experienced issues with weak governance, military rule, transitioning to 
democracy, refugees, and environmental issues. Most important for consideration in this chapter, 
each fell victim to terrorist attacks in recent years, particularly incidents involving Boko Haram.  
These four states also struggle with the challenges of building and maintaining basic 
elements of capacity as well as monitoring and benefiting from the extraction and export of 




has proven problematic in terms of creating enough employment opportunities and resources to 
satisfy growing populations that may otherwise become discontent and question the status quo. 
 
 
As noted in Table 5.1, the four states vary in some aspects. In terms of population, 
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger all have between 12 and 25 million citizens. In contrast Nigeria has 
a population of over 200 million, much larger than any of its neighbors. The total land area of 
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria is around one million square kilometers whereas Cameroon is less than 
half that size. Cameroon and Nigeria have much higher percentages of their populations residing 
in urban areas compared to Chad and Niger where populations are much more dispersed. Both 




variations lead to similar challenges for each state, namely governing empty spaces and 
extensive borders. When considering how each scores on the measure of Institutionalized  
 
Democracy in the Polity IV dataset, with a range from 0 to 10 with higher values representing 
more democratic states, we see variation as well. The Institutionalized Democracy score includes 
three components: the ability of citizens to express political preferences effectively, the existence 
of institutionalized constraints on the executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens. 
Table 5.1 West Africa General Demographics (2018 estimates) 
 Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria 









Population Size 25, 640, 965 15, 833, 116 19, 886, 231  203, 452, 505 
 
Total Area (sq. km) 475,440  1,284,000 1,267,000 923,768 





1 1 6 8 
Administrative 
Divisions 
10 23 7 (1 capital district) 36 (1 territory) 
 
 
Urban Population 56.4% 23.1% 16.4% 50.3% 
 
Military Size (as 
Percent of GDP, 
2016) 

















Islamic State of 
Iraq and ash-Sham 
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(ISGS), Islamic 
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West Africa), Boko 
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In 2017 measures Cameroon and Chad score very low on the scale at one whereas Niger at six 
and Nigeria at eight are much more democratic. In summary, the states surrounding Lake Chad 
have been chosen because they exemplify several of the concepts identified as significant factors 
in Chapter Four: military capacity and repression as well as administrative capacity and 
clientelism. 
Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region  
 Terrorism in the Lake Chad region today consists predominantly of acts carried out by 
Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist militant group originating in Nigeria. Several other domestic 
or home-grown movements in the four countries of interest in the chapter exist as well and are 
briefly discussed. Figures 5.2 through 5.5 provide the count of incidents in Cameroon, Chad, 
Niger, and Nigeria between 1985 and 2016, graphed separately due to the drastically higher 
number of incidents in Nigeria in the last decade during the rise in violence carried out by Boko 
Haram. Hence the varying scales in the number of attacks for each state. In the case of Cameroon 
terrorism has been relatively rare outside of a small number of incidents in the early 1990s up 

















































































In the cases of Chad and Niger, terrorism has been more frequent than in Cameroon but the 
number of incidents is still significantly less than that of Nigeria. Prior to the rise of Boko Haram 
the highest number of incidents in a year in Chad was just over 10 while in Niger it was 
approximately 15 in the early 1990s. Nigeria though has suffered from terrorism at a much 




As a consequence of efforts to improve state capacity, capacity targets are a significant portion of 
































































































































































































































the aggregate of attacks in Figure 5.6 and see that approximately thirty-five percent of the 3,528 
terrorist incidents in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria between 1985 and 2015 fall into 
categories that involve some aspect of military or administrative capacity. These categories 
include Infrastructure,23 Government Institutions,24 Military Institutions, Police, and Education 
Institutions. Others such as Religious Institutions and Private Citizens and Businesses25 make up 
a majority of the rest of the incidents.26 As the chart demonstrates while private entities and 
individuals are the majority of those affected by attacks, the institutions of the state that form the 
basis of a state’s capacity are specifically targeted as well. 
 
Boko Haram  
Of all the movements in the West Africa region, Boko Haram has been the greatest threat 
to the stability of the states analyzed in this chapter. With its origins in the early 2000s as a pro-
Islamist movement under cleric Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram grew quickly into a national 
                                                          
23 The GTD differentiates between several elements of infrastructure that I included under one categorical name. Thus, ‘infrastructure as listed in 
Figure 5.6 includes the following sub-categories: Airports and Aircraft, Telecommunications, Transportation, and Utilities.  
24 The GTD lists Government Institutions as one of two sub-categories, General or Diplomatic, and are combined in Figure 5.6. 
25 Private Citizens & Property and Businesses are listed as separate categories in the GTD but are added together for the purposes of Figure 5.6. 
26 Approximately 18 percent of the total number of incidents in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria are listed as ‘Unknown’ or ‘Other.’ To the 
Other category I also added targets designated Maritime, Journalists and Media, NGO’s, [Other] Terrorists and Non-State Militia, Tourists, and 
Violent Political Parties.  












and regional terrorist organization in 2009. In July of that year several hundred followers of 
Yusuf’s were killed by Nigerian security forces during a wave of protests against a new 
motorcycle helmet law. The protests turned violent between Boko Haram protesters and the 
Nigerian security forces in Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, and Kano states and Yusuf himself died while 
in police custody (START 2014).  
Like many of the post-9/11 terrorist movements, Boko Haram’s ideological goals include 
extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith. The group’s overall goal is to establish an Islamic 
Nigeria including shari’a criminal courts to replace the state’s secular justice system where 
shari’a courts do not currently exist. As a trained Salafist, Yusuf founded the movement to 
oppose Western concepts and teachings such as evolution and the Big Bang theory (Sergie and 
Johnson 2015). The group’s name colloquially translates to “Western education is sin” 
(Blanchard 2016) and primary targets reflect that name. Targets include Westerners in Nigeria, 
the secular government, and Muslims that cooperate with those entities.  
 Immediately after the events in July 2009 the group’s activity declined significantly and 
was believed to be past its prime as a movement (START 2014). Just over a year later though the 
group, now under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, returned to the forefront of Nigerian 
national security concerns. In September 2010 Boko Haram members attacked a prison in the 
state of Bauchi and freed 700 prisoners, many supporters of Boko Haram detained in the 
previous year. A year later in August 2011 the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of 
the headquarters of the United Nations presence in Abuja, the national capital. From then on the 
organization increased in violence and succeeded in carrying out attacks across Nigeria. The 
violence by Boko Haram militants targeted civilians and non-civilians alike as well as fellow 




(START 2014). Not all followers of the movement agreed with the indiscriminate approach and 
a number of members established a splinter movement, Ansaru, opposed to targeting of Muslim 
civilians and more focused on targeting only symbols of the West (Kassim 2018).  Shekau 
responded by targeting members of the faction in 2013 and reintegrating some Ansaru members 
into the fold of Boko Haram while others moved into other extremist groups across the Sahel 
(Blanchard 2016).   
 By June 2013 the government of Nigeria came to consider Boko Haram a significant 
threat to stability. President Goodluck Jonathan soon designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as 
terrorist organizations and declared the need to increase counterterrorism resources in the state 
(Blanchard 2016). In response Boko Haram increased its attacks on civilians and the 
government. In July 2014 the group began to shift its efforts from asymmetric attacks on civilian 
and government targets to conventional offensive efforts to hold territory in the northeast of 
Nigeria according to Blanchard. Attention to the growing threat of Boko Haram increased after 
the abduction of hundreds of schoolgirls from a school in Chibok. The increased violence even 
led the Jonathan administration to approach the group with ceasefire negotiations in October 






Incidents by Boko Haram 




 Violence by the movement continued to rise and an attack on a multinational military 
base and villages around the town of Baga left nearly 2,000 dead over a several month period 
(Blanchard 2016). Soon thereafter Boko Haram began to strike at targets outside of Nigerian 
territory, first in Chad in February 2015. Boko Haram responded to Chadian military support in 
Nigeria with attacks in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. Attacks in Cameroon and Niger occurred 
soon thereafter. The challenges of dealing with thousands of displaced Nigerians flooding across 
international borders to seek refuge in neighboring areas quickly increased. As noted by 
Blanchard, by 2016 the violence displaced 2.8 million in the Lake Chad region and 5.6 million 
required food aid. Boko Haram also pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015, believed by 
experts to be an effort to bring more international attention to their cause as well as the financial 
resources of the transnational Islamic State movement (Kassim 2018).   
Between the rise of Boko Haram as a violent movement in 2009 and 2015 the 
organization has been identified as responsible for 1,839 terrorist incidents in the Global 
Terrorism Database in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. A breakdown of where these attacks 




occurred in Figure 5.7 shows the overwhelmingly majority of incidents are in the northeastern 
territory of Nigeria. As noted in Figure 5.7, the count of incidents by Boko Haram in Nigeria 
(1,642) still far outpaces the number of Boko-Haram-attributed incidents in Cameroon (128), 
Niger (40), and Chad (29). In short, while Boko Haram has in recent years increased its activities 
to include neighboring states, 89 percent of attacks by the organization occurred within Nigerian 
territory.  
Since 2015 efforts by the new Buhari administration as well as by Cameroonian, 
Chadian, and Nigerien forces led to a reversal of territorial gains made by Boko Haram and a 
notable decline in Boko Haram activity as shown in Figure 5.4. Yet militants maintain the ability 
to travel freely through a region that stretches from the Diffa state in southern Niger to the 
northern reaches of Cameroon and across the border into the area surrounding Lake Chad 
(Blanchard 2016). The map in Figure 5.8 shows all incidents attributed to Boko Haram by the 
GTD up to 2015.  
Beyond Boko Haram  
 Boko Haram, while the most significant terrorist movement to security in the Lake Chad 
region, has not been the only movement to threaten stability in the four countries considered in 
this chapter. Figure 5.9 provides a map of where incidents by groups other than Boko Haram.27 
The most well-known of these movements, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an 
organization that formed as a merger of the former Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat and the transnational al-Qaeda movement in the mid-2000s.  
                                                          
27 This includes a number of incidents categorized as ‘Other’ or ‘Unknown’ perpetrators by researchers for the Global Terrorism Database. They 
are still important to note because even without a designated perpetrator by the GTD researchers, these incidents of terrorism still occurred 




AQIM activity occurs mostly in countries outside of the Lake Chad region, particularly 
Algeria and Mali, but the group claimed responsibility or has been identified as the perpetrator 
by the GTD in several incidents in and Niger and Nigeria. AQIM’s most notable attack occurred 
in 2007 with the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Algiers but more recently the 
movement shifted focus to the Sahara-Sahel region due to improved counterterrorism efforts in 
Algeria and weak governance in southern Algeria and the surrounding states (Thornberry and 
Levy 2011). The group also spawned several splinter organizations active in the region that have 
carried out isolated attacks in Chad and Niger, including al Murabitoun (“The Sentinels”), al 
Mulathamun (“The Masked Ones”) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO) (CRS 2017).  
Other notable movements include the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) and the New Delta Avengers, active predominantly in Nigeria and, to a small degree, 
Niger. MEND’s origins date back to 2006 when the group claimed responsibility for an attack on 
foreign oil workers, the group’s preferred target (Hanson 2007). Unlike terrorist movements such 
as Boko Haram and AQIM, MEND’s activities in the region have been gauged toward 




environmental causes. Active in the oil-rich Niger Delta, MEND militants seek to disrupt 
Nigeria’s oil refineries, a major factor in the Nigerian economy. The combination of 
environmental degradation and federally-directed revenue sharing from oil profits not reaching 
the 30 million residents of the Delta due to clientelism and wasteful spending led to the rise of 
the MEND movement (Hanson 2007), starting first as a series of armed groups supplied by local 
politicians used to rig local elections but later to demand increased benefits from oil revenue to 
improve roads, schools, hospitals, and basic utilities in the Delta (Duffield 2010). MEND came 
to serve as an umbrella organization or “loose web of armed groups” (Duffield 2010), organized 
at the village or clan level. Sub-groups include the Ijaw Youth Council, the Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Niger Delta Vigilantes (Hanson 2007).  
MEND remained active until 2009 when the group agreed to a ceasefire with the federal 
government as well as amnesty and job training for its members. In 2017 though old tensions 
returned and a new generation of militants formed in the Delta, calling themselves the New Delta 
Avengers. The Avengers have been responsible for a series of attacks on Nigeria’s oil production 
facilities in response to continued clientelism and corrupt behavior in the region. In a statement 
by the group, the Avengers declared a resurrection of “the spirit of insurgency to demand a better 
deal for our people…through bloody attacks and destruction of oil assets in the creeks and 
upland areas so as to disrupt and eventually cripple oil prospecting and production operations in 
the state” (Owolabi 2017). Their main grievance is with the governor of Delta state, Ifeanyi 
Okowa, who they accuse of misusing oil revenue. The group’s tactics have proven effective, 
resulting in a reduction in Nigerian oil production of nearly thirty percent and impacting the 




A final movement of significance to briefly consider is the Fulani militants, active in 
Nigeria and Niger respectively.28 Fulani cattle herders in the northern regions of Nigeria, 
believed to be the largest semi-nomadic group in the world and spread across territory from 
Senegal to the Central African Republic committed numerous terrorist incidents dating back two 
decades (Mikailu 2016). In 2014 the Fulani militants killed approximately 1,200 in the region, 
making them one of the deadliest groups in the world (IEP 2015). The militants primarily carry 
out acts of violence in response to disagreements over farmland, grazing areas, and access to 
sources of potable water for their herds. Underlying tensions between the predominantly 
nomadic Muslim Fulani herders and established Christian farming communities have also been a 
factor (Mikailu 2016). 
Capacity in the Lake Chad Region  
 In response to the Boko Haram movement and other terrorist threats to their states, 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria attempted various policies to improve capacity. As noted in 
Chapter Four, military capacity, measured through a general accounting of the strength of a 
state’s military force, and administrative capacity , measured through a series of proxies that 
account for both infrastructural and rule of law-driven concepts, are the primary focus of the 
analysis. In addition I consider how weaknesses in these two areas lead to factors such as 
repression and corruption impacting the prevalence of terrorist movements in a state.  
 The following section focuses first on administrative capacity and considers significant 
legislative acts which give states the ability to distinguish terrorism from other criminal acts. I 
also consider how those bureaucratic measures meet criticism due to the broad powers granted to 
executive institutions across the Lake Chad region. I also consider informal approaches that 
                                                          





exemplify the attempts at improving administrative capacity such as relationships with religious 
organization in the state as well. Second, I turn to military reorganization, the establishment of 
anti-terror units, and cooperation with citizens living on the front lines of the fight against Boko 
Haram to illustrate how military capacity improves to respond to terrorism in the state. Regional 
efforts also support these bureaucratic and military efforts are a third area of consideration. I 
conclude this section with a brief discussion of weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity 
in each state, particularly repressive behavior and corrupt practices.  
Bureaucratic Measures against Terrorism 
To consider how the states responded to the weaknesses in capacity exposed by terrorism 
in the region from an administrative perspective, I consider two general areas. All four states 
passed legislation in the last decade to establish definitions of terrorism as well as systematic 
approaches to charging individuals with criminal acts for carrying out terrorist attacks or 
providing support for terrorists or terrorist organizations. Prior to the presence of Boko Haram 
none of the four states have clear standards for handling terrorism from an administrative 
perspective. Another effort taken by some of the Lake Chad states consists of creating 
relationships with religious leaders, particularly Islamic figures in the Lake Chad region, to 
coordinate on information sharing between religious communities and the state. Both policy 
approaches that illustrate the administrative capacity measure of state capacity vary across the 
four states and are impacted by how the state utilizes these capabilities which can lead to charges 
of repression and corrupt behavior among elites that hinders the state’s capacity to respond to 
terrorism and other issues. I consider the weaknesses of these bureaucratic approaches, 
particularly the impact of political corruption and abuse of these new laws to repress political 




Legal Capacity: Legislating against Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region  
Legal Efforts in Nigeria and Niger 
Nigeria, dealing with Boko Haram since 2009, and Niger, dealing with porous borders 
and terrorists and other militants from neighboring Algeria, Libya, and Mali, took the first steps 
in 2011 to establish legislation defining certain criminal activity as terrorism or support of 
terrorist organizations in order to improve the state’s administrative capacity in routinizing the 
response to terrorist incidents in the states’ legal systems. Niger’s legislature passed Law 2011-
11 in January of that year to establish a special chamber within the Court of Appeals’ to 
investigate, prosecute, and punish acts of terrorism (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013, p. 23). 
The new legal framework has allowed the state to process more cases of terrorism through the 
judicial unit with 230 cases involving terrorism suspects, including 11 women and 25 children, in 
approximately sixty days (UNODC 2017; UN Volunteers 2017). More staff are needed to 
account for the increasing numbers of individuals arrested for terrorism charges however. 
Approximately 1,500 individuals in 2017, including women, children, and those with mental 
disabilities were in detention and not provided with legal defense services. The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has worked with Niger though to train lawyers to provide 
legal assistance to detainees, and provide information about international terrorism legal 
structures (UNODC 2014) but backlogs in the system continue. While Niger’s capacity to 
process terrorists through its legal system improved with the introduction of this legislation, 
specific resources such as staff are still needed to further improve capacity.  
To Niger’s south, the Nigerian National Assembly passed the Terrorism Prevention Act 
(TPA) of 2011 and President Jonathan signed the bill into law in June of that year. The 2011 act, 




prosecute terrorists as well as those who provide various forms of support for terrorist 
organizations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013). Terrorist acts under the TPA are those in 
which serious harm or damage to a country or international organization is expected with the 
intention of:  
“compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from 
performing any act; seriously intimidate a population; destabilize or destroy the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or 
international organization; or otherwise influence such government or international 
organizations by intimidation or coercion” (Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011).  
 
In addition, the TPA includes terrorist acts are those that inflict harm to people or involve 
kidnapping, the destruction of a “public facility, a transport system; an infrastructure facility, 
including an information system; a public place or private property” (TPA 2011) and a high 
likelihood of endangering human life or resulting in economic losses. The hijacking of planes or 
public transportation, releasing dangerous substances into the environment or disrupting the 
water supply are other examples included in the TPA. Individuals convicted under the 2011 
version of the law faced sentences of up to twenty years (TPA 2011; Goitom 2011). The act goes 
on to define other elements such as terrorist meetings, support or harboring of terrorists, training 
terrorists, obstruction of terrorist investigations, terrorist financing and property, jurisdiction for 
the prosecution of terrorist cases, and interactions with foreign states in pursuing terrorist 
organizations (TPA 2011). Section 2 of the act also allows the state to designate groups as 
terrorist organizations. Only a judge with advice from the Attorney General of Nigeria, the 
National Security Advisor, and the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Force have the 
power to declare a group a terrorist organization.  
One of the first notable uses of the new anti-terrorism law came with the charging of 




collaborating with a spokesperson of Boko Haram (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013, p. 26).The 
ability to use this new legislation to identify and charge not only common citizens but also elites 
within the state for supporting terrorist organizations demonstrates how Nigeria’s administrative 
capacity to respond to terrorism not only improved with the legislation but that to a degree it 
allows the state to credibly respond to elites not supporting the state’s battle with Boko Haram.  
In February 2013 the Nigerian legislature passed an updated version of the 2011 law. The 
amendments to the original act allows law enforcement to detain and prosecute terror suspects 
and establishes criteria for the judiciary to follow when sentencing those found guilty of 
terrorism. The amended act also added the death penalty as an option for consideration during 
sentencing (Terrorism Prevention Act 2013; Bureau of Counterterrorism 2014, p. 37). 
The law met with vocal opponents soon after it passage in 2011 and again in 2013. The 
TPA gives the state significant leeway for investigating terrorist suspects and does not include 
strong oversight mechanisms. If there is “reason to suspect” an offense is being committed, 
officers are permitted to searches persons or places without warrants and detain or arrest anyone 
suspected of committing or being about to commit an offense. Law enforcement officers are also 
given immunity from civil or criminal liability regarding the use of force in the pursuit of 
terrorist suspects (Goitom 2011). In September 2017 the Nigerian Defense Headquarters faced 
accusations of acting without authority when they declared the Indigenous People of Biafra 
(IPOB) to be a militant terrorist organization under the Terrorism Prevention Act. A justice for 
the Nigerian Federal High Court found the federal government failed to provide evidence for 
sustaining charges of IPOB being a terrorist organization under the law (Kingsley 2017). 




respond to terrorism, abuse of the authority granted through the legislation and a lack of 
oversight could lead to repressive behavior by elites in the state.  
Legal Efforts in Cameroon and Chad 
Despite the passage of these legislative acts in Niger and Nigeria, the threat from Boko 
Haram continued to spread and by 2014 attacks occurred in neighboring Cameroon and Chad. 
Both states adopted their own laws to establish their own terrorism-focused legal structures and 
expand administrative capacity. Cameroon does so with the 2014 Law for the Fight against 
Terrorism and Chad with Law 034/PR/2015 the following year. Before 2014 Cameroon had not 
enacted legislation that clearly criminalized terrorism but rectified the issue with a new law that 
confers the death penalty on those guilty of participating in or supporting acts of terrorism 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2015, p. 16). The law defines terrorism as committing:  
“an act likely to cause death, endanger physical integrity, cause bodily injury or material 
damage, destroy natural resources, the environment, or cultural heritage with the intent 
to: 
a. Intimidate the public, provoke a situation of terror or face the victim, the 
government and/or a national or international organization to carry out or refrain 
from carrying out an act, adopt or renounce a particular position; 
b. Disrupt the national functioning of public services, the delivery of essential 
services to the public to create a crisis situation among the public; 
c. Create widespread insurrection in the country;  
d. Shall be punished with the death penalty”(Johnson 2014) 
The law also designates the financing of acts of terrorism and laundering funds for the purpose of 
acts of terrorism, recruitment and training, and other special provisions such as remand during 
prosecution. The law provides the state with bureaucratic tools to target and remove potential 
threats as well as identify those playing non-combatants roles in terrorist movements and 
codifies the state’s administrative capacity in responding to terrorism.  
The anti-terrorism law however, as is the case in Nigeria, faces criticism within 




groups all expressed concerns with the wording of the law they argue could allow the state to 
target political opponents and those not providing favorable coverage of the state (Bureau of 
Counterterrorism 2015). The law as it stands includes wording used to require government 
approval for journalistic accounts of the state’s battle with Boko Haram and tactics used by the 
government, (Johnson 2014) inhibiting free speech by the press. The Bureau also notes members 
of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), one of Cameroon’s political parties, expressed concern 
that the law could be used to suppress political opposition as well and limit the media’s ability to 
report on anything that might portray the regime in a negative light. Overly broad provisions in 
the law, the death sentence for various offenses, allowing authorities to detain those accused of 
terrorism indefinitely, and trying cases of civilians accused of terrorism in military courts 
(Quintal and Rozen 2017) are all issues with the law.  
Kah Wallah, a leader in the Cameroon People’s Party, noted similar concerns as those 
made by the SDF. Wallah argued at the time of the consideration of the legislation that “[t]his 
[anti-terrorism] law is manifestly against the fundamental liberties and rights of the Cameroonian 
people. In the guise of fighting terrorism, the government’s real intent is to stifle political 
dissent” (Johnson 2014). In short, the state’s effort to establish the legal authority to come after 
terrorists and their supporters also opens the door for abuse by the state which then could lead to 
further dissent among the Cameroonian people and increase support for opposition to the status 
quo. According to Johnson, the government response to criticism of the legislation noted its 
similarity to other anti-terror legislation such as the 2001 Patriot Act in the United States. Yet as 
more recent reporting from Cameroon has shown, the very abuses of the law feared by political 
opponents of the Biya regime reportedly occur, suggesting this effort to improve administrative 




In 2015 the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported on recent cases where 
Cameroon used the anti-terror law to prosecute journalists reporting on militants and others that 
have been critical of the Biya administration. In one case, Cameroonian authorities arrested a 
journalist reporting on Nigerian refugees fleeing to Cameroon after a series of suicide bombings, 
charging him under the anti-terror law where he spent two years in custody. The court found the 
journalist guilty of “laundering the proceeds of terrorist acts” by a military tribunal, and 
sentenced him to ten years in prison (Quintal and Rozen 2017, p. 7). Similarly, the editor of one 
publication stated they are “not told what the difference is about reporting the facts or acclaiming 
what is happening and [they] therefore run the risk of contravening the anti-terrorism law” (p. 7). 
The CPJ also identified four other cases in which journalists faced charges through the anti-
terrorism law and detainment until a presidential decree released them in August 2017. Without 
the decree all four faced a military tribunal and the death penalty (Quintal and Rozen 2017). 
Amnesty International also provides examples of how this effort to build the state’s 
capacity to fight terrorism through the legal system had negative consequences for the people of 
Cameroon. In a 2017 report on human rights abuses by the Cameroonian state in its battle against 
Boko Haram, Amnesty documented 101 cases of individuals detained, tortured, and killed by 
Cameroonian security forces between 2013, the year before passage of the anti-terrorism law, 
and March 2017. In several reported cases Cameroon arrested individuals using soldiers from the 
regular army, the Rapid Intervention Battalion, or by unidentified men in civilian clothing. 
Nearly all faced arrest without a warrant or even a reason provided for their arrest. As one 
individual interviewed noted, even being related to a suspect of terrorism can lead to arrest by 
the security forces (Amnesty 2017). The majority of the cases involved Cameroonian men 




the Kanuri ethnic group. 32 of the 101 individuals interviewed by Amnesty suggested they 
witnessed the deaths of others as the result of torture by Cameroonian security forces. In short, 
capacity to counter terrorism improved but potentially led to a more repressive state apparatus.  
 Finally, Chad’s Law 034/PR/2015 serves as the most recent effort in the Lake Chad 
region to establish anti-terror legislation as a way to improve administrative capacity. The 
Chadian parliament unanimously adopted the law in 2015 and included several measures the 
state argued would boost its capacity to respond to terrorists. The law itself came in response to 
two suicide bombings in June of that year in N’Djamena targeting the National Police School 
and the capital city’s central police station (Boring 2015). The attacks led to the discovery of a 
Boko Haram safe house and weapons cache in the city (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016, p. 21).  
One of the measures taken in Law 034 is the substitution of the death penalty for life 
imprisonment as the maximum sentence available as an option in terrorism cases (Severin 2015). 
The death penalty can be prescribed for committing a terrorist act, financing an attack, or 
recruiting or training individuals to participate in terrorism (“Chad Adopts” 2015). Other policies 
in Law 034 included new identity cards and passports as well as new policing powers to initiate 
unannounced searches of individuals at checkpoints on roadways and in public places (Boring 
2015). According to Boring, individuals can also be detained up to 15 days as suspicion of 
terrorist activities and the banning of the burqa is another measure taken by the state in 2015 to 
prevent the camouflaging of suicide bombers. Therefore like the other examples presented in 
building legal capabilities in the Lake Chad region, administrative capacity improvements had 
the unintended consequence of repressive actions by those in power.  
Criticisms of the law include the fact that the death penalty is not a deterrent for those 




terrorism that has been argued to be too broad and could allow anything to be called terrorism 
(Severin 2015). Article 14 of Law 034 defines terrorism as the “intention to disrupt normal 
functioning of public services and provision of essential goods to the public, or creating a crisis 
situation among the population as well as inciting a general uprising in the country” (“Chad 
Adopts” 2015). Like the other states with new anti-terror legislation, reported abuses include 
executions of innocent individuals charged with terrorism (Severin 2015). The Coordination of 
Political Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC) also suggest the law is repressive 
and CPDC a spokesman for the organization argued at the time that “instead of punishing the 
acts [of terrorism], it punishes the opinions, yet opinions are protected by the 
Constitution…[and] it is therefore unconstitutional” (“Chad Adopts” 2015).  
In short, all four states enacted laws in the last decade to provide new authorizations and 
structures to the security and judicial sections of the government to protect citizens from 
terrorism and improve the capacity of the state. Providing legislative definitions and prescribed 
punishments for terrorist offenses allows states to improve administrative capacity by more 
effectively targeting not only those involved in physically carrying out an act of terrorism but 
also those who provide various forms of support. The state also is able to more efficiently 
process cases of terrorism through the legal system. The challenge however is for states to not 
abuse these laws, as alleged in several instances. New bureaucratic tools are sought to improve 
state capacity but the flipside of this issue is the potential for using those tools for repression.  
Semi-Formal Bureaucratic Measures: Working with Religious Leaders  
Two of the states in the Lake Chad region also implemented semi-formal measures to 
connect with representatives of the religious communities that illustrate attempts to improve 




extremism in the state as well as coordinate and communicate with Muslim clerics and cultural 
figures. Cameroon’s constitution provides for a secular government and prohibits discrimination 
based on religion as well as the right to practice a religion and worship. The government of 
Cameroon however does require religious groups or institutions to seek approval to operate as a 
group. The state does not impose penalties on those without official recognition but does reserve 
the right to suspend activities of unregistered groups (Bureau of Democracy 2016a). Similarly, 
Chad also enacted regulations to govern the establishment of religious associations which by law 
must register with the Minister of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing. 
Associations applying are also required to provide a list of all founding members of the 
organization, various documentation, and submit to background checks. Failure to apply to be a 
registered religious association in Chad can lead to bans, fines, and even imprisonment.   
Other measures seek to govern particular aspects of religious behavior in the name of 
improving the state’s administrative capabilities to monitor and limit potential extremism in the 
population. Cameroon implemented a ban on full-face Islamic veils in the Far North region after 
a series of terrorist attacks in 2015 but never actually enforced the ban according to the report. 
Another tactic by the Cameroonian government to combat terrorist groups such as Boko Haram 
in their recruitment efforts is working with the Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of 
Cameroon to train Muslim clerics and cultural figures from the Far North region in 
communication technology and information sharing. The program coordinates with individuals 
interacting with susceptible groups in the population and alert security forces to suspicious 
activity or individuals they believe are potential recruits of Boko Haram (AOAV 2016).  
 One individual who participated in the program, Mudibo Alidou, represents a mosque 




to his fellow religious figures they “do not have weapons but [they] have a duty to inform the 
military and Cameroon officials of any suspected visitors in [their] localities” (Kindzeka 2015). 
Bureaucratic measures such as these programs with the religious communities are meant to build 
the state’s ability to collect information on potential sources of strife and identify those 
sympathetic to Boko Haram’s cause. Yet as can be said for the various laws passed in the Lake 
Chad states to address who is and is not a terrorist, abuse of the programs that require the support 
of Cameroon’s and Chad’s religious communities could result in a backlash and lead to claims of 
repression by the state.  
Military Capacity Measures against Terrorism  
In terms of military capacity, states in the Lake Chad region implemented a combination 
of policing and military forces in the wake of Boko Haram’s growth across the area. Regional 
and national level police forces are used in conjunction with specialized units of the state 
military to maintain border security, identify potential terrorists, and respond after attacks by 
Boko Haram and other militants. All four states also developed informal arrangements with 
groups of citizens to combat terrorism in the region as well.  
Anti-Terrorism Units in Nigeria and Cameroon  
 As the heart of the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria implemented the earliest policy 
changes to improve state capacity and its ability to identify and subdue supporters of Boko 
Haram after its development as a terrorist group in 2009. Nigeria’s constitution establishes a 
national police force that operates in all regions of the country but also allows for the creation of 
additional branches to work alongside the armed forces to protect “harbors, waterways, railways, 
and airfields” and other elements of the state’s infrastructure (Pike 1998). The Nigerian Police 




officers for all 36 states and the federal capital territory of Abuja. A presidentially-appointed 
inspector general and several deputies oversee police operations, including a department 
responsible for “countersubversive activities” (Dept. of Justice 2013). 
While the NPF is the only constitutionally-authorized police force in Nigeria, a separate 
policing force does exist in the twelve northern states of Nigeria that are governed by Shari’a 
law, and is a source of tension within the state that could be seen as diminishing military 
capacity. Shari’a law is compulsory for Muslims in these regions and optional for non-Muslims 
though some reports have suggested the Hisbah Police or Shari’a police in Kano state have 
attempted to apply Shari’a law to non-Muslim populations in the area (Shuaibu 2008). The 
Hisbah are local men led by traditional leaders armed with various weapons other than firearms 
(Jamestown 2008). The Hisbah often investigate crimes, detain suspects, and hand them over to 
the NPF though they have also been accused of carrying out summary executions (Adamu 2008).  
Clientelism and improper actions by the NPF and the Hisbah police damages credibility 
with the citizens of Nigeria. NPF officers on occasion exceed their constitutional mandate in 
administering justice and commit other violations. A sample of policing issues include:  
 Armed officers demanding bribes and extorting money. 
 Embezzlement of public money by high-level officials. 
 A “return” system where the rank-and-file share extortion money with those higher up 
the chain of command. 
 Physical and sexual assault, torture, and extrajudicial killings of those detained by the 
NPF. 
 Mass arrests of individuals in public places without cause (HRW 2010). 
While there is some support for a constitutional amendment to allow for state-level, locally-
organized police forces given that Nigeria is one of the only states to rely solely on a federal-
level law enforcement structure, others have opposed the establishment of regional forces they 




 Nigeria also instituted a state of emergency in response to the growing threat and inability 
of Nigeria’s police and military forces to end the insurgency. In May 2013 President Jonathan 
declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states due to the violence carried 
out by Boko Haram militants, extending a previous state of emergency from the previous year 
(Ross 2013; Associated Press 2013; Campbell 2013). During previous states of emergency, 
governors in Nigeria have been removed from office but in this instance the president ordered 
the governors of the three northeastern states stay in place to maintain the constitutionally-
elected offices and quell criticism from the opposition (Campbell 2013). Jonathan renewed the 
order in November 2013 and again in May 2014. Under the first state of emergency Jonathan 
also ordered the establishment of the joint task force (JTF) between the military and police.  
In August 2013 Nigeria also re-organized units of the state’s military to improve the 
response to Boko Haram. The Nigerian military established the 7th army division in August 2013 
with the goal of providing additional security to the three northeastern Nigerian states of 
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The division’s headquarters is based in the city of Maidugri in the 
region (Nigerian Army 2016a). After President Buhari took office he ordered a new command 
center be established as a “forward command base” for the military, arguing the war against 
Boko Haram could not be won from the nation’s capital, Abuja (DeCapua 2015). The 
establishment of the Maiduguri command did not end attacks on civilians and the military by 
Boko Haram forces. The burning of villages in the northeastern states, attacks on army convoys, 
and the burning of military bases by gunmen all occurred after the standing up of the seventh 
division (Adamczyk 2017). A third army division was later established in Adamawa state to 
provide additional support and is headquartered in Jos. (Nigerian Army 2016b). Troops from the 




disputes between local communities including herdsmen. The establishment of local security 
forces and improving coordination between the state’s military and policing operations are 
indicators of improvements in military capacity, corrupt behavior among elites in the police force 
and military weakens capacity.  
In the case of Cameroon, despite terrorist threats across the country’s Far North region, 
no specialized border police officers existed prior to the spread of Boko Haram into its territory. 
Instead border units drew forces from Cameroon’s general police force (Bureau of 
Counterterrorism 2014). By 2016 the state had recruited new border security officers with 
specific assignments to the country’s borders and improved screening procedures at ports but 
uncontrolled border crossings continue (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017).  
Anti-Terrorism Units in Niger and Chad 
 Niger increased its counterterrorism capabilities in the wake of violence to its north in 
Mali and to its south in Nigeria around the same time as Cameroon. Counterterrorism duties now 
fall to a specific investigative organization, the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism 
(SCLCT) which includes representatives from Niger’s three primary law enforcement bodies: the 
Nigerien National Police, the Nigerien National Guard, and the Gendarmerie (Bureau of 
Counterterrorism 2017, p. 45). A separate National Police Intervention Group (GIPN) under the 
Ministry of Interior also performs some counterterrorism duties, particularly emergency response 
to terrorist attacks. Additionally, the Nigerien government began spending more on border 
security after the Tuareg insurgency in Mali beginning in 2012. The Nigerien cities of Arlit and 
Niamey suffered attacks in response to Niger providing military support to reestablish control 




Mauritania, and Algeria increased surveillance and monitoring of terrorist groups operating in 
the Sahara region (ACHPR 2014). 
Lastly, efforts in neighboring Chad came later as did the Boko Haram threat but the state 
eventually adopted similar policing and security policies as its neighbors. All twenty-two police 
brigades are involved with counterterrorism duties and the Director General of the Chadian 
National Police is working to increase training in border control and crisis response. Chad’s 
border patrol conducts border-crossing screenings for Boko Haram affiliates and contraband. The 
unit consists of a mixture of dedicated border police, general police, the military, and gendarmes 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017, p. 24). Chad also cooperates with Libya and Algeria to 
monitor porous and desolate border areas while Sudan and Chad share a history of cross-border 
rebel activity and provide one another with tactical support in tracking insurgents crossing into 
Chadian territory (HRW 2006).  
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger also established dedicated military units to respond to the 
growing Boko Haram threat as violence spread into their territories. Niger’s aforementioned 
SCLCT serves as a coordinating body for terrorism response and the military operates a 
specialized cell of the joint response entity out of the city of Diffa, a location significantly 
impacted by Boko Haram activity (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017). Cameroon’s Rapid 
Intervention Battalion and Chad’s Special Anti-Terrorism Group (SATG) conduct similar duties 
in their respective countries according to the Bureau. In short the common theme across the four 
states in terms of formal institutions of military capacity is the effort to improve coordination 
between various elements of the state’s security apparatus and codifying the specific duties of 





Semi-Formal Measures: Vigilance Committees  
 On a less-formal level of institutions in the area of military capacity, all four states in the 
Lake Chad region work with individuals that are not part of the police or military, referred to as 
vigilantes or vigilance committees. These groups, controlled by local figures such as village 
chiefs, play a role in state security in Cameroon for example since the 1950s. In the 1990s and 
2000s Cameroon worked with comités de vigilance to combat bandits in the north, the same area 
where Boko Haram is active today. While the Rapid Intervention Battalion exists as a state-
established military unit, the government also works with vigilance committees through local 
chiefs as a secondary force as well. Chiefs maintain membership lists and provide identity cards 
for these ad-hoc security units (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016; International Crisis Group 
2017). By 2016 Boko Haram carried out 113 attacks in the Far North, killing 262 civilians, 30 
vigilance committee members, and six soldiers (Bureau of Democracy 2016b) and actively 
searched out members of the vigilance committees as targets (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017), 
demonstrating the front-line role vigilantes are playing in the fight against Boko Haram.  
Local leaders such as the governor of the Far North region, Augustine Awa Fonka, issued 
regional decrees formalizing vigilance committees in the wake of Boko Haram’s attacks in 2014. 
After the suicide bombings in the regional capital of Maroua in July 2015 the state established 
more committees and had nearly 16,000 vigilantes available as of the end of 2015 (Chimtom 
2015). In December of that year in the Far North town of Waza a group of vigilance committee 
members came upon three female suicide bombers during a routine patrol. Three vigilantes and 
one of the attackers died in the ensuing confrontation but prevented the bombers from detonating 




While vigilantes received credit for decreasing the number of suicide bombings through 
their active roles as patrols in public places (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017), members also 
went beyond their prescribed duties. Cameroonian vigilance committees launch occasional 
offensive attacks beyond their defensive duties, pursuing Boko Haram militants into Nigerian 
territory at times (ICG 2017). The death of a suspect who attempted to steal a bicycle and the 
burning of the body of another suspect (Bureau of Democracy 2016b) are just a few examples. 
Some officials in Cameroon express concern over the independence of vigilance committees and 
creating an “uncontrollable militia,” resulting in a reluctance to arm and train vigilantes. 
Cameroon does not sanction automatic weapons possession for vigilantes, most of whom only 
possess machetes, spears, bows, and arrows (Chimtom 2015). Others accused some vigilantes of 
being double agents for Boko Haram or reselling goods confiscated from Boko Haram members, 
with several arrests in Cameroon as well as neighboring Nigeria (ICG 2017). Vigilance 
committees also allegedly use children as young as twelve years old (Embassy 2018).  
Vigilantes play a more limited role in neighboring Chad. The official use of vigilance 
committees began in 2015 but Chadian authorities are more cautious about the role of vigilantes, 
given the Chadian civil war from 2005 to 2010 (ICG 2017). Yet after the first attacks directly 
attributable to Boko Haram in 2015 the minister for territorial administration and Chadian 
President Idriss Deby called on Chadians around the Lake Chad area to establish comités de 
vigilance. Deby also visited vigilantes on patrol such as a visit to Ngouboua in 2016. The state 
also provided weapons to local chiefs overseeing vigilance committees according to the ICG. 
In the case of Niger the government had concerns with vigilance committees due to the 
Tuareg insurgencies in the 1990s and 2007, a weak security force, and fears over the 




operating inside Nigerien territory. The ICG notes Niger banned civilians from creating 
roadblocks but the state does allow vigilantes such as the dan banga to operate in the public 
markets of Diffa and Mainé Soroa. The state also utilizes vigilance committees in thirty localities 
to monitor and prevent child trafficking (Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2014). Militias 
formed in the Peul and Mohamid Arab communities briefly received permission to operate by 
Niger but later lost authorization due to rising ethnic tensions in the region (ICG 2017). Niger 
instead used vigilante groups as a network of informants in less secure regions of the state such 
as Bagara and Toumour.  
Finally, the use of vigilantes in Nigeria against Boko Haram first began to take shape in 
2013, though the practice of raising vigilante forces dates back decades. With increasing 
violence in Maiduguri the Joint Task Force (JTF), under the direction of the Nigerian army, 
organized groups with assistance from local and traditional authorities (ICG 2017). The Civilian 
Joint Task Force, the formal name given to the vigilance committees in Nigeria consists of nearly 
30,000 civilians helping to fight Boko Haram (Cropley 2017). Individuals from the area with 
local knowledge became an integral part of the effort to push Boko Haram out of the city.  
In exchange for their service some vigilantes receive compensation in the form of small 
salaries and healthcare while others only gifts in cash from local officials or military 
commanders (ICG 2017). Other requests for a more formal arrangement with the state face 
concerns over the “blurred lines in Nigeria between local politics and orchestrated violence” 
(Cropley 2017). Some vigilantes do receive a stipend of 15,000 naira ($48) per month from the 
Borno state government (Cropley 2017) which raises questions of the vigilantes being a 
volunteer force or a mercenary-like arrangement the state could use for other purposes in the 




recognition. In one example, a couple on patrol in the town of Gambaru died after being targeted 
by Boko Haram militants in the region (Lauvergnier 2018).  
In Nigeria the groups patrol border areas, run checkpoints to observe new arrivals to 
markets, mosques, and villages, perform arrests for security forces, interrogate detained suspects, 
and participate in operations outside of their home cities and villages (Cropley 2017; ICG 2017). 
Concerns over human rights abuses, looting and stealing, sexual violence, extortion, and 
summary executions of some prisoners by vigilantes exist, as in other states in the region. One 
solution implemented is keeping vigilantes operating in their home communities, where their 
actions will be known to people that know them on a personal level (Cropley 2017; ICG 2017). 
In sum, all four states recognized weaknesses in their military capacity after the increase 
in terrorist attacks by Boko Haram militants, first in Nigeria between 2009 and 2013 and later in 
the neighboring states as violence spilled over into their territories. Dedicated police and military 
units with appropriate training introduced a more formal level of military capabilities in the area 
of counterterrorism that paralleled the bureaucratic moves taken by each state. In addition, all 
four states, to varying degrees, organized groups of citizens to fill in the gaps in the state’s 
military capacity and found success using vigilance committees to do everything from conduct 
patrols of prime bombing targets to collect intelligence as natives and locals invested in 
protecting their communities. As with the bureaucratic measures though, improvements in 
military capacity, both formal and informal, run the risk of abuse by those within states when not 
held accountable for their actions. The Boko Haram violence escalated shortly after concerns 
grew regarding the treatment of those that supported its hardline views on Islam and the 




citizens against violent extremism, extrajudicial killings and corrupt practices by representatives 
of the state are damaging to the efforts to end Boko Haram as well.  
Regional Efforts at Building Capacity  
 While each of the four states implemented various measures to improve bureaucratic and 
military capacity in response to terrorism in the last decade, all four also benefited from regional-
level coordination on combatting terrorism. Beyond the African Union (AU), two other 
organizations provide support and resources that enable states to enhance their ability to respond 
to Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations in the region. Nigeria and Niger are members of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) while Cameroon and Chad are 
members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Both are 
economically-centered regional organizations but established counter-terrorism efforts in 
response to the threat of Boko Haram. The following briefly explores how these regional-level 
approaches build state capacity in response to the regional threats like Boko Haram.  
ECOWAS and ECCAS  
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a fifteen-member 
regional organization established in 1975 and revised in 1993 to promote economic integration 
and acts as a trade union between the member states. Members include Niger, Nigeria, and 13 
other states though not Cameroon and Chad. The group allows for free movement of citizens 
through the member states, supports non-aggression between member states and the 
“maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security through the strengthening of good 
neighborliness” and “is meant to be a region governed in accordance with the principles of 
democracy, rule of law, and good governance” (ECOWAS Treaty 1993). Members also consult 




regional threats, and provides support for peacekeeping operations when necessary. Among its 
current initiatives, ECOWAS is coordinating the development of a regional-level ten-year plan to 
improve infrastructure in the region, particularly improving the efficiency of transport corridors 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017, p. 372).  
The ECOWAS pact failed to include defense and regional security in the beginning but 
by the 1980s members decided to sign the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense for any armed 
threat or aggression against a member state. ECOWAS established the Defense Committee and 
Council and the Allied Armed Force of the Community in the 1980s as well. Later the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group, a multilateral armed force in 1990 and intervened in Liberia in 1990, Sierra 
Leone in 1997, and in Guinea-Bissau in 1999. The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping, and Security, adopted in 1999, 
created a formal structure to respond to various threats to the region, from political instability to 
Boko Haram (UNECA 2016).  
In February 2013, the member states signed on to the Political Declaration and Common 
Position against Terrorism, the official counter-terrorism strategy of ECOWAS. In it, members 
declared support for efforts to freeze or confiscate financial assets for those known to support 
terrorism, for efforts to prevent territory within their state becoming safe havens for terrorists, 
and encouraged the adoption of counter-terror legislation and zero-tolerance policies regarding 
terrorist activity (ECOWAS Strategy 2013). The declaration and strategy plan also included the 
establishment of ECOWAS’ Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit that monitors states’ 
implementations of counter-terrorism efforts and coordinates training and technical issues with 




Central African states formed their own version of ECOWAS in 1983, ECCAS or the 
Economic Community of Central African States, but the organization was inactive for several 
years due to conflicts in the region. The member states resurrected the group in 1998 (African 
Union n.d.). Formed as a customs union between member states (UNECA 2016), ECCAS also 
added a non-aggression pact to the agreement in 1994 and formed the Council for Peace and 
Security in Central Africa (COPAX) in 1999 (AFCAC 2013). In 2016 the heads of ECOWAS 
and ECCAS met at the 27th Summit of the African Union and among several issues discussed 
how the two organizations can coordinate on combatting the threat of Boko Haram (ECOWAS 
2016), given that member states from ECOWAS (Niger and Nigeria) and ECCAS (Cameroon 
and Chad) are directly affected the growth of the terrorist organization.  
The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
On a continental level, the African Union works to support efforts to stymie the growth of 
Boko Haram across West Africa. As Boko Haram activity surpassed territorial boundaries of one 
state, the surrounding countries and the African Union formed an international-level response to 
support Nigeria and the other Lake Chad states. In 2015 the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union authorized the Multinational Joint Task Force, operating under the guidance of 
the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to eliminate Boko Haram and other terrorists groups 
(MNJTF 2018; Assanvo et. al. 2016). The force includes the four countries under consideration 
in this chapter as well as the country of Benin (Assanvo et. al. 2016). The MNJTF began to work 
on retaking territory from the territory around and islands in the Lake Chad area (Besheer 2017), 
though the origins of the MNJTF predate the rise of Boko Haram and dates back to an agreement 




safe and secure environment in areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram,” to restore 
authority of the states, and to return internally-displaced persons and refugees (MNJTF 2018).  
The MNJTF carried out several major military operations after its authorization to target 
Boko Haram in 2015. Operations in the Nigerian towns of Ngoshe and Kumshe in February 
2016, the latter on the Cameroonian border resulted in the taking of a Boko Haram support base 
while a May operation that year targeted Boko Haram militants in the Madawya forest in Nigeria 
using forces from Cameroon and Nigeria (Assanvo et. al. 2016). By 2017 the MNJTF reportedly 
killed 828 Boko Haram militants, arrested 615 others, had over 1,000 more surrender to the task 
force, and freed more than 20,500 hostages while also destroying 32 terrorist camps, mostly 
belonging to Boko Haram (Besheer 2017). Operation Gama Aiki (‘finish the job’ in Hausa) 
involved forces from Niger and Nigeria on several fronts around Lake Chad and resulted in the 
liberation of several towns and villages in the Niger/Nigeria/Chad border area (ISS). Refugees in 
the region noted destruction from air strikes and repeated attacks by Boko Haram militants in 
areas to which people had been evacuated as part of the operation (Bavier 2016). While the 
operation succeeded at pushing back militants in several areas, Boko Haram remains active. The 
Joint Steering Committee on Support to the MNJTF against Boko Haram in December 2017 
recommended continuing the MNJTF authorization for the time being (UNOAU 2017).  
An issue the MNJTF has faced thus far in its operations is the need for more financial and 
material support from the Lake Chad states and the African Union, including a need for specific 
equipment such as flat-bottomed patrol boats and helicopters for rescues and patrols of the region 
(Besheer 2017). MNJTF support has increased since Muhammudu Buhari took office in Nigeria 




adding $100 million to MNJTF funds (Assanvo et. al. 2016), though the operational budget of 
the force is close to $700 million (Bavier 2016).  
Both ECOWAS and ECCAS serve as multi-faceted organizations focused predominantly 
on economic growth in their respective regions. By mitigating conflict throughout their 
members’ territories by enhancing regional capacity, ECOWAS and ECCAS serve as excellent 
examples of states supporting one another’s weaknesses in state capacity. The MNJTF exhibits 
this regional-level cooperative mechanism in the area of military capacity specifically, providing 
states such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria with a structure to enhance their efforts to 
end Boko Haram’s insurgency in particular and combat terrorism in general.  
Findings and Continuing Weaknesses in Capacity  
 Despite the various bureaucratic and military capacity improvements made by Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria since Boko Haram’s wave of violence began in 2009, there remain 
identifiable weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity in these four states. Given the 
results of the analysis in Chapter Four, improvements in the legal structures used to punish 
terrorism and the establishment of formal and informal security entities are hindered if issues 
with repression and clientelism continue to plague the states in question.  
Corruption in Cameroon is widespread with Transparency International in 2015 ranking 
Cameroon 130th out of 168 countries. Cameroonians regularly report bribery and extortion in the 
government and business sectors (Freedom House 2015), with 69 percent of respondents in one 
survey suggesting they paid a bribe to police (Ardigo 2016). The presidency also exercises 
significant control over national and local level politics and political figures, requiring 
sponsorship and financial support from those seeking political appointments (Atangana 2012; 




Higher Judicial Council are all appointed by the president as well (Bertelsmann Stifung 2016a), 
resulting in similar issues of corrupt behavior in the selection process.  
More recently, President Biya approved a new penal code in 2016 that bans political 
protests at public buildings, schools, and universities (Freedom House 2017a). The previously 
mentioned cases of Ahmed Abba, a journalist arrested for reporting on Boko Haram and later 
sentenced to ten years in prison (Amnesty 2018a), and a radio reporter in Douala the year after 
being strip searched after she asked questions at a public hospital are two examples of 
Cameroon’s repression of free speech (Freedom House 2017a). Pre-trial detention and trial time 
limits are not being enforced systematically (Freedom House 2015) and the Rapid Intervention 
Battalion detained over 100 people between March 2013 and March 2017, who then faced 
systematic torture likely sanctioned by senior military officials (Amnesty International 2018a). 
Chad continues to struggle with various forms of corruption. Transparency 
International’s 2016 ranking of Chad as 139th in the world, up from 166th in 2013, shows some 
signs of improvement in the area of ending clientelism but problems remain (Chene 2014, 2016). 
Low salaries for civil servants and a lack of training and accountability in the civil service 
(KPMG 2014), power remaining concentrated in the executive branch regarding elections, the 
shutting out of the opposition in election reform (Chene 2014), absenteeism in public facilities 
(World Bank 2010), and officers in uniform committing street crimes (Bureau of Democracy 
2013) are all longstanding issues.  
Recently, several public incidents highlighted the continuing issues with clientelism and 
repressive tactics by the state. After President Idriss Deby won a fifth term in 2016 several 
members of the military disappeared allegedly for voting against Deby as well as reports from 




House 2017b). In 2017 the Chadian government banned several peaceful assemblies and 
detained protesters including two leaders of a movement called IYINA (“We Are Tired”) who 
call on citizens to wear red as a protest against corruption (Amnesty International 2018b).  
Clientelism and repression remain significant issues in Niger as well. Approximately 16 
percent of respondents to the 2015 Global Corruption Barometer reported paying a bribe to 
officials in the police or the court system (Chene 2017). In addition, the national budget 
allocations remain secretive and not open to public scrutiny (Bertelsmann Foundation 2016b) 
and in October 2014 the former president, Mamadou Tandja faced indictment for corruption in 
relation to nearly $800 million of public money from the national treasury (Heritage Foundation 
2016), though he was released shortly after (Bertelsmann Foundation 2016).  
On the repression side of issues, Niger’s 2016 legislative and presidential elections saw 
the primary opponent of the incumbent president jailed and reports of electoral irregularities, the 
banning of an international journalist over coverage of Boko Haram, and the detainment of a 
local civil rights activist who received a six month sentence for criticizing the government on 
Facebook (Freedom House 2017c). In 2017 security forces responded to a student protest in 
Niamey with force, killing one student with a tear gas canister which a commission of inquiry 
found to be due to negligence of the gendarmerie (Amnesty International 2018c).  
Lastly, Nigeria is notorious for issues with corruption as with the aforementioned cases of 
the Nigerian police force. Embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds are notable 
examples. A former governor of Delta state was found guilty of using public money to purchase 
several houses around the world, luxury cars, and a private jet (Global Witness 2012) and a scam 
involving government subsidies paid for oil products resulted in financial losses for the state and 




payments for favoritism, buying the appointments of judges are problems as well according to 
Martini. President Buhari has made corruption in the state a priority since taking office and in 
signed Executive Order Number 6 in 2018 to target high profile corruption in the country 
(Wakili 2018) and the administration claims the recovery of $9 billion in stolen assets since 
Buhari took office in 2015 (Freedom House 2018d).  
Repression in Nigeria, especially in the efforts to thwart the growth of Boko Haram, 
remains a major issue. The Nigerian military arrested and detained thousands of individuals 
including women and children. Overcrowded cells, denial to access to lawyers and family 
members, disease and dehydration are all problems as well. Hundreds of detainees have died in 
detention and women have given birth to children also being held in detention now as well 
(Amnesty International 2018d). Attempts by the state to rectify some of the issues with 
repressive and illegal tactics by the state include holding police and military officers accountable. 
Amnesty also notes the sentencing of two police officers to death for taking part in extrajudicial 
killings of six traders in Abuja in 2005 and the High Court in Port Harcourt convicting five 
policemen for executions in 2009 are positive signs of reform under the current administration.  
Conclusion  
As the discussion in this chapter illustrates, the states of the Lake Chad region 
implemented various legislative and structural policies to improve bureaucratic and military 
capacity after the rise of Boko Haram as a regional threat between 2009 and 2018. As the 
number of attacks in Nigeria continued to increase and then spill over into neighboring 
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, each state incorporated formal and informal measures to improve 
counterterrorism efforts within their territories and the region. New laws defining terrorist 




to process cases of terrorism through the legal system and move the fight against Boko Haram 
away from all-out warfare to more of a criminality issue. 
Reorganizing police and military units to better investigate and counter terrorist 
operations improved military capabilities in the region as well. Informal approaches including 
partnerships with the religious community and the use of vigilante forces add to the four states’ 
capacity to counter Boko Haram and terrorism in general as well. Finally, regional organizations 
create an additional layer of capacity building each state benefits from, not only economically as 
is mostly the case with ECOWAS and ECCAS, but also militarily with the MNJTF that allows 
for transnational cooperation to respond to a transnational threat to state security.   
Yet despite these various efforts to build bureaucratic and regional capacity, problems 
remain within all four states. Corruption and clientelistic acts inhibits the state’s ability to police 
its own citizens while repressive tactics cause the people of each state to question the authority 
and effectiveness of the regimes currently in power. Abuses of legislative efforts and using new 
anti-terrorism laws to tamp down political opposition and the press while police and military 
officers continue to face accusations of improper detainments and extrajudicial executions 
compound weaknesses in state capacity and only inspire citizens questioning the merits of 
supporting the current regime.  
Chapter Six will follow the same pattern of investigation into terrorism and state capacity 
in the Southeast Asian region, considering the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Singapore. The chapter highlights similarities with the Lake Chad states in terms of military and 
administrative capacity developments in the same general time period as the rise of Boko Haram. 





Chapter 6: Jemaah Islamiyah and State Capacity in Southeast Asia’s Island States 
Introduction  
 In this chapter I continue to explore the four factors identified in Chapter Four: 
bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and clientelism. As 
previously noted from the cross-national analysis we see evidence of how each impacts the 
number of terrorist attacks in the regions researched in this dissertation. Where Chapter Five 
explored these factors in four states in Sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter provides a similar 
qualitative analysis for the same set of factors in Southeast Asia.  
 As with Chapter Five, this chapter explores incidences of terrorism and changes in state 
capacity across a set of geographically-concentrated states. I examine state capacity in four 
predominantly island-based nation-states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. 
These four states, like those chosen in Chapter Five’s exploration of Sub-Saharan Africa, are 
linked by their experiences with terrorist movements that transcend national boundaries. Where 
Chapter Five explored one major terrorist movement, Boko Haram, this chapter considers two 
separate but parallel organizations in Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. 
Predating Boko Haram’s activity in the twenty-first century to a degree, these two terrorist 
organizations developed across the four aforementioned states but are comparatively less active 
today than the Boko Haram movement.  
 This chapter follows the same methodology and organization of Chapter Five. First, to 
examine bureaucratic or administrative capacity we can consider how state’s developed legal 
structures to respond to Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and other movements in the last decade. 
Like states in Sub-Saharan Africa, contention exists over defining terrorism and support of 




Second, the military’s capacity to combat groups using force and how it implements its 
use of force through formal and informal bodies requires consideration here as well. Like 
administrative approaches such as legal structures for responding to terrorism, states responded 
to Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and other terrorist movements by developing new programs. 
New military units and coordination between police and military institutions in the state enhance 
state capacity but also have the potential for becoming repressive responses to any challenge to 
the status quo. Unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, less evidence exists of informal groups of individuals 
policing border regions and conducting the duties of the state’s police and military forces.  
Third, another significant factor in state capacity is border security which requires both 
major elements of military might and administrative capability. Different challenges exist in 
securing border regions in Southeast Asia compared to the Sub-Saharan states studied in the 
previous chapter however. A maritime security component therefore is more significant in state 
capacity in this region. Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf able exploit these 
specific weaknesses in Southeast Asian states and are able to transcend borders both in their 
activity as well as in their efforts to elude authorities responding to terrorism, much like Boko 
Harm does across land borders. Therefore, building bureaucratic and military capacity at a 
regional level and through regional organizations provides some insight into the improvements in 
state capacity across the states involved. As mapping across these sub-regions within the 
Southeast Asian case demonstrates, understanding state capacity and terrorism requires analysis 
transcending state borders and the interconnecting strengths and weaknesses of states. Therefore 
in both the bureaucratic and military capacity sections I discuss efforts to improve border 




The factors noted above are explored in a qualitative approach which parallels the 
approach taken in the previous chapter. First I identified notable policies and issues of capacity 
discussed in the US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism from 2007 to 2017. I then 
explore those policies further through additional data from government and international 
organization reports and local and international media coverage of specific incidents across the 
region in the last decade. Geo-spatial mapping is also presented to highlights specifically where 
incidents of terrorism are occurring in each region of interest. After discussing the policies 
undertaken to improve bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, and briefly 
examining regional capacity I conclude with a discussion of the ongoing capacity weaknesses in 
the region that result in clientelism and repression.  
Southeast Asia: Terrorism and Capacity in Pacific Island States 
Islands, Archipelagos, and Terrorism in the Pacific 
 For this chapter I consider four states located in close proximity to one another but not 
generally connected via shared land borders as with the states discussed in Chapter Five. The 
four states under consideration in this chapter, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Singapore are all predominantly states made of island chains with Malaysia and Indonesia 
sharing land borders on the island of Borneo and with Thailand, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea. 
Figure 6.1 provides a map of the region. As with the Sub-Saharan cases in the previous chapter, 
the four Southeast Asian states share a common experience in the form of colonial rule for at 
least some period of history prior to the late twentieth century. Independence came significantly 
earlier for the Philippines and Indonesia but indirectly compared to the Sub-Saharan examples. 
Spanish colonial rule of the Philippines for example ended not with independence for the state 
but acquisition by the United States as the result of the Spanish-American War in 1898. A 




intent of full independence during the next decade. The Japanese occupation during World War 
II lasted from 1942 to 1945, interrupting the process but the US ultimately recognized the 
Republic of the Philippines as an independent state in 1946. Indonesia similarly became an 
independent state at the end of World War II, ending the Japanese occupation that replaced 
Dutch colonial rule which existed for several decades prior to the occupation in 1942. British 
colonial rule of Malaysia and what ultimately became Singapore ended in 1963. Two years later 
the Federation of Malaysia and the people of Singapore agreed to separation, creating the fourth 
state under consideration in this chapter.  
 
 Most important for our consideration in this chapter though is not the colonial experience 




incidents involving Jemaah Islamiyah. Each of the four states struggled with the challenges of 
building and maintaining the same basic elements of capacity as did the Sub-Saharan states. 
Unique to the region however is the expansive, unconnected territory these states must maintain, 
with the exception of Singapore. Employment opportunities, access and control of natural 
resources, and basic infrastructure are all considerations for capacity-building. As noted in Table 
6.1 the four states vary in some important aspects. In terms of population the state vary 
drastically, from just under six million in Singapore to over 260 million in Indonesia. Total land 
area varies significantly as well with Indonesia’s nearly two million square kilometers to 
Singapore’s 719. Three of the four states have between 46 and 76 percent of their population 
living in urban areas while the fourth, Singapore, has 100 percent living in urban areas given its 
and status as a city-state with not much additional territory.  
What these four states do have in common in terms of territory though is a significant 
amount of coastline that must be monitored and presents unique challenges for state capacity not 
faced by land-locked states in Sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia. Indonesia for example has 
over thirteen thousand islands that make up its territory while around one thousand are inhabited 
by humans. The Philippines has over seven thousand islands though the population is 
concentrated primarily in the northwest and south-central Luzon chains, the islands of the 
Visayan Sea such as Cebu and Negros, and nearly one eight of the state’s population resides in 
Manila. Mindanao is the second-largest island of the Philippines with approximately twenty 
million residents and home to several of the long-standing conflict and terrorist movements in 
the country. Malaysia consists of over eight hundred islands with much of its population 
concentrated on portions of the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo. Even comparatively 






Finally, considering how each scores on the measure of Institutionalized Democracy in 
the Polity IV dataset, with a range from 0 to 10 with higher values representing more democratic 
states, we see some variation. The Institutionalized Democracy score includes three components: 
Table 6.1 West Africa General Demographics (2018 estimates) 
 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines  Singapore 










Population Size 262,787,403 
 
31,809,660 105,893,381  5,995,991  
Total Area (sq. km) 1,904,569 329,847 300,000 719.2 
Coastline (km) 54,716  2,742 36,289 193 
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the ability of citizens to express political preferences effectively, the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens. 
Three of the four states have scores between six and nine, high on the democratic end of the 
scale and Singapore at two or much less democratic. In summary, significant variation exists in 
terms of the population and geographic characteristics of the four Southeast Asian states but all 
four have the shared experience of dealing with Jemaah Islamiyah as well as widespread, 
disconnected territory through the region.  
Terrorism in the Southeast Asian Region  
Terrorism in the Southeast Asian states considered in this chapter varies drastically by 
state and only Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf exist in multiple states, though their activities 
are concentrated in some places than others. Several other domestic or home-grown movements 
in the four countries of interest in the chapter exist as well. As is apparent in Figure 6.8 the 
Philippines in particular experiences a significantly higher number of terrorist incidents in the 
observed time period, 1985 to 2016. 
 
 In contrast very few terrorist incidents are listed in the Global Terrorism Database for 
Singapore. As with Chapter Five the number of terrorist attacks for each of the four states under 




















































































































































incidents peaked in the observed time period in 2001 with over 100 separate attacks but dropped 
precipitously in the mid-2000s and steadily climbed back to the 20-40 range in the last several 
years. For the Philippines the annual number of attacks, as noted in Figure 6.3, is much higher, 
especially in the last several years, reaching several hundred in 2014 alone. In the cases of 
Malaysia and Singapore, depicted in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, terrorist incidents are less common. For 
Malaysia the annual number of incidents never reached twenty in the observed time period and 
for Singapore in this time period only once did more than one attack occur in a year and only one 
incident is attributed to a specific terrorist group. Nevertheless as will be discussed throughout 
the chapter Singapore finds itself on the forefront of terrorist activity in the region in other ways, 
in particular financing and several failed terrorist plots. 
Capacity targets are a significant portion of terrorist incidents in the region. Using data 
from the Global Terrorism Database we can examine the aggregate of attacks in Figure 6.6 and 
see that approximately fifty-eight percent of the 6,359 terrorist incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Singapore between 1985 and 2015 fall into categories that involve some 
aspect of military or administrative capacity. These categories include Infrastructure,29 
                                                          
29 The GTD differentiates between several elements of infrastructure that I included under one categorical name. Thus, ‘infrastructure as listed in 



















































































































































Government Institutions,30 Military Institutions, Police, and Education Institutions. Religious 
Institutions and Private Citizens and Businesses31 make up a majority of the rest of the 
incidents.32 As the chart demonstrates while private entities and individuals are the majority of 
those affected by terrorism, institutions of the state that form the basis of capacity are specifically 
targeted as well. 
 
Jemaah Islamiyah  
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) dates back to the late 1970s though experts disagree on whether 
the name’s original usage referred to a formal organization or an informal gathering of 
individuals with shared ideological views about Islam in the region (CFR 2009). JI’s ideological 
roots are in another movement, Darul Islam. Darul Islam appears first after the end of Dutch 
colonial rule in the state in the 1940s that sought to establish Islamic rule across Indonesia and 
fought a violent insurgency against the state throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Australian 
                                                          
30 The GTD lists Government Institutions as one of two sub-categories, General or Diplomatic, and are combined in Figure 6.6. 
31 Private Citizens & Property and Businesses are listed as separate categories in the GTD but are added together for the purposes of Figure 6.6. 
32 Approximately 9 percent of the total number of incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are listed as ‘Unknown’ or 
‘Other.’ To the Other category I also added targets designated Maritime, Journalists and Media, NGO’s, [Other] Terrorists and Non-State Militia, 
Tourists, and Violent Political Parties.  












Government n.d.). Other experts suggest JI formed in the 1980s under a group of Indonesian 
extremists exiled in Malaysia (CFR 2009). 
Nonetheless the group turned violent in the 1990s after existing for several years as a 
non-violent religious movement. The group’s leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, joined Darul Islam in 
the 1970s, served a prison sentence for Islamist activism, and then fled the state for Malaysia 
after a court ordered his return to prison. Bashir worked from Malaysia to recruit volunteers to 
fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, increase funding from sympathizers, and form connections with 
al-Qaeda, though some question the depth of these connections (CFR 2009; Vaughn et. al. 2009). 
At the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 Bashir returned to Indonesia and led the 
Mujahadeen Council and established an Islamic seminary on the island of Java (CFR 2009).  
While JI existed prior to the September 11th attacks, the group’s notoriety as a violent 
terrorist movement comes afterwards first with the 2002 bombing of a nightclub on the 
predominantly Hindu island of Bali. A few incidents prior to this attack including a wave of 
bombings at Christian churches and another series of bombings in the Philippine capital Manila 
indicate the group’s violent turn took place even prior to ties developing with al-Qaeda. Within 
just a handful of years however the group established cells in Australia, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and southern Thailand (BBC 2012; Bureau of 
Counterterrorism 2007). Throughout the 2000s JI carried out several significant terrorist attacks 
or plotted attacks including:  
 A 2001 plot uncovered by Singaporean authorities targeting American, Israeli, British, 
and Australian embassies and diplomatic facilities.  
 The 2002 Bali nightclub bombing. 
 The 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
 The 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.  
 The 2005 Bali suicide bombings. 




 A 2010 plot uncovered by Indonesian authorities targeting the Danish Embassy in 
Jakarta. 
 A 2013 plot uncovered by the Philippine military as a joint operation between JI and Abu 
Sayyaf to carry out bombings across the island of Mindanao. 
 A 2015 plot uncovered by Philippine authorities targeting a visit by Pope Francis to 
Manila and Tacloban. (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007-2015) 
Jemaah Islamiyah overall is responsible for far less attacks than groups in Southeast Asia and 
beyond such as Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. During Jemaah Islamiyah’s existence, the 
GTD identified JI as responsible for seventy-five terrorist incidents in Indonesia and the 
Philippines and zero in Malaysia or Singapore, however several plots and arrests of JI members 
in the latter two states, as discussed later in the chapter demonstrate the group’s transnational 
presence. Figure 6.7 provides geo-spatial mapping of the aforementioned JI-attributed incidents.  
 
Prior to the 2002 Bali bombing authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
failed to take significant action against JI operatives but after Indonesia as well as its neighbors 
began several capacity-building policy reforms that eventually led to the capture of several high-
level leaders of JI and over 1,500 JI members dead or detained (Singh 2018). Singapore and 




Malaysia soon outlawed citizens from being members of JI while the Philippines and Indonesia 
focus on arresting perpetrators of specific terrorist acts by the group (CFR 2009) and until 
recently maintained lax financial controls and minimal visa requirements as well as porous 
borders (Vaughn et. al. 2009). No JI or JI-affiliated attacks occurred in 2016 or 2017 but 
authorities believe the group continues to recruit and strengthen its network of operatives and 
finances as well as uses ISIS-affiliated training camps in Syria to prepare operatives for future 
operations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016-2017; Australian Government n.d.).  
The regional focus on more recent developments with other terrorist movements such as 
ISIS allowed JI to regroup and focus more narrowly on Indonesia and a period of “strategic 
dormancy” as well as spreading its ideology through pesantrens or religious boarding schools, 
mosques, educational institutions, and publishing houses (Singh 2018; Vallee 2018). As one 
analyst in the region noted, JI as of 2016 had about 2,000 active members, “roughly where it was 
prior to the crackdown” which is corroborated by former JI members (Jenkins 2016). As the 
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict suggests, “Jemaah Islamiyah is not an immediate threat, 
but rather one with a 25-year time frame for achieving an Islamic state” (Vallee 2018, p. 63). 
Beyond Jemaah Islamiyah 
Much of the terrorism beyond transnational movements in Southeast Asia in the last two 
decades occurred in the Philippines, specifically the southern end of the state’s numerous island 
chains. Figure 6.8 illustrates the sheer number of incidents in the Philippines between 1985 and 
2015, excluding Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
formed as an Islamic separatist organization in the late 1970s and remains active, seeking an 




who primarily live in the Mindanao region. The MILF originated as a splinter of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) due to ideological and political disagreements (Bale 2003).  
  
Ultimately the MILF focuses on building up its larger organization but also an armed 
wing known as the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). The MILF continued negotiating 
with the Philippine government to achieve the goals of autonomy and independence but carried 
out bombings and damaging property to illustrate its ability to force the government to negotiate 
which ultimately results in a truce and semi-autonomy. A peace agreement between the MNLF 
and the state leads to increased support of the MILF in the late 1990s (Bale 2003). The group 
also gained power due to its secluded mountainous hideouts in the southern Philippines and weak 
local presence of the Philippine government. In turn the MILF established Islamic communities 
with their own governing and judicial systems but continued fighting the state until a ceasefire 
agreement in 2003 (Vaughn et. al. 2009). While negotiations continued for several more years 
and resulted in a peace agreement and signed legislation in 2018, other splinter groups to 





continue the violence developed in between. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters 
emerged in 2010 and disrupted the peace process, targeting military and police in the Philippines 
and some evidence the group coordinates with other movements in the region (Chalk 2013). 
Another group develops as a splinter of the much larger Moro National Liberation Front 
but soon rivals the MNLF in its intensity and violence across the southern Philippines (CFR 
2009). The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) emerges in the early 1990s under Abdurajak Abubakar 
Janjalani and other leaders that spent time training and fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 
1980s (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007; CFR 2009). Janjalani, having studied in Saudi Arabia 
and Libya where he became radicalized, returned to the Philippines to recruit former MNLF 
members to rise up against the secular state (Niksch 2002). Janjalani died in 1998 in a clash with 
police in the Philippines and his brother Khadaffy replaced him until his death in 2006 during 
“Operation Ultimatum” led by the Philippine Armed Forces to disrupt ASG operations. Shortly 
thereafter the group posted a video on YouTube featuring the Janjalani brothers and asking for 
financial support for the ASG (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2008). The group is known for 
various acts of terrorism in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the Muslim-dominant 
areas of the southern Philippines. The group engaged in bombings, kidnappings for ransom, 
beheadings, and assassinations throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. The group’s first 
attacks came in the early 1990s against the town of Ipil in Mindanao and an earlier grenade 
attack that killed two American evangelists (CFR 2009; Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007). 
Other notable incidents include a bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in 2002 
and the bombing of SuperFerry 15 in Manila Bay in 2004, the Valentine’s Day bombings in 
Manilla, Davao City, and General Santos City in 2005, and a motorcycle bomb outside the 




assassinate President Gloria Arroyo after Philippine security officials discovered the plot in 2008 
(CFR 2009). One of the group’s few plots beyond the territory of the Philippines came in 2000 in 
the kidnapping of several foreign nationals in nearby Malaysia (Bureau of Counterterrorism 
2007). Figure 6.9 provides a map of these incidents.33  
ASG activity increased in 2010 with multiple attacks on civilians, humanitarian groups, 
Christian churches, and military and police personnel (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011) and 
despite leadership turnover the group maintained the ability to replenish its base of recruits 
among those discontent with the state in Basilan, Marawi, and elsewhere in the south (Banlaoi 
2010). An attack on the island of Basilan in 2010 included a vehicle-based improvised explosive 
device resulted in 11 deaths. Between 2011 and 2016 the ASG carried out numerous kidnap for 
ransom operations as well as a series of bombings on various islands in the Sulu Archipelago and 
                                                          
33 Various other terrorist groups identified in the GTD exist but perpetrated in most cases less than ten attacks in the time period under 
consideration. 




elsewhere in the Philippines (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011-2016). In 2014 the group’s 
current leader, Isnilon Hapilon, swore allegiance to ISIL (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2015).  
The group remains active and in the last few years carried out ambushes on the Philippine 
military, continued to kidnap for ransom, and execute those for which ransom demands were not 
met including citizens of Malaysia, Germany, and Canada. In May 2017 the Philippine Armed 
Forces launched an operation to capture Hapilon in the city of Marawi. The ASG and the pro-
ISIS Maute Group laid siege to Marawi resulting in 150 security forces, 47 civilians, and 800 
militants killed and 40,000 displaced by the fighting (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2018). Soon 
after President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2017 he initiated an “all-out-war” against Abu 
Sayyaf’s stronghold on Jolo Island and severely disputed the group’s operations for nearly two 
years. Yet in late 2018 reports suggested several members of the ASG leadership believed to be 
killed by Duterte’s operations in 2016 survived and are now leading a resurgence of the group 
and new kidnapping operations (Vanar and Golingai 2018). Eight alleged members of Abu 
Sayyaf detained in Malaysia appeared to be attempting a series of kidnappings for ransom off 
eastern Saban in Malaysian Borneo in November 2018 (Asyraf 2018). 
 Finally as with the cases in Sub-Saharan Africa presented in Chapter Five, the threat of 
ISIS entered the Southeast Asian region in the last few years. While the MILF and ASG are 
predominantly limited in their activity to the Philippines, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham 
is noted as an active threat in Indonesia and Singapore as well, though its activities are limited 
and as one expert noted in testimony to the US Congress, “There is at present no ISIS Southeast 
Asia nor has ISIS formally declared an interest in any Southeast Asian country…the presence of 
ISIS is expressed in the form of radical groups…who have taken oaths of allegiance to ISIS” 




the conflict suggest the group’s interests in the region are evolving with the introduction of 
additional resources to the region and local language-based propaganda, as noted by the same 
expert (Liow 2018). Reports of black ISIS flags flying from “every corner of the city” of Marawi 
in the Philippines and ISIS-linked suicide bombings in Jakarta around the same time of the siege 
would suggest support if not the presence of the terrorist network in the region (Griffiths 2017). 
Later in 2018 ISIS also claimed responsibility for a series of church bombings in Surabaya, 
Indonesia carried out by one family including two children (Jamjoom 2018), indicating the 
group’s activity in the region is minor but nonetheless active.  
Capacity in Southeast Asia  
 In response to JI, Abu Sayyaf, ISIS, and other threats in the region, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Singapore attempted legislative and military reforms to improve state 
capacity. As noted in previous chapters military capacity, measured through a general accounting 
of the strength of a state’s military force, and administrative capacity, measured through a series 
of proxies that account for both infrastructural and rule of law-driven concepts, are the primary 
focus of the analysis. In addition I consider how weaknesses in these two areas lead to factors 
such as repression and clientelism impacting the prevalence of terrorist movements in a state.  
 As with Chapter Five I focus first on administrative capacity in this section and consider 
significant legislative acts which give states in Southeast Asia the ability to distinguish terrorism 
from other criminal acts. I consider as well how those bureaucratic measures balance national 
security with criticism over broad powers and governmental overreach in the executive 
institutions across the region. I also consider informal approaches that attempt to mitigate 
terrorism and improve administrative capacity such as relationships with religious organizations 
in the state as well as de-radicalization programs. I then turn to military reorganization, the 




other movements in the region. A factor particularly important to capacity in Southeast Asia is 
coastal security and monitoring movements across the territorial waters of these four states. 
Where the states discussed in Chapter Five struggle with border security over porous land 
borders, Southeast Asian states encounter different challenges regarding border security over 
expanses of sea and ocean. Thus regional efforts are particularly important at coordinating and 
improving bureaucratic and military capacity in this chapter, the third area of consideration. 
Finally as with Chapter Five I conclude with a brief discussion of existing weaknesses in 
bureaucratic and military capacity in each state, particularly repressive behavior and corrupt 
practices.  
Bureaucratic Measures against Terrorism 
 To consider how states in Southeast Asia responded to the weaknesses in capacity 
exposed by terrorism in the region from an administrative perspective, I consider two general 
areas. All four states, like Sub-Saharan Africa, passed legislation in the last decade to establish 
definitions of terrorism as well as policies for charging individuals with various terrorism-related 
crimes, from financial support to the use of nuclear materials in a terrorist attack. Prior to the rise 
of Jemaah Islamiyah and other movements none of the four states have clear standards for 
handling terrorism from an administrative perspective, much like the Sub-Saharan cases post-
9/11. Another semi-formal bureaucratic effort across the four Southeast Asian states in the wake 
of dealing with groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah is the establishment of de-radicalization 
programs alongside counter-propaganda campaigns staffed by religious figures that call out the 
narratives and ideologies of extremist groups. Both policy approaches illustrate the 
administrative capacity measure of state capacity and how it varies across the four impacted 
states in the region. As with increasing the bureaucratic and legal capacity of Sub-Saharan 




capacity to effectively counter terrorist movements. These issues are discussed further in the end 
of this chapter. 
Legal Capacity: Legislating against Terrorism in Southeast Asia 
Legal Efforts in Indonesia and the Philippines 
In the days after the September 11th attacks in the United States, Indonesia developed 
legislation to improve administrative capacity in order to respond to terrorist threats active in the 
state. Local Islamist movements linked to international networks such as al Qaeda and after the 
2002 Bali bombing the Indonesian parliament passed the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law. Under the 
2003 version of the law Indonesia allowed for the detainment of suspected terrorists for a week 
and for the military to conduct arrests, discontinued after abuses by the army during the Suharto 
era. Weaknesses in the judiciary at the time though made the law’s requirement that intelligence 
gathering be approved by a judge an ineffective check on the military and the law (HRW 2003).  
In 2016 the Indonesian legislature took under consideration a plan to amend the 2003 
Anti-Terrorism law to provide for more cooperation between the National Police and the Army 
of Indonesia by allowing the police more leeway in taking preventative steps against terrorist 
groups and suspects (Johnson 2017). The Indonesian legislature eventually passed a revised anti-
terrorism bill in 2018, after two years of debate over several issues including the role of the 
police and the definition of terrorism. Pressure to pass an amended version of the 2003 
legislation came from a wave of suicide bombings carried out in Surabaya and Jakarta by the 
Islamic State starting in 2016 and a threat from President Joko Widodo in 2018 to issue an 
emergency proclamation if Parliament failed to pass the updated law (Da Costa and Kapoor 
2016; Arab News 2018; Diela 2018). Among the changes to the 2003 law, Parliament included 




investigation) and charge citizens for joining or recruiting for terrorist groups in Indonesia or 
outside the country (HRW 2003; al Jazeera 2018).   
The new law defines terrorism as using violence or threats of violence to create a “sense 
of terror or fear among the wide public; claiming massive victims, taking away freedom, 
properties or lives of other human beings, and/or causing damage or destruction of strategic vital 
objects, the environment, public facilities and/or international facilities” (Revised Law of 2003).  
Criticisms of the new definition include the fact the counterterrorism law could be used to target 
peaceful political activities of indigenous groups, environmental advocates, and religious 
organizations due to the wording regarding political dissent and property damage. In addition the 
prolonged pre-detention period raises concerns regarding the conditions of detention and the 
potential for abuse and torture of suspects (Adams 2018a). Therefore while the updated 
legislation does improve state capacity by adopting a clearer definition of terrorism, the potential 
for abuse of the law by the executive branch remains a concern in the state.  
Other legal measures taken by Indonesia to respond to Jemaah Islamiyah and other 
movements and build state capacity include the Presidential Regulation Number 46 in 2010 and 
the Intelligence Bill of 2011, both of which attempted to reorganize the counterterrorism and 
intelligence structures of the state to better respond to terrorism and other domestic threats to 
state security. In July of 2010 the Yudhoyono administration issued Presidential Regulation 
Number 46 in an effort to reorganize the counterterrorism structure in Indonesia. Yudhoyono 
established a new National Anti-Terrorism Agency responsible for “formulating policies and 
national programs, coordinating government offices…in the field of anti-terrorism by set up 
taskforces with members of government offices” including existing anti-terrorism units from the 




(Detachment 88) (Buchanan 2010). Regulation 46 raised concerns among human rights groups 
due to the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a “radical” group or individual and the 
military’s role in the enforcement of anti-terror legislation (Buchanan 2010).  
A year later in October of 2011 Indonesia passed a new State Intelligence Law to allow 
for greater authority for the State Intelligence Body (Badan Intelijen Negara or BIN) to intercept 
private communications, conduct surveillance, and wiretap suspects for organized crime, 
terrorism, and other criminal acts (Freedom House 2012). Versions of the bill appeared in 
Parliament for nine years but failed to receive enough support for passage due to widespread 
criticisms from civil society organizations, the media, and international groups due to the broad, 
ambiguous terms set in the legislation, though the Yudhoyono fought for the broadest version 
with the least oversight (HRW 2011a; ICG 2011). ‘Opponent’ for example includes any “party 
from inside and outside the country engaged in effort, work, activities, and action that may be 
detrimental to national interest and national stability” (HRW 2011a) which could potentially 
allow the state to use the law to target not only terrorist groups or drug traffickers but also more 
benign opponents of the states such as opposition political parties and protest groups.  
Similar legislative efforts at building capacity took place in the Philippines around the 
same time period as the state also encountered threats from Jemaah Islamiyah as a transnational 
movement and domestic terrorism by groups in Mindanao as well. In 2007 the Philippines 
enacted the Human Security Act that defines terrorism as “causing widespread and extraordinary 
fear and panic among the populace” and provides the state the power to arrest suspects of 
terrorism or supporters of terrorist groups without warrants and detain them without charges 




Like Indonesia however, the definition of terrorism in the HSA received criticism from 
various human rights organizations for being vague and ambiguous and has the potential for 
abuse of the freedom of speech for citizens of the state (Roque 2007; HRW 2007). Establishing 
the military as responsible for performing policing duties and operating without warrants for 
arrests and detentions of suspects also raises human rights concerns (Morallo 2018), though the 
ban on the use of torture, threats, and coercion of detainees included in the law received praise as 
a positive check on the state’s treatment of terror suspects (HRW 2007).  
In 2018 a series of amendments proposed in Congress met significant opposition over 
concerns that the revisions to the law are geared toward increasing the authority of new president 
Rodrigo Duterte beyond what is necessary to combat terrorism in the state. To quote a legislator:  
“These bills should be seen in the light of the Duterte regime’s recent ouster of the chief 
magistrate which places the Supreme Court under the thumb of the executive, its fake 
anti-corruption campaign that recycled venal officials close to Malacanang, its majority 
control over Congress, its war on drugs which is getting local and international backlash 
for taking away ordinary lives without the due process of law, its unjustified placing of 
Mindanao under martial law, [and] its heightened military attacks on peasant and lumad 
communities which have resulted in the escalation of extrajudicial killings and human 
rights violations” (Luci-Atienza 2018).  
Others criticized the proposed amendments to the law as well. The International Commission of 
Jurists lobbied to the Congress that the amendments would be “incompatible with laws and 
standards that prohibit unfettered surveillance power and arbitrary deprivation of the right to 
liberty and protect the rights to privacy, information, redress, and freedom of opinion and 
expression” (ICJ 2018). In addition the ICJ argues the proposed changes allow for military 
personnel to conduct surveillance and detain citizens suspected of terrorism. Five years after the 
passage of the HSA, the Philippines created legislation to support capacity in monitoring and 
stopping financial support for terrorism. The government passed two laws in 2012: The Republic 




laundering and allowed the Anti-Money Laundering Council to investigate bank accounts 
without a depositor’s knowledge (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013; Republic 10167).  
The second act, No. 10168, established the financing of terrorism as a stand-alone 
criminal offense in the Philippines in 2012. The law allows the state to freeze property and funds 
of individuals suspected of financing terrorism or acts of terrorism. In addition the act also 
permits the Anti-Money Laundering Council to investigate the bank accounts of suspects without 
their knowledge. Due to weak monitoring of the authorities granted this power groups raised 
concerns over ensuring the integrity of the investigatory measure (Bureau of Counterterrorism 
2013) though freeze orders by the Council are limited to twenty day periods (Republic 10168). A 
recent application of the law by President Duterte announced the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP)-New People’s Army (NPA) would be declared a terrorist organization and 
financial support for the CPP-NPA would become a criminal offense (PCOO 2017).  
Another piece of legislation worth considering in a discussion of the state’s effort to 
improve administrative capacity through legal measures is the 2012 Peace Framework 
Agreement, also referred to as the Bangsamoro Basic Law. For several decades the Moros in the 
southern region of the Philippines fought the state over land appropriation of ancestral lands and 
formed groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). Both movements spurred violence in the region and used terrorist 
tactics to fight for a separate Moro state. The Supreme Court of the Philippines declared the 
agreement to establish an autonomous political region for the Moros unconstitutional in the 
2000s. Under the Aquino administration in 2012 the state formed a Bangsamoro Transition 
Commission (BTC) to establish the framework for a peace agreement that both sides agreed to in 




A major feature of the agreement included the replacement of the existing autonomous 
region of Mindanao with a new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(BARMM) with its own government and greater autonomy on budgeting, law enforcement, civil 
liberties, and natural resources (Ximenes 2018). In 2015 44 members of the Special Action Force 
died in an encounter with the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom fighters, derailing 
progress on legislation (Marcelo 2018). In short the intent of the legislation included the 
establishment of a new bureaucratic structure with autonomy for a region of the state that the 
central government long struggled to govern due to cultural and religious differences as well as 
the exploitation of locals for the benefit of the state overall.  
Another four years passed however before legislation to meet the terms of the agreement 
made its way through the Congress of the Philippines. The Basic Law passed the Senate and 
House of Representatives in July 2018 and abolished the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao by creating a new governmental structure for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. 
Delays in the passage of the law four years after terms established in the peace negotiations led 
to breakaway groups in the region including the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Ansar 
al-Khalifa and the Maute Group taking up arms against the state (Bureau of Counterterrorism 
2018). The expectation is the Basic Law’s passage will end decades of fighting in the region 
which Duterte noted as an effort at healing the long suffering of the Moros and received support 
from leaders in Mindanao as well but see it as a milestone, not the end and will require 
adherence to the law by the state (ABS-CBN 2018). 
A final legislative effort to improve administrative capacity to consider is part of an effort 
to improve the investigating ability of the Philippine government. The state passed the National 




with overlapping counterterrorism authority had limited investigative powers, overlapping 
jurisdiction, and unclear, undefined roles in responding to and investigating terrorist attacks and 
organizations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017). Among changes made under the legislation 
include establishing regional offices in all provinces of the Philippines with a Head Agent and 
defined roles for each investigative unit in terms of specific types of criminal activity including 
terrorism (Republic 10867).  
Legal Efforts in Malaysia and Singapore  
Finally, the early legislative foundations for modern counterterrorism policy and efforts 
to build the capacity of the state are intertwined for the states of Malaysia and Singapore. As 
noted in an earlier section, Malaysia and Singapore once existed as a single entity until the 
Malaysian Parliament voted to expel Singapore from the Federation in 1965. Prior to their 
separation legislators in the Malaysian Parliament introduced the Prevention of Crime Act 
(POCA) of 1959 and the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960. The two acts served as the basis of 
criminal law in the state for several decades. The POCA of 1959 established the general legal 
structure for the state post-British rule and only briefly mentions terrorism, noting the act’s 
importance for “the more effectual prevention of crime throughout Malaysia and for the control 
of criminals, members of secret societies, terrorists, and other undesirable persons” (POCA 1959 
[2015], p. 7) with more specific details regarding terrorism left to the Malaysia Penal Code.  
The ISA of 1960 provided the state with expansive powers in terms of detaining suspects 
of crimes including terrorism during a national state of emergency in the early 1960s during a 
communist rebellion (HRW 2002). Under Section 73 of the law any police officer had authority 
to arrest and detain any person suspected of acting or preparing to act in a manner that could 




remained a regularly used law until its repeal in 2011(“Malaysia Repeals” 2011). The ISA 
allowed authorities to detain individuals for sixty days and an infinite number of two year 
extensions to the initial detainment. Individuals did not receive the right to a trial and the ISA 
included no process for judicial review (HRW 2002). Prime ministers and officials in Malaysia 
since 1960 used the ISA for political purposes to target opposition leaders, academics, unions, 
and religious, social, environmental, and women’s rights activists (HRW 2002).  
Meanwhile Singapore continued to use the ISA after its separation from Malaysia. Unlike 
Malaysia though, Singapore revised the legislation in 1985 and the law continues to provide the 
foundation for state security in Singapore. Singapore’s ISA focuses on providing the state with 
the power to preventatively detain individuals and suppress organized violence in Singapore 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009). The act specifically defines terrorist as anyone who 
possesses firearms or explosives in a manner that threatens public safety and the public order, 
possesses weapons without legal authority to do so, and anyone who “is about to act, or has 
recently acted, in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.” 
Anyone convicted under the ISA faces life imprisonment (Internal Security Act 2018). 
Both the POCA and the ISA have received criticism for violating human rights norms 
and the civil liberties of Malaysians and Singaporeans. In the case of the POCA, revised several 
times since 1959, the Home Ministry in 2018 announced plans to establish a special committee 
to review the POCA and other laws related to national security to ensure they are not being used 
for political purposes or to persecute individuals based on their ideology (“Special Committee” 
2018; “Malaysia Repeals” 2011).  
Meanwhile in September 2011 Prime Minister Najib Razak in Malysia announced plans 




(SOSMA) of 2012. Parliament passed SOSMA and replaced the ISA in July of 2012, though 
Razak allowed the ISA to be used in the interim to detain 13 individuals indefinitely for 
suspected links to militant groups in the country (HRW 2011a). The opposition in Parliament 
also raised concerns regarding the lack of inclusion of an amendment to allow judges to hold 
discretionary power over evidence submitted by the police to ensure torture or force are not used 
to obtain testimony or other evidence (Arukesamy 2015). 
Among the changes included in SOSMA after passage is a clause granting suspects the 
right to a fair trial and a maximum detainment period of 28 days after which the attorney general 
must provide a decision on the intention to prosecute and the charges to be brought against 
individuals. The 28-day period sub-section of the law must be renewed every five years to ensure 
the police are not abusing the provision and currently has been renewed through 2022 (Bernama 
2017). SOSMA also guarantees notification of next-of-kin and the right to a lawyer (SOSMA 
2015). The use of SOSMA to detain suspects came soon after its passage with the arrest of two 
suspects in February of 2013. The act immediately received criticism because of its arbitrary use 
and the fact one of those detained had been held for several years under the ISA (Amnesty 
International 2013), raising questions of if the effort to maintain the state’s capacity to detain 
suspects accomplished the stated goals of reform.  
SOSMA continues to raise questions among human rights organizations though for many 
of the same issues associated with the ISA. No judicial oversight exists in the first 24 hours in 
custody, access to a lawyer and next-of-kin notification can be delayed for 48 hours on the 
approval of a high-level police officer, and prosecution witnesses can remain anonymous and not 
subject to cross-examination at trial (HRW 2011b; Spiegel 2012). Further, the definition of a 




acts “detrimental to parliamentary democracy” (SOSMA 2015) which sets up the potential for 
abuse due to the vagueness of what to consider prejudicial or detrimental (Spiegel 2012).  
Both Malaysia and Singapore established other legislative measures to improve state 
capacity in addition to revising and replacing the ISA. In the case of Malaysia The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (POTA) of 2015 allows Malaysian authorities to detain those suspected of 
involvement in terrorist activities for up to two years and does not allow for appeal or judicial 
review of those detentions. A Prevention of Terrorism Board reviews each case instead. POTA 
received legislative approval shortly after a plot against the capital and the arrest of several 
suspects (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).  
The most recent piece of legislation in Malaysia introduced to improve the administrative 
capacity of the state to combat terrorism among other issues, the National Security Council Act 
of 2016 received legislative approval in December 2015. The act allows for the creation of a 
National Security Council, the establishment of specific security zones, and grants new legal 
authority to the Security Forces in an effort to improve the state’s ability to maintain security and 
stability in various regions of the state. The act allows the Prime Minister to declare areas of 
Malaysia as “national security areas” for six month periods when security is “seriously disturbed 
or threatened by a person, matter or thing which is likely to cause serious harm to the people, or 
serious harm to the territories, economy, national key infrastructure of Malaysia or any other 
interest of Malaysia, and requires immediate national response” (Buchanan 2016).  
In short the state’s ability to expand military capacity into particular regions of the state 
can be quickly implemented without legislative debate. Critics and leaders of the opposition 
coalition raised concerns that the NSC Act specifically blurs the lines between executive, 




the power to execute warrantless searches and arrests as well as impose curfews on areas of the 
state as well as suppress demonstrations by citizens (Buchanan 2016; al Jazeera 2016). Provision 
18 for example provides the Prime Minister the authority to establish security areas (Benedict 
2016). While military capacity to respond to terrorism quickly is enhanced with the NSC Act 
there is a degree of concern over leaders utilizing this authority in unproductive, non-democratic 
ways that could lead to repression of opposing factions.  
For Singapore a series of acts passes since 2006 specifically add legal definitions and 
penalties for terrorism to the city-state’s legal code. In October 2006 the Singaporean Parliament 
approved the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act which supports the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Under this legislation any individual 
“who intentionally and without lawful excuse delivers, places, discharges or detonates an 
explosive or other lethal device” in public places, state or government facilities, public 
transportation systems, or infrastructure facilities “with intent to cause death or serious bodily 
injury, or extensive destruction of such place, facility, or system that results in or is likely to 
result in major economic loss” (Terrorism Act 2008). In short the act, updated in 2008, clearly 
delineates who the state considers a terrorist based on actions taken in support of a movement or 
organization. The parliament amended the act to allow the government to respond to extradition 
requests (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2008) and any person in Singapore with knowledge of 
terrorism not provided to the state faces a fine or prison term (Terrorism Act 2008).  
Singapore passed two other pieces of legislation to support legal capacity efforts in the 
city-state. In August 2010 the Singaporean Parliament passed the Hostage Taking Act to support 
the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2010). 




hostage-taking including life imprisonment, death, fines, and caning (Hostage-Taking Act 2011). 
Most recently in 2017 the Parliament passed the Terrorism (Suppression of Misuse of 
Radioactive Material) Act which updates several elements of the 2007 act including language 
regarding nuclear and radioactive material. Possession of such material can result in a sentence 
of life in prison while threats to “do any act that would be an offense under section 6 or 7,” 
(Terrorism Act 2017) using radioactive material or attacking a nuclear facility, faces charges up 
to ten years in prison. The actual use of radioactive material to carry out an attack results in the 
death penalty while similar legislation regarding biological and chemical weapons is under 
consideration as well (Liang 2017).  
In short, in the wake of movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah in the 1990s and 2000s all 
four states in the region revised existing or enacted new laws to provide additional authority to 
the executive and judicial sections of government to improve the capacity of the state. Specific 
legal definitions and proscribed punishments for acts of terrorism allow each Southeast Asian 
state to improve administrative capacity by targeting terrorists and their supporters alike. These 
legal revisions parallel those discussed in the Sub-Saharan cases covered in Chapter Five and 
illustrate a similar approach across regions of the developing world to accounting for terrorism in 
the twenty-first century. Yet also as is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge in Southeast 
Asia is for states to not abuse their newfound powers as noted in cases in both regions. New 
bureaucratic tools improve state capacity but again, the flipside of this issue is the potential for 
using these tools to repress those not involved in terrorism. 
Semi-Formal Bureaucratic Measures 
 Also similar to the Sub-Saharan cases of Cameroon and Chad, states in Southeast Asia 
integrate their bureaucratic efforts with members of the religious community. While the focus in 




system, the latter Southeast Asian cases adopted de-radicalization and counter-propaganda 
programs in conjunction with their religious communities to both preempt recruitment and 
radicalization by terrorist organizations and work to safely reintegrate ex-terrorists back into 
society. All four states adopted this approach in one form or another with varying results. 
Semi-Bureaucratic Measures in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy includes not only military and bureaucratic 
operations but also prison reform, rehabilitation programs, and the production of counter-
propaganda (Gindarsah 2014). In the early years of the program Afghan veterans, members of JI, 
and those from smaller movements received de-radicalization “training” in a program that soon 
spread to prisons around Indonesia. The program revolves around the idea that radicals listen to 
other radicals and by providing inmates with an informed, welcoming approach to call out the 
inaccuracies of extremist Islamic ideologies, individuals will leave the terrorist life behind upon 
release (Schulze 2008). Other related programs such as Yayasan Prastasi Perdamaian build 
libraries in Indonesian prisons to provide those being de-radicalized with texts and religious 
teachers that challenge the key tenets of extremist ideologies (Yayasan 2018). De-radicalization 
or ‘soft approaches’ lead to the construction of large networks of paid informants and former 
militants that work to persuade other radicals though those involved with the program gain a 
degree of suspicion for their complicity in working with the state (Tyson 2011).  
In late 2012 Indonesia’s Minister of Law and Human Rights issued Regulation 99 in 
order to reduce the chances of recidivism by those released from prison. The new regulation 
required those convicted of narcotics trafficking, corruption, and terrorism to sign loyalty oaths 
to the Indonesian government, provide evidence and information to prosecutors, and exhibit 




Participation in the program to qualify for release includes a statement of loyalty which varies 
from prison to prison. For example, the Kedung Pane prison requires prisoners to sign a “Justice 
Collaborator Statement” also signed by a Detachment 88 official stating: 
“I the undersigned […] state truthfully that I am prepared to cooperate with law 
enforcement officials (police, prosecutors, Detachment 88) to investigate the crime that I 
have been accused of and I am prepared to help expose the crime I committed. This is a 
truthful statement and if I violate the terms of this statement I am prepared to be charged 
in accordance with existing laws and regulations” (IPAC 2013, p. 12).  
Indonesia implemented a de-radicalization program in their response to trying and convicting 
those involved with terrorism. As of 2013, Indonesian police arrested and tried around 700 
suspects for since the first major post-9/11 incident in Bali in 2002 (IPAC 2013).  
The efforts to de-radicalize have not been entirely without issue. Those opposed to 
violence and charged with supporting terrorists quickly signed on and benefited from de-
radicalization efforts while others such as the Bali bombers showed no interest in participation. 
No post-prison rehabilitation exists and a lack of skills, employment prospects, and money also 
result in former terrorists returning to their old networks (Schulze 2008). By 2018, it became 
clear the de-radicalization efforts by Indonesia are not foolproof. One report in 2013 suggested 
of some 270 released after serving their sentences, 28 have been re-arrested or killed in police 
operations related to counterterrorism (IPAC 2013), though other agencies report different 
figures due to varying definitions of arrests and convictions (IPAC 2013).  
In 2018 the Indonesian National Police admitted further incidences of recidivism. Out of 
1,200 convicts linked to terrorism since 2002, 300 are involved with de-radicalization programs. 
Yet the suspect of a terrorist attack in Bandung, West Java in March of 2017 had been released 
in 2014 after completing a de-radicalization program. Yayat Cahdiyat served two of a three year 




after his release in 2014 Yayat joined the Islamic State-linked Jemaah Ansarud Daulah (JAD) 
(Ramadhani and Aritonang 2017). Inmates responded negatively to the issuance of Regulation 
99 in 2012 and within a month a riot broke out at the Tanjung Gusta prison in Medan over 
several issues including the injustice of Regulation 99. The Minister of Justice capitulated by 
agreeing to only apply the regulation to those convicted after November 12, 2012 (IPAC 2013).  
Malaysia also implemented rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs in its prisons 
for those convicted of terrorist activity in conjunction with Muslim leaders in the state. In 
addition, the state established the Islamic Development Authority (JAKIM) to counter violent 
extremism among other issues related to the practice of Islam in Malaysia. Meant as an entity to 
promote Islam in the state, JAKIM has been accused of being a state apparatus of the ruling 
Umno party since the 1980s to push the state’s preferred vision of Islam with the Home Ministry 
having the authority to ban books, ban the use of certain words such as “allah” by non-Muslims, 
and JAKIM’s operation of a free-to-air televisions station, Alhijrah (Teoh 2017).  
Among other activities, JAKIM works to train teachers in mosques and Islamic 
institutions and to guide the implementation of Islamic family law among those of the faith in 
Malaysia’s thirteen states and three federal territories. The Razak administration allocated 
JAKIM and the Federal Territory Islamic Department 810.9 million ringgit (approximately 197 
million USD) (Hassan 2018). Participants are segregated from the rest of the prison population to 
ensure they are not influenced by those not participating in the program. The state works in 
conjunction with JAKIM (the Malaysian Islamic Affairs Department), psychologists, and NGOs. 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011; Star 2016). Malaysia established a de-radicalization center 
for rehabilitation of terrorists at the Kamunting Detention Center in Taiping to provide a 




two former prisoners in Tapah prison, held under SOSMA, and seven wardens of various prisons 
around the country, now being rehabilitated themselves under POCA, led to the need to create 
separate facilities for extremists (FMT Reporters 2017). By 2018 Malaysia’s deradicalization 
program succeeded in rehabilitating ninety-seven percent of those that participated according to 
Malaysia’s defense minister (“Mat Sabu” 2018). 
Concerns however with the scope and budget of JAKIM emerged in recent years. In 2017 
JAKIM faced criticism for overstepping its authority in seizing Malay and Iban-translations of 
the Bible owned by the Bible Society of Malaysia which it then refused to return despite a state 
order (Teoh 2017). In another case JAKIM refused to discontinue the program testing the 
genealogy of illegitimate Muslim children disputed in federal court but supported by the 
National Fatwa Council (Bernama 2017). In 2018 Prime Minister Mohamad announced 
intentions to review the work of JAKIM and make changes to the organizations budget though 
observers suggest the agency has approval of the people of Malaysia and interference with the 
organization could raise fears of the targeting of Malay-Muslim rights (Hassan 2018).  
Semi-Bureaucratic Measures in the Philippines and Singapore  
In the case of the Philippines the government established a counter-radicalization 
program, the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient Communities in 
Conflict Affected Communities), in 2010. Established by President Aquino for peace-building, 
reconstruction, and development in five thousand specific conflict-affected locations across the 
country, the program provided resources for those displaced by conflict, reintegration support for 
former combatants and terrorists, and development programs (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011).  
The program included the implementation of the Bayanihan Leaders Program in 2011. 




focuses on reducing the vulnerability of those living below the poverty threshold to recruitment 
by criminal syndicates and terrorist groups that ultimately require government expenditures and 
resources on national security that could be applied to other state-wide concerns if these 
organizations could be diminished (National Security Policy 2011-2016, p. 22). The program 
brings various members of the community including the Department of Education and the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development, local government entities, religious 
organizations, and youth groups together to educate communities about the threats of extremist 
organizations, their efforts to recruit new members, and identify propaganda from extremist 
movements (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011). The program has its roots in a successful 
program in the Bohol region that succeeded in eradicating insurgents in 2010 by reducing 
poverty, enhancing public services such as healthcare and education, and coordinating efforts 
between the security forces, local governments, and private sector (Brawner 2012). The program 
received national attention and local officials in Mindanao pushed for replicating the national-
local military coordination on the island and replicating mock security maneuvers, another aspect 
of the larger “Bayanihan” program (Unson 2017). The program continues under Duterte.  
Finally Singapore adopted similar semi-formal measures as those established in the other 
three Southeast Asian cases. The Religious Rehabilitation Group, formed in 2003, is a voluntary 
organization in Singapore that promotes tolerance and through programming seeks to provide 
counter-narratives to those pushed by violent extremist organizations in the state (Nasir 2018). 
Initially the group’s primary goal focused on rehabilitating detained Jemaah Islamiyah members 
and their families but broadened their scope to include those self-radicalized and supportive of 
ISIS (RRG 2016). Among those subjected to religious rehabilitation, none freed after counseling 




component of the RRG’s stated mission is to “correct the misinterpretation of Islamic concepts 
and dispel the extremist and terrorist ideologies they have been indoctrinated with…and help 
them come to terms with the fact that they have been misled” (RRG 2016). RRG counselors are 
certified by a selection board and require specialist degrees in counseling and psychology as well 
as being well-read in geopolitics. RRG also attempts to reach out to those recruited via social 
media platforms including Facebook, Youtube, and other platforms to counter false ideologies 
and message from terrorist groups (Song 2015). Singapore also encourages inter-religious and 
inter-ethic coordination and facilitates meetings between various communities and groups to 
build trust and address issues within the state (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).  
In 2016 Singapore launched the SGSecure Initiative and a smartphone application while 
the RRG launched its own application that allows users to ask questions and have conversations 
with RRG imams and counselors. The SGSecure Initiative focuses on sensitizing, training, and 
mobilizing Singaporeans during terrorist incidents (Nasir 2018). The Initiative provides all 
citizens of Singapore with advice on being aware of articles left unattended in public places, 
looking out for suspicious behavior by individuals, and signs of radicalization in family and 
friends (Ministry of Home Affairs 2018a). Downloads of the SGSecure application reached one 
million in the first year of operation but the government began efforts to move from raising 
public awareness about terrorism to increasing preparedness among individuals for terror attacks 
(Sue-Ann 2017). The RRG’s new smartphone app is geared toward deterring potential recruits 
by providing a counter-narrative to extremist propaganda posted online by ISIS and other 
organizations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). Individuals participate in private chats with 




now be proactive against those radicalized online (Salleh 2017), demonstrating an almost 
individual-level state capacity approach to counterterrorism in Singapore.  
 In summary the four cases under consideration in Southeast Asia adopted not only a 
series of legal reforms to improve bureaucratic and administrative policy but also worked closely 
with the religious community to build de-radicalization programs and counter-propaganda 
measures to supplement the legal capacity side of countering terrorism in the state. While 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore each revised or established definitions of 
terrorism and specific punishments for participation or support in terrorism-related activities, all 
four also established forward-thinking measures to attempt to inhibit recruitment of future 
terrorists as well as minimize the potential for those that serve sentences for involvement in 
terrorism to returning to violent extremism.  
Military Capacity Measures against Terrorism 
 As with the states of Sub-Saharan Africa considered in Chapter Five, the states of 
Southeast Asia also established new military units and structures as well as new policing 
priorities and programs to complement the administrative capacity -building efforts taken since 
the rise of JI and other movements in the 2000s. Regional and national level police forces are 
used in conjunction with specialized units of the state military to maintain border security, 
identify potential terrorists, and respond after attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah and other militants. 
Unlike the Sub-Saharan cases however, there appears to be less evidence of informal 
arrangements with groups of citizens to combat terrorism in the region.  
Anti-Terrorism Units in Indonesia and Malaysia 
Indonesia established three particular units to support counterterrorism efforts in the state. 
First, the Indonesian National Police (INP) exists as a Ministry in the Indonesian government 




police to separate the organization from the military to establish a civilian force and improved 
efforts at community policing and crime prevention (INTERPOL 2018). The INP continued to 
struggle with issues of human rights abuses after the division from the military in 2000. For 
example in 2009 the INP faced accusations including the use of torture tactics such as electric 
shocks, sexual assault, and beatings during police interrogations and detention (Uppal 2009).  
Special Detachment 88, also referred to as Densus 88, is the second specialized branch of 
the INP dedicated to counterterrorism efforts. Established in 2003, Densus 88 came in response 
to the 2002 Bali bombings and through financial support for counterterrorism from the United 
States. The unit soon began investigating and deterring activities by Jemaah Islamiyah and 
arrested several of its members using DNA analysis and forensics rather than invasive and 
violent suspect sweeps through Central Java (McDonald 2008). However, like the INP, Densus 
88 forces have committed human rights abuses against terror suspects including torture and 
physical violence including kicking a suspect repeatedly in the chest in one case (Prasetyo 2016).  
Densus 88 remained active over the last fifteen years, particularly in response to a 
number of incidents in 2018. In May 2018 Densus 88 personnel attempted to arrest and then shot 
four terror suspects in West Java (Kahfi 2018). In response to the recent wave of attacks in 
Indonesia the chief of the INP, General Tito Karnavian, worked to increase Densus 88’s 
capabilities. At the end of 2017 Densus 88 received resources to add 600 extra personnel to 
monitor Islamic State activity and prevent lone wolf attacks in Indonesia (Kapoor 2017). 
Karnavin also requested in June of 2018 an increase of funding of the police budget from 
parliament by 44.4 trillion rupiah ($3.1 billion USD) in 2019 to expand Densus 88 to 34 




Finally, the Indonesian military maintains a role in counterterrorism as well. In June of 
2015 the Indonesian military (TNI) established a new counterterrorism squad called the TNI 
Joint Special Operations Command or Koopsusgab (Parameswaran 2015). The Koopsusgab is an 
inter-service team of eighty military officers from the Indonesian Army, Navy, and Air Force 
Special Forces units. The unit raised concerns however. After years of improving civil-military 
relations and police units such as Densus 88 taking over counterterrorism responsibilities, the 
Koopsusgab is seen to some as a reversion to the military-driven security of the Suharto era and 
a lack of coordination and separation between military and police responsibilities. The Institute 
for Policy Analysis of Conflict has argued though Indonesia should focus its counterterrorism 
efforts on building the capacity of Densus 88 instead of establishing a parallel military unit 
(Parameswaran 2015). 
Leaders suspended Koopsusgab operations within a year of its inception but in May of 
2018 President Widodo agreed to reinstate the unit to assist the INP with counterterrorism but 
under certain conditions: only when the National Police’s capacity was deemed inadequate for an 
emergency situation (Sapiie 2018). Democratic and military observers and activists in Indonesia 
continue to warn though that despite increased support for Koopsusgab operations after the 
attacks in Surabaya, steps should be taken to ensure the unit operates on a temporary basis only 
due to Indonesia’s history of military-involved repression (Anugerah 2018).  
In neighboring Malaysia leaders formed several specialized units and task forces in the 
last decade to combat threats from Abu Sayyaf, ISIL, and other terrorist movements. In 2009 the 
Prime Minister established the Special Task Force within the RMP to oversee counterterrorism 
efforts and terrorism-related investigations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2010). Formed in 2016 




Operations Force (NSOF) serves as the response unit to terrorist activity in Malaysia and 
incorporates elements of the Malaysian military and police. The unit allows for improvement of 
interagency coordination and information sharing (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).  
Malaysia established one unit, the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM), in 
response to an uprising and standoff with a militant group in 2013. The Malaysian government 
created ESSCOM to oversee security and respond to threats from pirates and militants from the 
southern Philippines in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE). The area consists of a 
1700 kilometer coastline that borders Indonesian and Philippine territory and includes a civilian-
led task force of 64 military, police, and civilian agencies (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2014). By 
the next year, 2014, the Malaysian government had established a maritime curfew along the 
entire coastal region of Sabah and announced the addition of 330 police officers and 350 army 
personnel to the ESSCOM force to continue securing the border region (Bureau of 
Counterterrorism 2015) though kidnappings for ransom by Abu Sayyaf in the Malaysian 
territorial waters continued into at least 2015 (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).  
Military Measures in the Philippines and Singapore 
In the case of the Philippines the Internal Peace and Security Plan called for a reform in 
security responsibilities across the state, moving internal security functions from the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines to the Philippine National Police (PNP). However even in 2016 the 
armed forces continued to play a lead role in counterterrorism as gaps in the capabilities between 
the military and domestic security services remain unaddressed (Bureau of Counterterrorism 
2016) though the PNP succeeded in November 2017 at thwarting an Abu Sayyaf plot to disrupt 
the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) world leaders as well as 




 Finally, in the case of Singapore Internal Security Department (ISD) is the law 
enforcement entity responsible for investigating and preventing terrorism in Singapore but is the 
primary law enforcement agency for the state overall (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013). The 
ISD’s powers of investigation are regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code, Official Secrets 
Act, Internal Security Act, and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and the organization 
dates back to the British colonial government and originally focused on dealing with subversion 
in the state (Minsitry of Home Affairs 2018b). Singapore maintains both military and domestic 
divisions of its security forces which provide external and border security for the state in addition 
to the ISD’s role in domestic security. While the Singapore Civil Defense Force are tasked with 
firefighting, emergency services, and emergency warning systems in the event of air raids, 
industrial accidents, or natural disasters, the Defense Force plays a role in responding to terrorist 
incidents as well (SCDF 2018).  
As noted in a Bureau of Counterterrorism report, “the government of Singapore has a 
‘not if, but when’ stance regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the city-state” 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). Thus several units of the state’s internal and external 
security forces are counterterrorism units. As with the other states discussed in this chapter an 
important element to Singapore’s counterterrorism efforts is naval and coast guard operations. 
The Singapore Police Coast Guard includes several units and squadrons as well as bases across 
the city-state. The Loyang and Lim Chu Kang Regional bases focus on the northern port waters 
of Singapore while the Brani and Gul Regional bases provide support to the southern port waters 
of the state. After a JI plot uncovered in 2002 indicated the need for increased maritime-based 
counterterrorism, Singapore increased port and ship monitoring for various terrorist threats and 




Anti-Terrorism Programs  
 In addition to the aforementioned military and police units with dedicated responsibilities 
for counterterrorism in the region three of the four states considered in this chapter developed a 
series of programs and reforms, in some cases in consultation with US representatives, to 
improve military capacity across each state in the region and improve border security. First in the 
case of Malaysia the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS) program coordinates aerial surveillance of the 
Singapore and Malacca Straits between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Malacca 
Straits, the world’s busiest shipping lane, also allows for monitoring of illicit trafficking and 
other potential security threats to Malaysia and its neighbors (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2008).  
For the Philippines improved monitoring of territory in the southern end of the country’s 
expansive territory allowed for increased military capacity in terms of minimizing the freedom of 
movement of terrorist groups and their supporters in the Sulu Archipelago and the island of 
Mindanao. In September 2011 President Aquino signed an executive order establishing the Coast 
Watch System to coordinate security and protect maritime boundaries against violent extremism 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011). With US assistance, the Philippines opened the National 
Coast Watch Center (NCWC) in 2015 to function as a strategic hub for maritime security in the 
southern Philippines (Parameswaran 2017). The NCWC coordinates policies and programs to 
secure border regions and trade traffic through the Sulu Archipelago and the Sulawesi Sea, the 
long-time safe-haven for groups such as Abu Sayyaf (Comer 2010; Porcalla 2011).  
With assistance from the US Department of Justice the Philippines improved policing 
through the Southern Philippines Law Enforcement Development Project and provided training 
to the PNP in policing and investigation techniques in several provinces as well as equipment for 




Counterterrorism 2008). In addition, the program included training for every individual officer 
serving in the critical areas of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao including the Sulu 
and Tawi-Tawi provinces and Cotabato and Isabela cities and specialized training for select units 
across the southern Philippines (Embassy of the US, Manila 2012) as well as a computer-based 
forensics systems to boost the state’s ability to collect and utilize evidence in pursuing criminal 
charges against terrorist groups and individuals (Chalk 2008). 
Finally, Singapore established the Changi Regional Command and Control Center to 
coordinate large-scale multinational operations and exercises and share information on regional 
disasters as well as strengthen networks of information with partner militaries in the region 
(“New Maritime Command” 2007). In 2015 to further the integration and coordination of 
agencies involved with border security in Singapore, the state announced a new Integrated 
Checkpoints Command system which includes land, air, and sea components and streamlines the 
chain of command for agencies involved with narcotics, immigration, and terrorism (Min 2015). 
In addition to improve military capacity and the state’s response to various threats, 
Singapore established a series of military readiness exercises that include terrorist attack 
simulations. The state conducts an annual sixteen-day readiness exercise referred to as Northstar 
which consists of a series of coordinated mock terrorist attacks on hotels and infrastructure 
across the country, simulating attacks similar to the bombings in Mumbai in 2008 (Bureau of 
Counterterrorism 2016). The 2017 edition of the Northstar Exercise included the first-ever large 
scale counterterrorism exercise at Changi Airport with a scenario responding to six gunmen and 
a suicide bomber on a simulated busy Saturday afternoon. The exercise resulted in the 
neutralization of the simulated terrorists and an improvised explosive device (IED) 




and civil defense forces coordinate their efforts in responding to the simulated attacks each year 
(Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). An additional annual exercise, APEX, tests the 
government’s response to maritime terrorist incidents (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009).  
Internationally, the country hosts the Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Deep 
Sabre with thousands of personnel from twenty-one countries to improve coordination between 
states and demonstrate Singapore’s multi-agency program for responding to terrorists and those 
attempting to move people or materials through Singapore (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009). 
The 2016 edition of the Deep Sabre exercise included table top exercises with allies on 
intercepting cargo as well as an at-sea phase practicing the boarding, searching, and seizure of a 
vessel-of-interest (Task Force 73 2016). Singapore also supported efforts to train Afghan 
civilians in counterterrorism strategies and improving administrative capacity elements including 
healthcare, civil aviation, and wastewater management (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009).  
In sum, like the cases considered in Chapter Five, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Singapore each implemented reforms to the structure of their military and domestic security 
apparatuses to improve military capacity in response to the threat of terrorism in the 2000s. 
While in some cases jurisdiction over counterterrorism moved to either the external or internal 
security apparatus of the state, in most coordination and integration of responsibilities replaced 
haphazard response plans and allowed for improved capacity and response to threats form JI, 
ISIS, and other movements across the region.  
Regional Efforts at Building Capacity 
 In addition to the national-level efforts carried out by the four states considered in this 
chapter, each is member to larger, sub-regional and regional agreements and organizations which 




and conventions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Southeast 
Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) headquartered in Malaysia. Other 
regional and international efforts such as Project Trace, a three-year initiative from 2017 to 2020 
supported by INTERPOL to build counter-terrorism capacity in the ASEAN member states by 
providing training, resources, and intelligence (INTERPOL 2017), exist as well but the ASEAN 
conventions and the SEARCCT are the most developed initiatives taken in the 21st century to 
combat terrorism in the region.  
ASEAN 
Members of ASEAN signed several agreements in the last twenty years to coordinate 
efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime in the region including the 2001 Declaration 
on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism as well as sub-regional efforts including the Agreement on 
Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines in 2002 to combat transnational crime and Malaysia’s joint effort 
at establishing its Regional Counter-Terrorism Center (Pushpanathan 2003). Members of 
ASEAN signed on to the Convention on Counter Terrorism in 2007 which specifically notes that 
“terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or 
ethnic group,” signifying the importance in the region of differentiating between religious 
movements and terrorist organizations and focusing counterterrorist policy efforts on violent 
extremists, not on repressing various entities in the state. In particular, the convention encourages 
states to work to prevent transnational terrorist activity including financing and the movement of 
resources through member state’s territory but also establishes jurisdiction over terrorist offenses 




All ten member states of ASEAN ratified the Convention by 2013 but had been in force 
since 2011 (“ASEAN Convention” 2013). A revised ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on 
Counterterrorism, introduced in 2017, expanded the region’s counterterror strategy (Bukit 2018) 
and in 2018 ASEAN announced a historic agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism which includes technical and regulatory 
assistance, financial intelligence sharing, and countering online radicalization in the ten states 
plus Australia (Manila 2018). Critics note though ASEAN fails to address the issue of thousands 
of Southeast Asians departing for the Middle East to join ISIS and later return to the region as 
trained combatants to support local terrorist movements (Bukit 2018). Others such as the Chief 
of Army for the state of Singapore argue that ASEAN militaries must improve the collective 
response to more than terrorist financing including chemical, biological, and radiological 
terrorist threats where joint efforts are still lacking (Liew 2018).  
Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) 
Malaysia established the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
(SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur in 2003 as a regional entity to support Malaysia and its neighbors 
in improving state capacity across the region and mitigate the threat of transnational terrorism to 
the region. SEARCCT provides training to Malaysian and other police and military forces and 
collaborates with other governments and international organizations. Specifically, SEARCCT 
promotes the idea that terrorism can be fought by more than military means through several core 
areas of training such as investigation, aviation and maritime security, cyber terrorism, financing 
of terrorism, and prevention and rehabilitation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).  
SEARCCT hosts hundreds of training events between 2003 and 2017 including seminars 




Counterterrorism 2015) and coordinates with other organizations such as the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime to increase regional law enforcement and collaboration on prosecutions of 
terrorism cases (UNODC 2011). SEARCCT also produces a series of publications encouraging 
various prevention and de-radicalization strategies. One example is “Don’t-Lah Wei!: A Peer-to-
Peer Resource Guide on Ensuring Your Kawan (Friend) Never Becomes a Terrorist” which 
includes chapters entitled “I Am a Female Terrorist-HEAR ME ROAR: The Terrorist Call to 
Women” and “So You Think You Can Dance Counter Terrorism?: Running a Counter Violent 
Extremism (CVE) Module for Young People” (Samuel 2018), demonstrating the state’s regional 
capacity strategy being centered on much more than military coordination.  
Findings and Continuing Weaknesses in Capacity  
Indonesia ranks 96th out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, therefore around the middle of the pack in terms of 
corruption in states around the world. While Indonesia’s democratic institutions grew after the 
fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 leading to multiple peaceful transitions of power 
including transitions between political parties. However, systemic corruption and violence 
against some minority groups continues. Indonesia also politicized defamation and blasphemy 
laws in recent years, repressing the freedom of speech of Indonesians (Freedom House 2017a). 
Corruption in Indonesia is present in all three branches of the government with Parliament 
widely considered the most corrupt institution with rampant bureaucratic corruption as well. 
However, in recent years the state’s Anti-Corruption Commission improved public perceptions 
and the business environment with several anti-corruption reforms. Decentralization of political 
powers shifted corruption from the state to the local level though and corruption in the judiciary 




Recent incidents include sending hundreds of members of a banned religious group to 
“reeducation” sessions, the arrest of thousands during non-violent rallies supporting 
independence for the Papua and West Papua provinces, and the use of defamation and 
blasphemy laws to target minority religious groups by regulating dress and behavior (Freedom 
House 2017a). Nine members of the persecuted Ahmadiyah religious community filed a petition 
to abolish the blasphemy law on the basis that it fuels discrimination and abuse of religious 
minorities. Indonesia’s Constitutional Court however ruled the abuses against religious groups 
occur due to ‘local regulations’ and enforcement, not the blasphemy law itself (Winowatan 
2018). In addition, in November 2018 Indonesia launched a smartphone application, much like 
the SGSecure app in Singapore, to allow mobile users to report individuals suspected of 
‘religious heresy’ and lists several religious groups as ‘deviant,’ risking further religious tensions 
and persecution of minority groups in the state (Harsono 2018).  
Indonesia’s counterterrorism law, argues Human Rights Watch, uses an overly broad and 
ambiguous definition of terrorism that allows for the targeting of indigenous groups and religious 
or political organizations’ political activity. HRW also criticizes the law for its extensive pre-trial 
detention period, giving law enforcement the authority to arbitrarily open and examine private 
mail and packages, and gives the Indonesian armed forces domestic policing authority without 
law enforcement training (HRW 2018a). In 2018 officials in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta 
authorized a new anti-crime campaign for one month allowing police to use deadly force against 
suspects resisting arrest. Officials instituted the ‘shoot to kill’ program after observing the tactics 
used by the Philippines Duterte in his “war on drugs” (Kine 2018). In addition, Indonesian 




over an eight year span in the Papua and West Papua provinces according to a recent report by 
Amnesty International with no consequences for the perpetrators (Amnesty International 2018). 
Malaysia ranks 62nd out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, just outside the upper third of states in the world. The same 
political coalition however has held power since 1957 by gerrymandering, encouraging and 
appealing to ethnic nationalists, suppressing criticism of the coalition through restrictive free 
speech laws and prosecutions of political opponents. (Freedom House 2017b). Several anti-
corruption reforms improved the state’s ranking including a judicial reform program aimed at 
driving out corrupt judges through improved monitoring of court proceedings and existing cases 
(McDevitt 2017) but elsewhere in the Malaysian legal world political opposition figures continue 
to face sedition charges for criticizing the government and the judiciary and in 2016 a court ruled 
against making public a report on Prime Minster Najib Razak’s mismanagement and 
embezzlement of a state development fund, 1MDB (Freedom House 2017b).  
 Recent incidents include the government’s arrest of several activists and organizers, 
shutting down independent news sites such as The Malaysian Insider, and the incarceration of a 
member of the political opposition for making public a report on the 1MDB scandal (Freedom 
House 2017b). The government also used the Sedition, Communications, and Multimedia Act to 
prosecute those that make ‘insulting’ comments on social media to Prime Minister Najib and 
members of the royal family (Melayu 2015). In early 2018 the Najib administration proposed a 
new “fake news’ law with various penalties in an effort to control any negative coverage of the 
regime (HRW 2018b). Before the bill could be passed into law however the Najib administration 
lost a May 2018 election and the state charged Najib with ten counts of breach of trust and 




counts of corruption for 45 million in bribes for government contracts (“Malaysia Charges” 
2018). The current government under the Pakatan Harapan coalition promised in 2018 to repeal 
the Sedition Act, deeming it “oppressive and unjust,” as well as the death penalty by the end of 
the year (HRW 2018c) While the Mohamad administration suspended the Sedition Act in 2018, 
the full repeal of the law has yet to occur (“Malaysia to Abolish” 2018). 
The Philippines ranks 111th out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, the lowest of the four states discussed in this chapter and 
thus the most corrupt. The election of Rodrigo Duterte and the subsequent assassinations and 
threats against activists, and overall corruption in politics limit the state’s capacity in spite of 
various reforms and policies. Extrajudicial killings and vigilante justice increased with the ‘war 
on drugs,’ resulting in the deaths of more than six thousand in 2016 (Freedom House 2017c). 
Investigations of numerous incidents find that the police routinely plant weapons and evidence 
including drugs and ammunition next to victims’ bodies though few follow-up prosecutions 
occur (Adams 2018b). 
Even when the Philippine National Police announced the suspension of anti-drug 
operations following revelations regarding the death of a South Korean businessman, Duterte 
immediately ordered the Armed Forces of the Philippines to “fill the gap created by suspended 
police operations by taking a frontline role in the anti-drug campaign” who then wear civilian 
clothes and balaclava-style facemasks, illegally enter homes, and beat or kill various targets 
(HRW 2017). The Philippine legal system tried cases involving police officers in 2018 including 
one case in which the court convicted three officers for the murder of a 17-year old from 
Caloocan City, caught on CCTV which contradicted the official story from the Philippine 




him in a dark alley while kneeling on the ground. The verdict is the first conviction of security 
force personnel since the initiation of the ‘war on drugs’ (Adams 2018b). In spite of various 
concerns with repression and extrajudicial killings Duterte vowed in July 2018 that the ‘war on 
drugs’ would continue and “be as relentless and chilling as on the day it began” (Conde 2018).  
Finally, Singapore ranks sixth out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, sitting only behind New Zealand, Switzerland, and a group 
of Scandinavian states as the least corrupt states in the world. While the state’s political system 
remains dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP) and the family of the current prime 
minister since 1959, the state experiences minimal corruption but also limited growth of 
opposition parties and freedom of speech (Freedom House 2017d). Early on in the state’s history 
though the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau investigated the Singaporean Police Force, 
rampant with corruption in the British colonial era, and by the 2000s resulted in very low rates of 
corruption in the state’s police force (Lee-Jones 2018). In 2017 for example, the Bureau 
registered an all-time low of 103 corruption cases state-wide (Lam 2018). 
The state experiences a very low level of corruption but the use of repressive tactics by 
the state remain an issue. Recently a 44 year old man openly supporting the Islamic State in 
Facebook postings and who recruited other Singaporeans to the cause faced charges under the 
ISA (“Singaporean Man” 2016) while another 22 year old woman became the first female 
detained in Singapore for radicalism in 2017 and faced charges under the ISA after her social 
media postings supporting ISIS appeared online (Ministry of Home Affairs 2017). Two others 
also faced charges under the ISA in 2017 for terrorism-related activities after evidence linking 




The act met significant criticism in recent years as well however. Several individuals 
including members of the business community and journalists called for reducing the authority 
of the state under the ISA including ending detainment without trial, phasing out caning and 
capital punishment, and not targeting individuals critical of the state for expressing their views 
publicly without violent intent (Salleh 2015). Singapore used the ISA to detain other individuals, 
reporters, and bloggers “on the grounds that comments they had posted on their personal 
Facebook pages violated rules on advertising during the ‘cooling-off period’ before a by-
election” and public events are limited in terms of whether or not “foreigners are involved, the 
topic to be covered is in no way related to race or religion, and the organizer is present at all 
times” (“Killing the Chicken” 2017).   
Conclusion  
 As the discussion in this chapter illustrates, the states of Southeast Asia adapted to the 
changing nature of the threat of terrorism in the twenty-first century through similar bureaucratic 
and military measures as discussed in the Sub-Saharan case in Chapter Five. Given that the rise 
of Jemaah Islamiyah dates back to the 1990s the states in Southeast Asia adjusted over a longer 
period of time to terrorism than those states examined in the case of Boko Haram. Newer threats 
though including al Qaeda and the Islamic State entering the region and local threats to states 
like the Philippines in the case of Abu Sayyaf and the MILF require continued adaptation to 
present circumstances.  
Reorganization of military and police units, redefining terrorism and establishing new 
legal statutes and procedures, and improving intelligence gathering and monitoring of terrorist 
activity all are examples of improved bureaucratic and military capacity taken on by the four 




organizations, namely the religious community, to provide support and access to information 
about the goings-on of at-risk individuals in the state also build state capacity. Each of the four 
states discussed here also require a maritime-centric strategy at building capacity with far-flung, 
disconnected territorial features that create conditions ripe for terrorist bases and hideouts. Thus, 
Malaysia’s Regional Center for Counterterrorism and ASEAN-based counterterrorism doctrines 
and policies support trans-regional coordination.  
Yet despite these various efforts to build bureaucratic, military, and regional capacity, 
problems remain as with the Sub-Saharan case, though not as evenly distributed as in the Lake 
Chad Region. Corruption remains a much more significant issue in Indonesia and the Philippines 
but comparatively less so in Malaysia and Singapore. Repression however is a central issue 
across all four states that remain Partly Free in Transparency International’s rankings. Each of 
the four states takes counterterrorism and efforts to reduce political violence in the state to the 
point of repressing certain minority groups and using anti-terrorism laws to further political 
goals, hindering both capacity-building and community trust in the state.  
Chapter 7, the conclusion to this dissertation, offers a comparison and brief discussion of 
how bureaucratic and military capacity, regional coordination, and weaknesses in state capacity 
vary between the Lake Chad region and the states of Southeast Asia considered in this chapter. 
The conclusion also provides a brief summary of the findings across all three empirical chapters 









Chapter 7: Conclusion: Findings and Future Avenues of Research 
Throughout the last several chapters of this dissertation I consider why terrorism has been 
more prevalent in some states but less so in other countries. As noted early on in this dissertation 
there is no clear consensus on the primary factors driving terrorism in the world today. While 
others focus on individual-level explanations of ideology or economic based grievances that 
drive terrorist activity in the state, I look at the status of the state itself as a driving factor in 
explaining terrorism in the developing world. Specifically I consider the strength or weakness of 
state capacity and how it increases or decreases the potential for extremist organizations to 
implement terrorist activity. Relating back to the predator-prey analogy presented in Chapter 
One, the state’s weaknesses lead to a situation where the state becomes the prey to an active 
terrorist organization. This leads to the growth of terrorist movements that challenge the state’s 
authority to rule and the ability to recruit members not satisfied with the status quo in their lives 
in the state.  
We cannot consider only one aspect of state capacity however. The abilities of the state’s 
military exist alongside the state’s administrative capabilities to govern. If the state finds itself 
incapable of deterring dissent and political violence and could fall victim to a particular terrorist 
movement or organization able to identify a strategic advantage. This advantage may be limited 
to a particular geographic territory as we see in the border regions surrounding Lake Chad in 
West Africa or a broader region where non-state actors can find an opportunity to operate and 
target the state at its weakest points as in the scattered island regions of Southeast Asia. Yet the 
state can also create conditions in which citizens become discontent with the state, particularly 
when the brutalization of citizens or corrupt practices by state institutions, lead to discontent in 




Summary and Comparison of Findings between Regions 
Chapter Four provided a broad overview of several factors of state capacity and offered a 
cross-national analysis of terrorism in the developing world between 1985 and 2012. After 
considering various factors against the number of terrorist attacks across Sub-Saharan, North 
African, and Southeast Asian nation-states, I found military capacity as well as repression are 
strong explanatory factors for increases in terrorist activity. Both consistently led to higher rates 
of terrorist incidents as states engage in increased military spending and repressive behaviors 
against their citizens. These findings are consistent with the larger body of literature on terrorism 
and capacity as well as terrorism and repression. Yet the results regarding my proxies for 
administrative capacity proved more complex to explain as the results of the cross-national 
analysis in Chapter Four suggests a relationship not entirely in line with the theory presented in 
Chapter Three. Other measures such as a proxy for infrastructural development in the state and 
corruption do show consistent negative relationships with the number of terrorist attacks in the 
developing world. 
I then chose to explore four of these elements of capacity, military and administrative 
capacity as well as repression and clientelism, further in Chapters Five and Six and found some 
qualitative evidence to support the broader argument that state capacity is a balance. In regards to 
the Sub-Saharan African case the states of the Lake Chad region implemented various legislative 
and structural policies to improve bureaucratic and military capacity after the rise of Boko 
Haram as a regional threat between 2009 and 2018. As the group grew in membership and 
organizational capabilities in northeast Nigeria the state slowly begins to adapt military and 
administrative capacity to respond to an internal threat in a sparsely populated region with a few 




allowed Boko Haram members to escape the authority of the state when necessary and continue 
to grow as a terrorist movement. By 2015 the group became a regional threat and begins to carry 
out attacks in the neighboring states of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that then also began to adapt 
their military organizations and legal structures to respond to weaknesses identified in the state’s 
capacity to stop the violence carried out by Boko Haram.  
 Elsewhere other regions adapted to the rise of terrorism in the 21st century. In Southeast 
Asia, the focus of Chapter Six’s discussion of the relationship between state capacity and 
terrorism, I found the states of Southeast Asia adapted to the changing nature of the threat of 
terrorism through similar bureaucratic and military measures as discussed in the Sub-Saharan 
case in Chapter Five. A longer history with facing the challenges of governing vast territories 
and threats such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf resulted in states such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore adjusting the major elements of state capacity earlier 
than those states noted in West Africa. Hence when presented with newer threats such as al 
Qaeda and the Islamic State entering the region the reorganization of military and police units, 
new legislation on defining terrorism as a crime and improving intelligence gathering capabilities 
had already developed to a degree in response to earlier threats to the region.  
 In both regions though there are some identifiable similarities in the response to 
improving state capacity in response to the growth of terrorist threats like Boko Haram and 
Jemaah Islamiyah. In the early years of the 2000s Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law, Singapore’s 
2006 Terrorism Act, the Philippines’ Human Security Act followed later by Malaysia’s Security 
Offenses (Special Measures) Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act expanded executive and 
judicial authority across the region to respond to terrorism with new legal definitions specific to 




movements. Later in the 2000s in response to the rise of Boko Haram the states of Sub-Saharan 
Africa discussed in Chapter Five introduce similar measures as well. Nigeria’s Terrorism 
Prevention Act, Niger’s Law 2011-11, Cameroon’s Law for the Fight against Terrorism, and 
Chad’s Law 034/PR/2015 all take similar actions as those laws introduced in the Southeast Asian 
states to expand executive and judicial authority on the specific issues associated with countering 
terrorism through the bureaucracy and legal system of the state.  
 As presented throughout this dissertation though, administrative and military capabilities 
go hand in hand in explaining state capacity. All eight states involved in these two case studies 
adopted various military reorganization policies and introduced new military and policing units 
to provide better-trained soldiers and officers that could respond to the threats presented by 
Jemaah Islamiyah and Boko Harm in their respective areas of the developing world but to 
varying degrees. In Southeast Asia that includes Indonesia’s Special Detachment 88 and 
Koopsusgab units as well as Malaysia’s Eastern Sabah Security Command and Eyes-in-the-Sky 
Program, the Philippines’ National Coast Watch Center, and Singapore’s Changi Regional 
Command Center. The latter two states do not have dedicated anti-terrorism units however. In 
West Africa this includes Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion, Niger’s Central Service for 
the Fight against Terrorism, Chad’s Special Anti-Terrorism Group, and Nigeria’s army divisions 
dedicated to operations in Boko Haram’s areas of operation in northwestern Nigeria.  
 All of the states involved in these case studies also incorporate regional-level components 
to their capacity-building efforts. In Southeast Asia all four states are members of ASEAN as 
well as the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism headquartered in Malaysia. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa the equivalents are the Economic Communities of West and Central 




established to directly respond to Boko Haram Activity in the region. All of these units and 
regional entities came in response to the development of terrorist movements in the state and 
exemplify responses to weaknesses in state capacity.  
 Of course there are a few broad differences across the two regions that suggest capacity-
building responses are unique to a degree to the context of the threat as well. In the Sub-Saharan 
African region all four states, to varying degrees, organized groups of citizens to fill in the gaps 
in the state’s military capacity and found success using vigilance committees to do everything 
from conduct patrols of prime bombing targets to collect intelligence as natives and locals 
invested in protecting their communities, an approach not taken by the states in Southeast Asia.  
Meanwhile the Southeast Asian cases adopt a drastically different approach in the form 
of de-radicalization and counter-propaganda programs. These states adopted an approach to 
terrorism in the region that not only includes creating legal structures to criminalize terrorist 
support and activity but also reform and rehabilitation programs to re-incorporate ex-terrorists 
back into society as well as counter-propaganda programs to try and expose the messaging of 
terrorist movements like ISIS as corrupt versions of religious ideology. While two of the Sub-
Saharan states, Cameroon, and Chad, notably coordinated with the religious community leaders 
as those in Southeast Asia do in terms of rehabilitation and counter-propaganda, the Sub-Saharan 
polices have been more geared towards information gathering and monitoring of religious 
activity than coordinating with the religious community to counter extremist religious 
organizations.   
A continuing area of concern across all eight states discussed in the previous two chapters 
though in terms of state capacity and terrorism center around two factors noted in Chapter Four 




particular the primary concern across both regions with new legislative doctrines governing the 
powers given to the state to combat terrorism is abuse of these powers to repress political 
opposition and the freedom of citizens to criticize the state. From abuses by Nigerian and 
Philippine police and military officers committing extra-judicial killings of those suspected of 
providing support to terrorists to Cameroonian and Malaysian authorities using laws to detain 
and imprison journalists and those critical of the state on social media, the state’s tactics in 
countering terrorism raise serious questions regarding the treatment of the public and state’s 
obligations to civil rights and due process. Additionally the wording of some of the previously 
discussed pieces of legislation suggests the state’s administrative components are being used to 
abuse the rights of citizens as well. The results identified in Chapter Four then regarding a 
positive relationship between administrative capacity and the number of terrorist attacks could 
possibly be explained by the abuses committed by those in power when the state uses its legal 
authority to suppress criticism of the state.  
 In summary there are general similarities and differences across the regions that highlight 
the relationship between state capacity and terrorism in the developing world. Military 
capabilities and repressive tactics remain consistent indicators of higher numbers of terrorist 
incidents in the developing world. States in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia restructured 
military and policing organizations to respond to new threats of terrorism but at the same time 
have been accused of abusing new authority granted through legislation to protect the citizens of 
their respective states.  
Yet through the two case study chapters I do identify some major differences in the 
approach to capacity-building and responding to terrorist threats to the state. In Sub-Saharan 




civilians into creating additional security units to monitor border areas and conduct official 
operations on behalf of the state. The result has been additional patrols to monitor territory and 
counter threats like Boko Haram along the porous border regions of Nigeria and Cameroon but 
also abuses have been committed by some of those involved with the vigilance committees 
against the civilians the state expects them to protect. In Southeast Asia in contrast the states 
have taken a more holistic approach to countering terrorism. 
From efforts to deter individuals from joining by exposing the extremist ideological 
interpretations of religions like Islam to providing rehabilitative programming for those caught 
and imprisoned for carrying out or supporting terrorist actions, states such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia attempt to identify the roots of the problem rather than the symptoms. While the data 
suggests these policy approaches are not silver bullets to the problem of violent extremism and 
terrorism, and a degree of recidivism does occur, the region as a whole experiences lower levels 
of terrorist activity comparatively than those in the Sub-Saharan African case.  
General Findings, Limitations, and Future Research 
In summary I turn to a brief discussion of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Three and 
what evidence I find to support each. In regards to the first hypothesis, as the state’s military 
capability increases, terrorism increases, there is considerable support presented across the 
empirical chapters that military capacity is tied to an increase in terrorist incidents but this 
relationship is connected to repressive tactics used by the state’s military and police forces in the 
effort to counter terrorism. As for the second hypothesis, as the state’s administrative capacity 
increases, terrorism decreases, the evidence is mixed. While in the statistical models the 
relationship is the opposite of that predicted, further investigation of administrative capacity 




those in power in the state. Using new legislation for example to repress those that criticize or 
challenge the state appears to have some relationship with terrorist activity. Therefore the 
hypotheses more democratic regimes where citizens participate in institutions reduce terrorism 
and as states increase their resources militarily and bureaucratically, terrorist attacks increase 
are likely explained by this same relationship between the state expanding its capacity to govern 
and secure its territory and abusing its authority to quash any criticism of those in control of the 
state apparatus.  
Finally, the last two hypotheses, states with low population density will experience more 
terrorism and clientelism actually decreases terrorist activity, require further investigation as 
well. In terms of population density no statistical significance was found in the cross-national 
chapter but logically the porous land borders in Sub-Saharan Africa and the vast coastal areas of 
Southeast Asia where the state is less present on a permanent basis and populations are sparser 
suggests these are weaknesses in the state that could be exploited by terrorist movements moving 
between geographically-concentrated areas. As for corruption and clientelism the relationship 
determined in Chapter Four is negative as hypothesized and terrorism declines in states with 
more corrupt institutions though as highlighted in the latter chapters I find corruption serves as a 
grievance in the state for a discontent population who could then be radicalized against the state. 
Therefore more exploration of this relationship is required to make a more definitive statement 
on the relationship between corruption and state capacity in terms of the impact on terrorist 
activity in the developing world.  
There are a few notable caveats to the methods and findings presented in this dissertation. 
For one there are limitations to the data available regarding infrastructural data in Sub-Saharan 




aspects such as the number and quality of public facilities or the kilometers of road or rail may 
be more enlightening for measuring infrastructure as an important element of administrative 
capacity, limited or unavailable data over time for states in the region of analysis in this 
dissertation precluded this approach. Other proxies beyond telephone service might offer 
different findings than determined in this dissertation and is an area of research to explore further 
in better understanding the relationship specifically between infrastructure and terrorism in the 
developing world.  
In addition, much of the analysis in this dissertation focuses on national-level events in 
terms of state capacity. In Chapter Four I provide a cross-national analysis to identify factors 
across states that are shared significant factors related to terrorism and terrorist activity in the 
state. In the latter chapters on Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia I focus predominantly on 
national-level polices established to counter terrorism and build capacity in the state. 
Considering sub-state variation, why terrorism occurs predominantly in northwestern Nigeria 
rather than in the southeast or why large areas with smaller villages in southern Niger and parts 
of Indonesia experience more acts of terrorism than cities like Singapore or Lagos could be 
better explained with multi-level modeling and focusing on resources available by state or 
province level. This would require new sources of data as well.  
There are then three general areas of future research to be pursued based on the findings 
in this dissertation. Administrative capacity and its relationship with terrorist activity should be 
explored in terms of considering sub-sets of the category. Legal capacity to respond to terrorism 
through non-military means and treat terrorist support and action through the criminal justice 
system, infrastructural capacity to govern all of the territory of a state and provide the expected 




potential avenues to consider separately. Second, corruption in the state’s institutions be they 
transitioning democracies or authoritarian regimes requires further exploration to determine if 
clientelism creates outlets to the grievances of citizens or is a grievance of the citizens 
themselves that drives participation in organized violence, or both. Finally, understanding state 
capacity at the sub-state level by incorporating new sources of data will help to understand how 
variation between the sub-units of a state result in terrorist movements that develop in one region 
of state remain predominantly active in that region rather than nation-wide.  
In short, if we return to the question asked at the outset of this dissertation, why has 
terrorism so far been more prevalent in some states but less so in other countries in the 
developing world, state capacity does appear to be a significant factor though the specific 
elements of state capacity that increase or decrease the likelihood of terrorist activity share 
different relationships to the phenomenon and depend to a degree on the context of the 
















Appendix A: Questions for Interviews 
Below are the questions for the preliminary interviews that were submitted to the IRB. 
 
Can you generally describe your current position and your experience working on the issue of 
terrorism?  
 
What factors do you believe are significant for why terrorist organizations emerge in different 
countries?  
 
What domestic factors in your opinion explain why terrorist organizations form in some 
countries but not in others?  
 
Are there any particular international factors that you, as an expert, consider explanatory for the 
development of terrorist organizations in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast 
Asia?  
 
Do certain regions of the world experience terrorism for different reasons? Please explain why or 
why not.  
 
How does the state’s ability to oversee its territory and citizens factor into the development of 
terrorist organizations?  
 











Appendix B: Full Regression Tables (with 1 Year Lag) 
 Table 4.3 State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain 
Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .019 (.003)*** -2.125 (.455)*** 
Military Capacity  .765 (.14)*** .017 (.187) 
Public Administration  .231 (.115)* .251 (238) 
Phone Service  -.060 (.032)* .026 (.037) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.175 (.538)* .002 (1.214) 
Repression .561 (.088)*** -.268 (.187) 
Corruption -.764 (.474) -.451 (.762) 
Population Density 
(Log) 
.019 (.076) .084 (.134) 
Constant -.290 (.497) .469 (.932) 
Observations  1387 
Non-Zero Observations 685 
Zero Observations 702 
Wald Chi Sq. 399.91*** 
Vuong Z-Test 8.32*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2794.001 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  





  Table 4.4: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit 
Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .019 (.003)*** -2.028 
(.377)*** 
Military Capacity  .696 (.146)*** -.073 (.214) 
RPA .595 (.663) -.302 (1.005) 
Phone Service  -.05 (.035) .005 (.040) 
Participation in Democracy 1.635 (.51)*** .612 (1.091) 
Repression .511 (.088)*** -.338 (.177) 
Corruption -.854 (.488) -.55 (.798) 
Population Density (Log) .031 (.079) .08 (.140) 
Constant -.506 (.888) 1.319 (1.495) 
Observations  1326 
Non-Zero Observations 662 
Zero Observations 664 
Wald Chi Sq. 362.92*** 
Vuong Z-Test 7.84*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2699.748 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.5 State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .019 (.003)*** -2.03 (.356)*** 
Military Capacity  .7 (.135)*** -.068 (.216) 
RPR -.146 (.298) -.265 (.464) 
Phone Service  -.064 (.032)* .001 (.042) 
Participation in Democracy 1.793 (.501)*** .697 (1.135) 
Repression .52 (.086)*** -.342 (.178) 
Corruption -.958 (.465)* -.508 (.774) 
Population Density (Log) .016 (.094) .067 (.148) 
Constant -.354 (.572) 1.3 (1.056) 
Observations  1326 
Non-Zero Observations 662 
Zero Observations 664 
Wald Chi Sq. 371.10*** 
Vuong Z-Test 7.97*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2700.966 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.6: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .019 (.003)*** -2.149 (.488)*** 
Military Capacity  .732 (.17)** .280 (.388) 
Public Administration .230 (.113)* .263 (.241) 
Military*Bureaucracy  .021 (.096) -.137 (.180) 
Phone Service  -.061 (.033)* .026 (.037) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.176 (.539)* -.122 (1.236) 
Repression .560 (.09)*** -.254 (.192) 
Corruption -.770 (.476) -.436 (.762) 
Population Density 
(Log) 
.02 (.076) .075 (.136) 
Constant -.277 (.507) .44 (.930) 




Zero Observations 702 
Wald Chi Sq. 273.31*** 
Vuong Z-Test 8.33 *** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2542.618 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.7: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain 
Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .019 (.003)*** -2.051 (.389)*** 
Military Capacity  1.483 (.622)* .527 (.89) 
RPA .841 (.705) -.094 (1.142) 
Military*RPA -.755 (.607) -.58 (.888) 
Phone Service  -.056 (.033)* .001 (.041) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.672 (.507)*** -.326 (1.104) 
Repression .513 (.09)*** -.326 (.181) 
Corruption -.952 (.479)* -.634 (.776) 
Population Density 
(Log) 
.025 (.081) .068 (.14) 
Constant -.699 (.924) 1.169 (1.476) 
Observations  1326 
Non-Zero Observations 662 
Zero Observations 664 
Wald Chi Sq. 373.67*** 
Vuong Z-Test 7.89*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2697.322 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  

































Table 4.8: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .019 (.003)*** -2.06 (.364)*** 
Military Capacity .59 (.356)* .626 (.507) 
RPR  -.151 (.311) -.477 (.451) 
Military*RPR .118 (.305) -.736 (.502) 
Phone Service  -.065 (.032)*  -.006 (.043) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.795 (.495)*** .755 (1.112) 
Repression .521 (.086)*** -.337 (.184)* 
Corruption -.978 (.450) -.581 (.769) 
Population Density 
(Log) 
.020 (.091) .022 (.145) 
Constant .349 (.576) 1.703 (1.01)* 




Zero Observations 664 
Wald Chi Sq. 417.21*** 
Vuong Z-Test 7.93*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2698.788 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  





Table 4.9: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions/Controls) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .018 (.003)*** -2.001 (.490)*** 
Military Capacity  .760 (.185)** .403 (.421) 
Public Administration .255 (.116)* .26 (.253) 
Military*Bureaucracy  -.011 (.093) -.182 (.185) 
Phone Service  -.035 (.035) .039 (.034) 
Participation in Democracy .955 (.515)* .057 (1.381) 
Repression .576 (.084)*** -.209 (.196) 
Corruption -.652 (.490) -.341 (.827) 
Population Density (Log) .035 (.081) .066 (.151) 
GDP (Log) -.147 (.053)** -.022 (.138) 
Chief Exec. Military Officer -.041 (.126) .122 (.386) 
Major Conflict  .288 (.229) -.333 (.746) 
Land Area .001 (.055) -.002 (095) 
Constant .494 (1.133) -.385 (2.049) 
Observations  1228 
Non-Zero Observations 610 
Zero Observations 618 
Wald Chi Sq. 1108.05*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2485.552 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  







Table 4.10: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions/ Controls) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .017 (.003)*** -1.977 (.438)*** 
Military Capacity  3.105 (.925)*** .757 (1.378) 
RPA 1.235 (.578)* .300 (1.104) 
Military*RPA -2.338 (.877)** -.741 (1.375) 
Phone Service  -.026 (.033) .02 (.033) 
Participation in Democracy 1.211 (.527)* .625 (1.234) 
Repression .523 (.078)*** -.302 (.191) 
Corruption -.906 (.417)* -.792 (.767) 
Population Density (Log) .079 (.084) .065 (.164) 
GDP (Log) -.177 (.051)*** -.05 (.152) 
Chief Executive Military Officer -.057 (.131) .373 (.381) 
Major Conflict  .334 (.194)* -.285 (.685) 
Land Area .095 (.059) .009 (.114) 
Constant -1.268 (1.198) .881 (2.158) 
Observations  1228 
Non-Zero Observations 610 
Zero Observations 618 
Wald Chi Sq. 535.23*** 
Vuong Z-Test 7.60*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2496.307 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.11: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions /Controls) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .018 (.003)*** -1.945 (.399)*** 
Military Capacity  .447 (.427) .573 (.547) 
RPR 0.013 (.339) -.476 (.444) 
Military*RPR .169 (.362) -.660 (.541) 
Phone Service  -.030 (.034) .015 (.037) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.49 (.491)** .996 (1.266) 
Repression .53 (.080)*** -.322 (.189)* 
Corruption -.919 (.426)* -.63 (.805) 
Population Density 
(Log) 
.086 (.085) .056 (.159) 
GDP (Log) -.152 (.055)** -.052 (.15) 
Chief Executive 
Military Officer 
-.036 (.135) -.226 (.097) 
Major Conflict  .305 (.24) -.226 (.789) 
Land Area  .047 (.059) .029 (097) 
Constant .378 (1.08) 1.340 (2.006) 
Observations  1228 (Non-Zero Observations: 610) (Zero Observations: 618) 
Wald Chi Sq. 535.23*** 




Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  




Table 4.12: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .017 (.003)*** -2.054 (.571)*** 
Military Capacity  .538 (.232)* .819 (.629) 
Public Administration  1.666 (.808)* .254 (.242) 
Military*Bureaucracy  .314 (.097)**  -.276 (23) 
Phone Service   -.055 (.032)* -.074 (.038)* 
Participation in Democracy .842 (.590) -.435 (1.361) 
Repression .619 (.088)*** -.273 (.186) 
Corruption -.686 (.484) -.158 (.810) 
Population Density (Log) .041 (.075) .063 (.157) 
GDP (Log) -.149 (.047)** -.001 (.136) 
Chief Exec. Mil. Officer -.049 (.128) .209 (.392) 
Major Conflict  .406 (.210)* -.673 (.823) 
Land Area .011 (058) -.028 (.102) 
Southeast Asia -.154 (.435) -.007 (.717) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.632 (.438) -.007 (.766) 
Constant .809 (1.119) -.089 (2.026) 
Observations  1280 (Non-Zero Observations: 633) (Zero Observations: 647) 
Wald Chi Sq. 957.26*** Log-Pseudolikelihood -2583.136 
Vuong Z-Test 8.13*** 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  







Table 4.13: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .016 (.003)*** -2.039 (.472)*** 
Military Capacity  2.795 (.807)*** 1.371 (1.728) 
RPA 1.348 (.807)* -.128 (1.270) 
Military*RPA  -2.099 (.782)** -1.109 (1.627) 
Phone Service   -.033 (.030) .059 (.044) 
Participation in Democracy 1.215 (.546)* .438 (1.193) 
Repression .543 (.082)*** -.369 (.196) 
Corruption -.953 (.424)* -.556 (.744) 
Population Density (Log) .083 (.085) .046 (.170) 
GDP (Log) -.178 (.050)*** -.036 (.153) 
Chief Exec. Mil. Officer .048 (.14) -.541 (.781) 
Major Conflict  .347 (.193)* .347 (.193)* 
Land Area  .095 (.061) .095 (.061) 
Southeast Asia -.152 (.39) -.152  (.39) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.336 (.374) -.336 (.374) 
Constant -1.096 (1.219) -1.096 (1.219) 
Observations  1228 (Non-Zero Observations: 610) (Zero Observations: 618) 
Wald Chi Sq. 1244.34*** Log-Pseudolikelihood -2482.384 
Vuong Z-Test 7.69*** 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.14: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-1) .016 (.003)*** -1.949 (.418)*** 
Military Capacity  .230 (.398) .814 (.615) 
RPR .101 (.302) -.604 (.476) 
Military*RPR .323 (.377) -.731 (.572) 
Phone Service   -.041 (.030) .048 (.046) 
Participation in Democracy 1.588 (.503)** .727 (1.237) 
Repression .561 (.081)*** -.373 (.193) 
Corruption -.987 (.443)* -.481 (.773) 
Population Density (Log) .105 (.088) .041 (.163) 
GDP (Log) -.159 (.052)** -.481 (.773) 
Chief Exec. Mil. Officer .022 (.135) .463 (.393) 
Major Conflict  .393 (.208)* -.448 (.892) 
Land Area .062 (.065) -.011 (.093) 
Southeast Asia -.501 (.482) .392 (.991) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.582 (.435) 1.029 (.78) 
Constant .543 (1.114) 1.025 (2.003) 
Observations  1228 (Non-Zero Observations: 610) (Zero Observations: 618) 
Wald Chi Sq. 804.55*** Log-Pseudolikelihood -2491.178 
Vuong Z-Test 7.85*** 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  








Table 4.16 State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 
(Basic Model) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .018 (.003)*** -.997 (.316)** 
Military Capacity  .866 (.152)*** .027 (.223) 
Public Administration  .279 (.134)* .518 (.293) 
Phone Service  -.068 (.042) .026 (.057) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.287 (.585)* -.574 (1.400) 
Repression .707 (.092)*** -.198 (.226) 
Corruption -.819 (.561) -.513 (.921) 
Population Density (Log) -.001 (.093) .163 (.156) 
Constant -.590 (.581) -.811 (.944) 
Observations  1338 
Non-Zero Observations 668 
Zero Observations 670 
Wald Chi Sq. 347.82*** 
Vuong Z-Test 6.23*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2807.569 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  






Table 4.17: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .018 (.003)*** -.927 (.288)*** 
Military Capacity  .778 (.157)*** -.128 (.234) 
RPA .587 (.817) -.385 (1.24) 
Phone Service  -.056 (.049) .004 (.069) 
Participation in Democracy 1.821 (.659)** .736 (1.289) 
Repression .644 (.096)*** -.290 (.210) 
Corruption -.951 (.575)* -.917 (.972) 
Population Density (Log) .01 (.103) .162 (.167) 
Constant -.666 (1.072) .687 (1.684) 
Observations  1279 
Non-Zero Observations 645 
Zero Observations 634 
Wald Chi Sq. 322.38*** 
Vuong Z-Test 5.85*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2712.832 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  








Table 4.18 State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .018 (.003)*** -.934 (.287)*** 
Military Capacity  .771 (.148)*** -.14 (.236) 
RPR -.091 (.334) -.133 (.595) 
Phone Service  -.066 (.047) .001 (.069) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.936 (.677)** .766 (1.342) 
Repression .65 (.092)*** -.297 (.207) 
Corruption -1.036 (.546)* -.811 (.93) 
Population Density (Log) .001 (.118) .149 (.174) 
Constant -.107 (.654) .420 (1.054) 
Observations  1279 
Non-Zero Observations 645 
Zero Observations 634 
Wald Chi Sq. 319.18*** 
Vuong Z-Test 6.01*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2714.489 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  





Table 4.19: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .018 (.003)*** -1.015 (.338)** 
Military Capacity  .84 (.212)*** .270 (.423) 
Public Administration .280 (.133)* .533 (.31)* 
Military*Bureaucracy  .018 (.122) -.120 (.187) 
Phone Service  -.069 (.043) .027 (.056) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.285 (.59)* -.671 (1.442) 
Repression .708 (.095)*** -.177 (.245) 
Corruption -.828 (.564) -.501 (.936) 
Population Density (Log) -.002 (.093) .153 (.158) 
Constant -.582 (.595) -.859 (.969) 
Observations  1338 
Non-Zero Observations 668 
Zero Observations 670 
Wald Chi Sq. 343.33*** 
Vuong Z-Test 6.27*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2807.172 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  







Table 4.20: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with 
Interactions) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .017 (.003)*** -.908 (.29)** 
Military Capacity  1.812 (.763)* .345 (1.034) 
RPA .922 (.741) -.095 (1.532) 
Military*RPA -.995 (.741) -.444 (1.012) 
Phone Service  -.061 (.048) -.003 (.071) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.832 (.661)* .671 (1.322) 
Repression .634 (.098)*** -.303 (.210) 
Corruption -1.059 (.567)* -.986 (.936) 
Population Density 
(Log) 
.009 (.105) .165 (.166) 
Constant -.929 (1.112) .248 (1.806) 




Zero Observations 634 
Wald Chi Sq. 349.69*** 
Vuong Z-Test 5.98*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2709.21 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  








Table 4.21: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit 
Model (Certain 
Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .017 (.003)*** -.93 (.287)*** 
Military Capacity .63 (.369)* .299 (.597) 
RPR  -.108 (.341) -.302 (.584) 
Military*RPR .158 (.334) -.459 (.590) 
Phone Service  -.068 (.047)  -.004 (.069) 
Participation in Democracy 1.941 (.666)** .779 (1.327) 
Repression .649 (.093)*** -.303 (.21) 
Corruption -1.068 (.115)* -.870 (.908) 
Population Density (Log) .007 (.115) .125 (.169) 
Constant .119 (.657) .725 (1.036) 
Observations  1279 
Non-Zero Observations 645 
Zero Observations 634 
Wald Chi Sq. 334.56*** 
Vuong Z-Test 5.97*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2713.119 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  


































Table 4.22: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions/Controls) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .017 (.003)*** -.957 (.337)** 
Military Capacity  .854 (.235)** .483 (.527) 
Public Administration .278 (.14)* .583 (.367) 
Military*Bureaucracy  -.018 (.115) -.22 (.225) 
Phone Service  -.04 (.044) .046 (.05) 
Participation in Democracy .959 (.593) -1.096 (1.695) 
Repression .723 (.095)*** -.104 (.249) 
Corruption -.709 (.616) -.266 (1.047) 
Population Density (Log) .035 (.097) .195 (.179) 
GDP (Log) -.165 (.07)** -.042 (.162) 
Chief Exec. Military Officer -.126 (.162) .06 (.504) 
Major Conflict  .162 (.293) -.905 (1.012) 
Land Area .001 (.062) .037 (.113) 
Constant .364 (1.281) -1.371 (2.436) 
Observations  1240 
Non-Zero Observations 619 
Zero Observations 621 
Wald Chi Sq. 411.21*** 
Vuong Z-Test 6.09*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2605.275 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  




 Table 4.23: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions/ Controls) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .015 (.003)*** -.812 (.235)*** 
Military Capacity  3.915 (1.028)*** 1.2 (1.746) 
RPA 1.568 (.697)* .734 (1.657) 
Military*RPA -3.061 (.967)** -1.234 (1.719) 
Phone Service  -.023 (.040) .023 (.044) 
Participation in Democracy .967 (.659) -.174 (1.471) 
Repression .601 (.082)*** -.294 (.202) 
Corruption -.932 (.495)* -1.273 (.884) 
Population Density (Log) .115 (.098) .261 (.187) 
GDP (Log) -.211 (.062)*** -.079 (.161) 
Chief Executive Military 
Officer 
-.032 (.175) .385 (.398) 
Major Conflict  .256 (.065) -.691 (.671) 
Land Area .136 (.065) .093 (.148) 
Constant -2.038 (1.405) -.981 (2.801) 
Observations  1189 
Non-Zero Observations 596 
Zero Observations 593 
Wald Chi Sq. 823.06*** 
Vuong Z-Test 5.78*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2491.941 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  







Table 4.24: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions 
/Controls) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .016 (.003)*** -.859 (.244)*** 
Military Capacity  .497 (.461) .367 (.636) 
RPR .058 (.392) -.345 (.542) 
Military*RPR .157 (.397) -.551 (.646) 
Phone Service  -.026 (.046) .023 (.049) 
Participation in 
Democracy 
1.354 (.639)* .522 (1.474) 
Repression .649 (.081)*** -.275 (.198)* 
Corruption -1.01 (.517)* -1.082 (.945) 
Population Density (Log) .112 (.101) .229 (.182) 
GDP (Log) -.18 (.179)** -.091 (.167) 
Chief Executive Military 
Officer 
.007 (.179) .430 (.389) 
Major Conflict  .198 (.299) -.670 (.77) 
Land Area  .067 (.070) .091 (127) 
Constant .062 (1.262) -.017 (2.271) 
Observations  1189 (Non-Zero Observations: 596) (Zero Observations: 593) 
Wald Chi Sq. 437.55*** 
Vuong Z-Test 5.93*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2508.933 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  
































Table 4.25: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional 
Dummies) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .015 (.004)*** -.865 (.385)* 
Military Capacity  .494 (.285)* .520 (.705) 
Public Administration  .383 (.121)*** .604 (.35) 
Military*Bureaucracy  .078 (.121) -.205 (.261) 
Phone Service   -.066 (.042) .058 (.051) 
Participation in Democracy .644 (.731) -1.546 (1.617) 
Repression .745 (.091)*** -.156 (.227) 
Corruption -.669 (.571) .01 (.1.035) 
Population Density (Log) .052 (.085) .203 (.173) 
GDP (Log) -.170 (.058)** -.041 (.155) 
Chief Exec. Mil. Officer -.144 (.165) -.019 (.489) 
Major Conflict  .357 (.245) -1.034 (.931) 
Land Area .01 (.067) .011 (.118) 
Southeast Asia -.121 (.479) .155 (.788) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.872 (.490) .373 (.1.04) 
Constant .872 (.490) -.1.366 (2.284) 
Observations  1240 (Non-Zero Observations: 619) (Zero Observations: 621) 
Wald Chi Sq. 685.26*** Log-Pseudolikelihood -2593.128 
Vuong Z-Test 6.17*** 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  













Table 4.26: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional 
Dummies) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model 
(Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .014 (.003)*** -.825 (.269)** 
Military Capacity  3.497 (.961)*** 1.556 (2.161) 
RPA 1.646 (.759)* .298 (2.006) 
Military*RPA  -2.768 (.902)** -1.485 (2.006) 
Phone Service   -.036 (.039) .043 (.063) 
Participation in Democracy .93 (.699) -.247 (1.414) 
Repression .626 (.084)*** -.323 (.203) 
Corruption -1.047 (.506)* -1.109 (.834) 
Population Density (Log) .113 (.097) .238 (.185) 
GDP (Log) -.211 (.062)*** -.075 (.162) 
Chief Exec. Mil. Officer -.006 (.188) .426 (.436) 
Major Conflict  .283 (.226) -.805 (.680) 
Land Area  .128 (.070)* .066 (.145) 
Southeast Asia -.043 (.449) -.155  (1.089) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.428 (.432) .657 (1.212) 
Constant -1.564 (1.501) -.758 (2.744) 
Observations  1189 (Non-Zero Observations: 596) (Zero Observations: 593) 
Wald Chi Sq. 1016.01*** Log-Pseudolikelihood -2488.212 
Vuong Z-Test 5.87*** 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  








Table 4.27: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies) 
 
Count Model (Non-Certain Zero) Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero) 
Terror Attacks (t-2) .015 (.004)*** -.851 (.25)*** 
Military Capacity  .220 (.413) .545 (.729) 
RPR .225 (.336) -.44 (.579) 
Military*RPR .3 (.394) -.678 (.663) 
Phone Service   -.043 (.043) .039 (.061) 
Participation in Democracy 1.364 (.700)* .263 (1.425) 
Repression .674 (.084)*** -.304 (.194) 
Corruption -1.105 (.539)* -.963 (.879) 
Population Density (Log) .134 (.1) .213 (.175) 
GDP (Log) -.187 (.064)** -.077 (.16) 
Chief Exec. Mil. Officer -044 (.186) .454 (.418) 
Major Conflict  .326 (.247) -.774 (.786) 
Land Area .079 (.082) -.054 (.119) 
Southeast Asia -.48 (.537) .572 (1.13) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -.796 (.486) .643 (.953) 
Constant .481 (1.405) -.016 (2.305) 
Observations  1189 (Non-Zero Observations: 596) (Zero Observations: 593) 
Wald Chi Sq. 625.41*** Log-Pseudolikelihood -2501.692 
Vuong Z-Test 6.03*** 
Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.  




Appendix D Measurement Notes  
6—As summarized by Hendrix and Young (2014), “factor analysis is useful for situations in 
which key concepts, like bureaucratic/administrative capacity, either cannot be measured directly 
or can be measured multiple different ways, each with varying degrees of construct validity—the 
degree of correspondence between the operationalizations in the empirical study and the 
theoretical constructs in the model—and measurement error. Factor analysis determines whether 
the interrelationships between a set of observable variables can be expressed by a smaller set of 
latent variables, or factors. Eigendecomposition yields orthogonal vectors (the latent factors) 
with eigenvalues corresponding to the common variance explained by the retained 
components/factors. Factors with eigenvalues greater than one are significant and explain an 
important amount of variability.” The results of the factor analysis are included in a table in the 
appendix of this chapter. 
7—Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score from the 2010 National Material 
Capabilities Data (Version 4.0) is used to measure the state’s material capacity to wage war. The 
CINC is comprised of several measures: iron and steel production (in thousands of tons), military 
expenditures (in thousands of current year USD), military personnel (thousands), primary energy 
consumptions (thousands of coal-ton equivalents), total population, and urban population (those 
living in cities with populations larger than 100,000 reported in thousands). Hendrix and Young 
(2014) argue the CINC score reflects both actual military capacity and economic as well as 
demographic factors of capacity. This establishes and upper bound of military capacity for total 
mobilization toward war and not a degree of mobilization which is more logical to consider for 
how a state counter’s the threat of non-state actors such as terrorist groups. The CINC also 
captures variation between sovereign states and not the state’s capacity to counter dissidents. For 
further discussion see Hendrix and Young (2014), p. 342. 
9— Components of the RPR score include the Economically Active Population, Unemployment, 
Activity Rate, Young Population, Social Security Revenues, Education, Urban Population, GDP 
per Capita, and Bureaucracy. Economically Active Population (the population engaged in the 
production of goods derived from Arbetman and Johnson (2008b) who use data from Taylor and 
Jodice (1982) and International Labor Organization (ILO) data), Unemployment, an Activity 
Rate (the unemployment rate subtracted from the economically active population rate), Young 
Population (the population between 0 and 14 years old, divided by the total population), Social 
Security Revenues (derived from IMF GFS data, the World Bank, and national sources), 
Education (gross secondary enrollment ratio for all programs per thousand people derived from 
the UNESCO Institute for Statistics), Urban Population (derived from the World Bank 
Development Indicators), GDP per Capita (derived from the World Bank in 2005 constant 
dollars), and Bureaucracy (share of government wages in total general government expenses 
derived primarily from Aretman and Johnson (2008b) who used the Government Finance 
Statistics published by the IMF, World Development Indicators, Europa Yearbooks, and national 
sources). 
10—Data is sourced from the World Development Indicator measure by the World Bank, 




(UNSD), the Global Indicator Database by the UNSD, and Government Finance Statistics by the 
International Monetary Fund. Further information on this measure can be found at 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/16845 
11—The codebook for the Relative Political Capacity dataset provides further detail on this 
measure but I provide a summary of the procedure here. The measure is established by first 
“defining each country’s distinct production function that specifies the output of an entire 
economy” and notes the political economic process that converts private capital and public 
spending into the total income of a country (p. 13). There are nine different dimensions of the 
public expenditure component: general public spending, defense, public ordering, economic 
affairs, housing, health, recreation, education, and social protection, derived from original 
COFOG criterion published by the UN in 1980. Second, coefficients are developed using the 
condition of profit maximization achievable by the government by allocating its public 
expenditures in accordance with optimal ratios. Two alternative estimations of the optimal 
allocative ratios are derived by running separate regressions on different samples of the data. The 
obtained beta coefficients are then used to construct a distance function as a “social allocative 
inefficiency score” for each country that allows measurement between the difference and the 
optimal public spending ratios. Finally, they calculate the RPA index from the obtained 
allocation inefficiency scores and normalize the measure to one as an average by using 
individual social inefficiency divided by its mean value, to maintain consistency with other 
measures in the dataset (See Kugler and Tammen 2012). 
12—The Varieties of Democracy corruption measures cover all countries and begins in 1900 and 
is based on expert surveys. The four different government spheres are weighted equally in the 
index and missing values for countries with no legislature are averaged using the other three 
measures. The individual measures of corruption (Public Sector, Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial) are formed by taking the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis 
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